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What do people talk about when they talk about climate change? This dissertation sets out to 
answer this question by focusing on local understandings of climate change and the policy 
priorities that result from them in Miami. Through a historical study that spans from the 1920s to 
today and 88 hourlong interviews, I demonstrate that climate change is a historically contingent, 
contested, and localized concept defined by power relationships. Through a historical 
investigation of the narratives that connect environmental policies with segregation and efforts to 
displace Miami’s Black residents over more than 80 years, I show how historic understandings 
of race and the environment inform debates about what climate change means and what to do 
about it today. This investigation shows how Miami’s current response to climate change has 
been shaped by its history as a colonial city built on the maximization of land value and 
exclusionary planning and policies. 
I find that dominant understandings of climate change in Miami have been rooted in 
concern for the effects of sea level rise on property prices, directing policy money toward 
 
 
shoreline areas while continuing to encourage a building boom that is accelerating gentrification. 
This set of responses is not haphazard. As my research shows, it represents a continuation of 
local and international patterns of exploitation. In recent years, however, a coalition of activist 
groups mounted an unprecedented campaign to force the city to include social and environmental 
justice concerns in its policy agenda. This coalition mobilized Miami’s history of 
environmentally-justified urban removal as a key counternarrative to policies that have 
historically ignored the problems of low-income areas, especially in Miami’s historically Black 
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 This project emerged from my desire to study the way that people talk about climate 
change. Having spent several years as a journalist covering climate debates as mostly through a 
partisan frame, I’d begun to suspect that there was a lot more to it than that. I initially assumed 
that people meant generally the same thing when they talked about “climate change”: the 
collection of warming gases like CO2 in the atmosphere causing global temperatures to rise. But 
when I read political speeches, or comments from people talking about their experiences, hopes, 
and fears, that premise started to look shaky.  Some people focused on what felt to be the most 
pressing climate change effect, like sea level rise, while others focused on technological debates, 
such as the viability of onshore wind power generation. People didn’t seem to be talking about 
the same thing at all. It made me wonder what studies of people’s opinions about climate change 
really showed. 
For my dissertation, I was interested in studying a place where policymakers across the 
political spectrum agreed that climate change was a problem and had committed in some way to 
implementing measures to respond to its challenges. In and around 2015, Miami made 
international news for the severe flooding it was experiencing as sea levels rose. During King 
Tide - when the waters are at their highest - streets were flooding even when it hadn’t rained. 
Striking illustrations would accompany articles in the media showing the iconic buildings of 
South Beach surrounded by blue seas - Miami’s pastel palette transposed onto an apocalyptic 
scene, with no human in sight. Similar depictions showed an art deco street completely 
underwater, with tropical fish swimming past. When I told friends I was thinking of studying 
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climate communication in Miami, most would nod and agree it was ‘ground zero’ for climate 
change. 
As I found when I started to attend climate policy meetings in Miami, however, the 
apocalyptic sublime was far from the minds of the people who spoke. Just as media coverage had 
suggested, sea level rise and its threat to real estate values were a major concern of policymakers, 
and shorefront residents worried about insurance premiums and mortgage payments. But for 
others, an entirely different set of worries was paramount: a lack of affordable housing, poor 
public transportation, and alarm at the social cost of hurricanes for people already struggling 
with poor housing, precarious jobs, and low wages. Even within a single city, the concept of 
climate change had very different meanings and consequences. 
Miami is one of the most segregated cities in the United States. Its early settlements were 
concentrated on South Florida’s coastal ridge, a continuous rocky spine that extends to the 
bottom tip of the state. As the city attracted more tourists, however, wealthy whites built hotels 
and homes along the shoreline while Black neighborhoods like Liberty City and Little Haiti were 
kept to high ground. Latino neighborhoods have spread out west into drained land that is prone 
to flooding. Deep and continuing segregation has created a fractured urban landscape in which 
physical experiences of climate change can be very different. In Coconut Grove, where the shady 
trees turn the streets into green tunnels and most people drive, extreme heat is not of such 






Figure 1: Miami remains one of the most deeply segregated cities by race and 
ethnicity in the United States (Justin Cable, “The Racial Dot Map,” Weldon Cooper Center 
for Public Service, University of Virginia, 2013) 
Beyond the ways that climate change feels different in different areas, I noticed other 
narratives emerge. Wealthier citizens might express optimism in municipalities’ capacity to 
adapt to climate change through planning and future technological innovations. This attitude is 
far less prevalent in areas like Liberty City and Little Haiti, which have received little investment 
for decades and are now new targets for developers due in part to their elevation. The concept of 
climate gentrification - the theory that developers now covet land that is relatively more 
protected from the effects of climate change - has become increasingly important in Miami. For 
some scholars, citizens, and activists, climate change and gentrification are as compellingly 
connected as climate change and sea level rise. Optimism in technological solutions and policies 
4 
 
is harder to muster in neighborhoods that have endured decades of displacement, neglect, toxic 
dumping, and overpolicing. 
Established narratives stemming from Miami’s history have become entwined with 
specific understandings of climate change and the priorities that emerge as a result. Different 
conceptions of climate change can reflect and reproduce power and powerlessness. They show 
that environmental policies can challenge or reinforce patterns of discrimination and 
displacement. In addition to conducting in-depth interviews over two years of fieldwork, I have  
systematically investigated an assortment of historical texts, policies, and spaces that show that 
deep connections between environmental policy, displacement, and segregation existed in Miami 
long before climate change became an object of concern. Dominant understandings of climate 
change tend to treat it as a shock – a phenomenon without history. But climate change is the 
result of centuries of exploitation of people and nature. By exploring how that history influences 
the development of climate change understandings in Miami, it is possible to explain how 
dominant interpretations may continue to perpetuate that exploitation. 
This exploration of the way local and global narratives come together in climate policy is 
relevant beyond the county lines of Miami-Dade. As the United States and other national 
governments’ climate policies have languished, city governments – mayors, disaster managers 
and sustainability professionals – have emerged as influential policy actors. Cities are a symbol 
of hope for environmentalists frustrated at decades of failure to tackle climate change at the 
international level. Mayors can take advantage of their large budgets and significant power to 
emerge as national and international climate policy leaders. At the same time, few US cities are 
changing patterns of growth and consumption that harm low-income populations, even as they 
introduce climate policies. Some cities’ policies have circulated – often uncritically – into 
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national and international debates as potent local examples of climate action, even if they present 
no substantive challenge to the status quo. In Miami, for instance, this has meant encouraging as 
much building as possible to fund adaptation measures through property taxes.1  
Communication is political. This study uses the case of Miami to show that imagining a 
city’s climate-changed future is a political act that can be conservative or subversive, egalitarian 
or exclusionary. By layering colonial narratives about race and the environment with later 
environmental justifications for the large-scale displacement of Miami’s Black population from 
coveted land and politicians’ environmental policies designed to attract newcomers while pricing 
existing residents out of the city, it is possible to see how discussions of climate change are 
suffused with power. Most people who care about climate change do not want to perpetuate 
segregation or enact displacement. But my research shows that an equitable response to the 
climate crisis is impossible unless communities specifically tackle historical injustices and 




1  Danielle Paquette, “Miami’s Climate Catch-22: Building Waterfront Condos to Pay for Protection against the 






Figure 2: A map of Miami-Dade County municipalities and the city of Miami’s 





1. Introduction: Environmental anxieties and racial 
discrimination in the Magic City 
1.1 The Bright Plan and green displacement 
“Oh! East is East: and West is West:” 
  —And though on magic feet— 
(As was sung by poet of wisdom blest) 
  “Never the twain shall meet.” 
 
But here ‘twixt gulf and ocean strand; 
  Where Nature lowers a mystic veil; 
Is a wondrous fair and a magic land 
  —Here the twain do really meet! 
 
For it is here: by the wise men planned: 
  —(Where the Old does not avail)— 
That the Gulf ebbs east: and the Sea wends west— 
  By the Tam-i-am-i Trail. 
 
Oh! Bronze is Bronze: and White is White: 
  —(Yet Bronze the first was here!) ... 
But Bronze seems wrong: and White seems right: 
  ...Through thrice a hundred year! 
 
Through the grass-grown ’glades,—high fronded blades 
  O’er channels’ flow, drop lotus bloom… 
The bronze man fades— 
    —As the petals from their plume. 
  In gloom—the cypress tower… 
    —And somber guard his tomb. 
And it is here—where the White has pressed! 
  —(Where the Old did not avail)— 
That the Gulf ebbs east: and the Sea wends west:— 
  By the Tam-i-am-i Trail. 
 
~George Merrick, “The Tamiami Trail,” Song of the Wind on the Southern Shore 
 
In 1920, Coconut Grove’s city council adopted a new plan with great pomp and publicity. The 
recently consolidated town a few miles south of the rapidly expanding Miami had hired the 
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services of Philadelphia architect John Irwin Bright. Bright was tasked with distinguishing 
Coconut Grove (spelled locally as Cocoanut Grove) from the rest of Miami by remaking it as a 
“garden city,” like Letchworth and Hampstead Garden Suburb in the U.K., or Canberra in 
Australia. Based on ideas laid out by urban planner and inventor Ebenezer Howard in his 
influential 1898 book Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Reform2, the garden city movement sought 
to solve the ills that the Industrial Revolution had caused in Britain’s urban and rural 
communities, such as poor health and low wages in the city and joblessness in the country. 
Howard aimed to achieve a happier integration between town and countryside through long-term 
planning that placed green and civic spaces at the center of healthier, more prosperous 
metropolises.   
Bright’s plan was different than other garden city visions, such as the federally-funded 
suburb Yorkship Village in Camden, New Jersey, which was constructed after World War I, 3 
because it imposed the ideal on an existing town, rather than planning a new city or suburb. The 
American Institute of Architects’ Thomas Adams called the plan to reinvent Coconut Grove “a 
work so tremendous in its implications as to transcend, in our opinion, any piece of town or city 
planning work ever done in the United States.” Bright had applied the garden city concept to “a 
town already in existence and which needs, as do thousands of our towns and cities, something 
more than the physically planned solution of their difficulties due to disordered growth.”4 In 
1920, Miami’s growth was certainly disordered, as Florida experienced a boom in land 
speculation fueled by nationwide advertising and encouragement from the state. Though 
 
2 Ebenezer Howard, Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform (London: Swan & Sonnenschein, 1898). 
 
3 Robert A. M. Stern, David Fishman, and Jacob Tilove, Paradise Planned: The Garden Suburb and the Modern 
City (New York: The Monacelli Press, 2013), 340. 
 
4 John Irwin Bright, “The Report for the Town of Coconut Grove with Foreword by Thomas Adams,” Journal of the 
American Institute of Architects 9, no. 4 (April 1, 1921), 110. 
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increased development had led to greater segregation, Coconut Grove was an older settlement 
where early residents of all races had lived in relative proximity.5 For Bright, this racial diversity 
was at the root of the disorder he perceived, depressing the value of white-owned property. He 
proposed that the ills of the Grove’s haphazard development could be resolved, and property 
values increased, with two measures: creating more green space, and relocating the entire Black 
population beyond the city limits. While most new garden city plans in the United States – many 
of them expressions of the country’s growing suburbanization – were implicitly for whites only,6 
the positioning of Coconut Grove’s Black community necessitated drastic intervention in order 
to achieve the desired level of segregation. For Bright, the town’s greatest problem came “when 
the question arose to the respective areas to be occupied by the white and the colored races… it 
was done without a proper realization of the influence the mere design of the areas could have 
upon the welfare of the town.” According to Bright, Coconut Grove’s Black neighborhood, 
called “Colored Town,” had “taken the form of a wedge… effectually dividing the town in to 
two parts.” He added: “The limitation of the desirable portion of the land whether brought about 
by a deliberate policy or thoughtless toleration leads to congestion and high prices and increases 
the cost of living for inhabitants.”7 Bright’s claims foreshadowed a process that would become 
familiar in Miami. As developers, officials, and planners began to covet previously neglected 
land occupied by Black residents, they would claim the land could be used more productively by 
white residents and wealthy business interests. Plans to displace Black residents from desirable 
 
5 N.D.B. Connolly, “Timely Innovations: Planes, Trains, and the ‘Whites Only’ Economy of a Pan-American 
City,” Urban History 36 (2009), 243–61. 
 
6 In Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, Kenneth Jackson noted in the development of 
U.S. suburbs a “tendency toward racial and economic exclusiveness.” While garden cities often aimed to achieve a 
mix of incomes – at least in principle – racial mixing was rare. See: Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The 
Suburbanization of the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 4. 
 
7 Bright, “The Report for the Town of Coconut Grove with Foreword by Thomas Adams.” 
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land, and other policies that achieved the same ends, became integral to this process. Further, as I 
will demonstrate, environmental policies and beliefs served to justify and naturalize patterns of 




Figure 3: The Bright Plan envisioned the displacement of the residents of Coconut 
Grove’s Colored Town to a model settlement separated from the white section by railway 
tracks and a ‘productive park’, as shown in the upper image (Design by John Irwin Bright, 
“The Report for the Town of Coconut Grove with Foreword by Thomas Adams,” Journal of 




Bright’s version of this plan used green space with a dual purpose: to control growth and 
to isolate Black residents. The drawings, widely circulated, showed in place of the Grove’s 
eclectic mixture of architectural styles, a plan for formal Spanish buildings and a mirror-lake. A 
“productive park” – an adaptation of the garden city principle of the agricultural belt – would 
encircle the town, allowing for cultivation, recreation, and growth control. To address the 
disruption in home values that he attributed to the placement of Colored Town, Bright proposed 
the removal of Coconut Grove’s entire Black population to the town’s outskirts, where they 
would be separated from the white community by the Florida East Coast Railroad line and a strip 
of parkland. The Kebo community, where Black residents of Bahamian descent had lived since 
the 1890s on land purchased from a platted homestead, would be destroyed to make room for a 
golf course. Bright estimated the purchase of Colored Town and moving its buildings at 
$211,800 – around $2.8 million today. The new Black Coconut Grove would be, essentially, an 
island.  
Many Black Grove residents suffered from a lack of infrastructure, few amenities, and 
poor sanitation – a situation perpetuated by the city government and absentee landlords as the 
community grew. This state of affairs provided a useful justification for displacement plans. For 
Bright, the new “Colored Town” – to be created from the “wilderness” on the outskirts of the 
Grove – would result in “a better living and economic standard” for Black and white alike. The 
existing buildings would be relocated to larger lots arranged around bath houses and a day 
nursery for working mothers. He did not envision that the new development would be 
independent, however. Nor would Black residents be much better off financially. He wrote: “In 
order to encourage independence of action without jeopardizing success a benevolent leadership 
might be very necessary. The profit to the negro will chiefly lie not in money but in the improved 
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living condition that will inevitably be brought about.” Bright presented an image of managed 
growth, and of civic and environmental harmony in Coconut Grove, achieved in large part by 
complete segregation and paternalistic governance.8  
The Bright Plan died as the bottom fell out of the swampland property market, a 
development played for laughs in the Marx Brothers movie, The Cocoanuts.9 In the end, the 
Coconut Grove Playhouse was the only part of the Bright Plan to be built. However, the Plan’s 
influence has been felt in subsequent attempts at Black removal, all closely connected with 
environmental policies and beliefs about nature. Miami has frequently been portrayed as an 
unplanned community sprawling into the Everglades and rarely saying no to new development, 
even at the cost of South Florida’s delicate ecology.10 This dissertation focuses on a parallel 
history, however: that of the community planners - many of whom have long been cognizant of 
the region’s unique and fragile ecology - who have sought to contain or at least direct Miami’s 
growth. Both Miami’s business community and its planners depended on the same thing: the 
existence of a low-paid and displaceable Black workforce. Black workers built the fantasyland 
its boosters used to lure tourists from the north and the railroad that brought them to Miami, 
cutting through South Florida’s thick vegetation, working coral rock, staffing hotels and white 
households, and digging mosquito control ditches. At the same time, Miami’s Black residents 
represented an important source of income for landlords, while their limited political power 
made displacements feasible.  
 
8 Bright, “The Report for the Town of Coconut Grove with Foreword by Thomas Adams.” 
 
9 The Cocoanuts, directed by Robert Florey and Joseph Santley (1929; Astoria, NY: Paramount Pictures). 
 




Further, even as planners and some developers wanted to manage growth, they were 
determined to guide it without slowing it down, ensuring that Miami could continue to attract tax 
dollars from development and wealthy new residents. From the late 1960s, Miami’s planners did 
not work publicly to displace populations, and many increasingly stated that they wish to prevent 
displacement. Yet, under the economic and policy conditions that practices such as redlining, 
low wages, and poor security for renters have created, these effects continue, even if apparently 
market-driven displacement now makes evidence of intentionality hard to find. Today, longtime 
residents of historically Black areas such as Liberty City and Little Haiti face displacement due 
to rising rents and taxes, developments that are due in part to concern from new residents and 
developers about sea level rise and other environmental pressures. 
In this dissertation, I explore the way environmental policies were and continue to be 
integral to discussions about displacement, the maintenance of racial difference, and the 
production of inequality. Planners, politicians, and scientists used the landscape and 
contemporary environmental anxieties such as urban pollution to naturalize theories of racial 
hierarchies, achieve segregation, and justify displacement. Later, policies aimed at reducing 
sprawl and encouraging urban infill put pressure on low-income, “inner-city” neighborhoods. 
These plans avoided discussing the city’s race and class dynamics, a tradition rooted in area 
boosters’ focus on ensuring new investors would not be discouraged by Miami’s potential for 
civic unrest. In more recent years, meanwhile, grassroots campaigns to link calls for 
environmental and housing justice have pushed displacement to the top of the agenda in public 
meetings.  
This chapter shows how, during the New Deal era and afterward, planners, developers, 
and politicians drew on colonial ideologies about race and the environment as they set about 
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creating formal structures of segregation, from redlining neighborhoods to efforts to displace 
Black residents. While the Bright Plan was never put into action, its influence was felt in local 
planning decisions in the years that followed: in parks used to create buffers between 
communities designated white and Black, in plans that combined urban and suburban living with 
agriculture, and in a singular focus on the relocation of Black communities to undeveloped land 
beyond the current city limits. In part, this was due to the influence of George Edgar Merrick, the 
developer of Coral Gables, the chairman of the Dade County Planning Board and, later, Miami’s 
Postmaster. In this broad array of roles, Merrick – on whom Bright’s plan was a likely influence 
– was able to use his influence to advance a greened version of segregation, helping to embed it 
into the fabric of Miami’s landscape. 
Large and hearty, Merrick was, according to Miami folklore, a dreamer, a master planner, 
and early environmentalist, a visionary who shepherded into being new model communities 
inspired by the garden city principles of space, beauty, and good building practices, despite the 
personal and financial costs he endured.11 Local history depicts him as an idealist who published 
poetry and imagined Miami as a tropical Eden. Part of the pioneer generation of Miami’s earliest 
days as a settlement, he wrote a collection of stories in honor of the traditions of the Black 
Bahamians he grew up with, which he titled Men of the Magic Isles, and their influence on how 
he believed Miami should develop.12 Other accounts show that, like his peers in the business and 
planning community, Merrick was also a segregationist. His plan to remove Miami’s entire 
Black population to far-flung “model negro communities” influenced Miami’s urban policies for 
 
11 See: Arva Moore Parks, George Merrick, Son of the South Wind: Visionary Creator of Coral Gables (Gainesville, 
FL: University Press of Florida, 2015). 
 
12 George E. Merrick, typescript of short story collection, Men of the Magic Isles, n.d., Merrick Collection, 




decades.13 He profited directly from the subjugation of Miami’s Black citizens, the funds from 
his developments for space-starved families subsidizing his exceedingly expensive dream to 
create a whites-only planned community, Coral Gables.14 Merrick’s plan to create a prosperous 
white community was long-lasting: To this day, Coral Gables remains 96 per cent white.15  
Merrick is often credited as a lone visionary battling against the follies of unplanned, 
unfettered development, but he owed the success of Coral Gables and the prominence of his 
ideas in Miami’s planning community to a range of factors, from his connections with the 
“pioneer” settlers and naturalists of early Miami to the inflated profits enjoyed by the city’s elite 
at the expense of Black communities crammed into tiny enclaves. Later, he benefited from New 
Deal largesse and new planning infrastructures that greatly benefited Florida during the 1930s. 
My work highlights the ways in which South Florida’s environmental history and Miami’s urban 
policy are connected. Merrick was both a boom town speculator and an advocate for garden city-
style planning who preached respect for South Florida’s natural features. 
Drawn from his history as a homesteader and fruit plantation owner, Merrick’s 
knowledge of and appreciation for Miami’s climate and ecology were essential to the shape of 
his racist agenda. His family moved to South Florida in 1898 when he was 12 years old. To 
encourage the colonization of the sparsely-populated area, the Homestead Act of 1862 offered 
settlers free land in South Florida. Merrick’s father Solomon bought a partially cultivated 160-
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acre plot from another homesteader.16 On his father’s fruit plantation, called Coral Gables, 
George Merrick worked alongside Black Bahamians who taught him to cultivate food, clear 
palmetto, and work coral rock, the limestone found in South Florida. Merrick called  the 
Bahamians he encountered while working his father’s groves the “way-showers,”17 teaching him 
about the Florida’s native flora as well as the plants they had brought with them from their 
homeland.18 This upbringing influenced Merrick’s view of Miami’s tropical ecology, his belief 
that development could occur in harmony with nature, and his romantic vision for a green 
version of segregation.  
Merrick’s background, therefore, was a colonial one, growing up alongside the expansion 
of US government control over the country’s least inhabited lands and overseas to Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines, the previous occupations Florida had experienced under the Spanish and 
French,19and the migration of Black and white Bahamians to the United States to work, fish, and 
cultivate land.20 Nineteenth-century pioneers continued the expansion of the North American 
frontier in Florida through colonization, land speculation, and aggression against Native 
populations, while replicating modes of colonial rule developed around the world by other 
imperial powers.  Merrick and his contemporaries extended colonial patterns of natural and 
human management into the administration of Miami, attempting to tame nature through 
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drainage projects, introducing plants from around the Americas for cash cultivation and 
ornament, and establishing Spanish revival architecture as a symbol of dominance over the 
frontier. 21 
Tourism and real estate were Miami’s two primary industries, providing the drive for the 
city’s growth and fueled by drainage, land clearance, and cheap labor.  The city of the 1920s was 
undergoing a land boom on the back Florida’s program of Everglades drainage. This reclamation 
exposed large tracts of land, and Miami became the base for new real estate offices as national 
land companies bought up the new expanses for agriculture and new subdivisions. The city’s 
population grew 440 per cent between 1896 and 1920 to 29,571. In 1923, a local survey showed 
that number had increased again to 47,000 inhabitants. Real estate prices skyrocketed.22 The 
events of the 1920s set in motion Miami’s unceasing reliance on real estate growth.  
Development became even more integral to Florida’s economy with the 1924 passing of 
a constitutional amendment abolishing state income taxes and inheritance taxes. This step locked 
the state’s counties and cities into a constant search for new development to fill their coffers, 
even as the limits of its ecosystems became more apparent. The state legislature prioritized two 
further markers of progress: the ever more rapid drainage of the Everglades and the completion 
of a road network that would bring more tourists south to the Sunshine State.23 
Miami’s rapid growth earned it the moniker the “Magic City.” Writers compared Miami 
Beach’s growth to a giant “mushroom” sprouting overnight.24 While Miami adopted and 
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marketed the title as its own, it was, in fact, indicative of a regional phenomenon; other “magic 
cities” included Roanoke, Virginia25 and Birmingham, Alabama. Like Miami, the railroad 
propelled these towns to unprecedented growth, with population outpacing the creation of 
infrastructure. Civic leaders neglected public services in favor of tax breaks for industries.26 In 
the 1880s, the editor of the Atlanta Constitution Henry Grady won national attention with a 
speech to the New England Society extolling the birth of a “New South” that was based on his 
book of the same name. He said:  
The old South rested everything on slavery and agriculture, unconscious that these could 
neither give nor maintain healthy growth. The new South presents a perfect democracy, 
the oligarchs leading in the popular movement; a social system compact and closely 
knitted, less splendid on the surface, but stronger at the core; a hundred farms for every 
plantation, fifty homes for every palace; and a diversified industry that meets the complex 
needs of this complex age.27   
 
“Magic cities” would transform the South, Grady believed, accommodating Northern industrial 
wealth and tourism alongside the old agricultural economy. Absent from Grady’s evaluation of 
the new cities was the tenacity with which they reproduced the racial ideologies of their older 
counterparts28 and replicated their repressive racial structures. Like their old South neighbors, 
these new cities depended on the low-wage work Black citizens provided at little cost to the city 
due to Black communities’ neglected infrastructure and the high rents they paid to landlords.29 
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 As in other New South cities, Miami’s boosters embraced the legacy of slavery as 
justification for segregation and engaged in hyperbole about southern hospitality, boasting of the 
“Miami way” or “Miami spirit.” Its ethos about social relations was similar to other southern 
cities, emphasizing urban growth and a rigid social order as mutually-reinforcing goods.  Local 
newspapers published reports celebrating growth while preaching racial harmony, and boosters 
expressed confidence in the future and concern for the greater good, which they insisted would 
be achieved through the strict enforcement of segregation.30 Merrick’s hopes for the future did 
not deviate from this marriage of growth and segregation, but he believed that careful planning 
and environmental policymaking could ensure the success and longevity of that marriage.  
Even critics avoided wholesale denunciation of the forces shaping Miami. Reformers like 
Commodore Ralph Monroe, a yacht designer and prominent early resident of Coconut Grove, 
criticized the tenor of progress but not Everglades drainage itself. He decried the city’s 
environmental degradation and its founding on the dispossession of the Seminole tribe. But he 
and other reformers like Napoleon Bonaparte Broward, who positioned himself against state 
handouts to railroad and development business interests, were still committed to the progress and 
development of urban Miami.31 For Broward, who became governor of Florida, enlightened 
progress was connected to drainage and the reclamation of the land beneath the water for 
farming.32 In his poem “The Tamiami Trail,”  Merrick elaborated on this vision of progress, 
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weaving together narratives that affirmed white settlers’ natural claim to the land, praise for 
South Florida’s landscape, and a call to exploit that landscape with drainage technologies: 
For by dredge and scoop—in vaunting dare: 
  They are drawing aside the door. — 
In the Everglades—will lay all bare 
  A fabulous treasure store!33 
 
The belief that both environmental quality and progress through growth could be simultaneously 
accommodated has persisted in Floridian attitudes toward the environment ever since.  
While he planned to eventually develop his own town, Merrick spent several years 
starting in 1912 developing tracts of land for Realty Securities Company. He eventually took 
over its development arm, working on subdivisions that included Kirkland Heights, Grapeland, 
North Cocoanut Grove, and Aqua Vista.34  Black citizens were mostly confined to a few smaller 
areas, the largest of which was Miami’s “Colored Town,” just north and west of the business 
district. Other settlements included the West Grove and Lemon City, north of the central 
business district. Expansion was no easy matter for Miami’s African Americans and Afro-
Caribbeans. Despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled racial zoning illegal in 
1917,35 both northern and southern cities sought new ways to enforce residential segregation. 
Planners became central to the effort. Cities like Richmond, Virginia employed planners as 
consultants to create strategies that completely separated communities designated Black from 
those designated white.36 Charles Knight, a Virginia planner, argued that the creation of “Negro 
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residential areas” need not prevent Black neighborhoods from thriving, advocating that they 
should be built with “all necessary municipal services,” from paving to police protection and 
open spaces.37 In practice, however, racial zoning was an effective tool for creating segregation, 
but rarely as efficient at producing improved communities.38  
Merrick’s career as a real estate entrepreneur and planner illustrates the tensions inherent 
in the interactions between planners who sought an improved form of segregation and developers 
who found that segregated housing was even more profitable when it lacked basic amenities. 
Unusually, Realty Securities also developed a new Black subdivision in a community called 
Railroad Shop’s Colored Addition – Railroad Shop for short – an area northwest of the city 
center where Black railroad workers had initially purchased property in the late 1890s. By 1915, 
Merrick had sold nearly 500 lots in the development, and Railroad Shop grew into a thriving 
community through the 1930s.  Following the example of planners like Bright and Knight, 
Merrick displayed an enthusiasm for amenities and opportunities within Black people’s 
segregated communities – albeit with limitations. His Railroad Shop subdivision would include a 
ten-acre park and a site for an industrial school.39  
Merrick was adept at the spectacular tactics his Miami contemporaries employed to 
attract new buyers, offering free transportation to sites and promising to give away thousands of 
dollars’ worth of gifts.40  However, local accounts often portray him as a breed apart from 
Miami’s other early capitalist carnival barkers like Carl Fisher, whose publicity ploys for his new 
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Miami Beach developments included the enlistment of elephants to carry building materials. 
When he turned to developing his own community, Coral Gables, Merrick aimed for a higher 
quality.41 His influences included Frederick Law Olmstead’s garden city suburbs, Tuxedo Park 
and Forest Hills Gardens, and especially the Shaker Heights suburb just outside Cleveland, Ohio. 
Like Bright, Merrick was also an avid reader of Olmstead, Daniel Burnham, John Ruskin, 
William Morris, and Ebenezer Howard, the planner of Letchworth in the U.K..42 Merrick 
adopted a similarly strong control over architectural styles, aesthetic choices such as paint color 
and landscaping, and zoning requirements including setbacks and driveways. He was also 
impressed by the fact that the garden city suburbs attracted a range of income levels.43  
Floridian developers at the time frequently harkened back to Spanish colonial building 
forms, seeing Spanish revival architecture as the natural style for construction in tropical regions. 
It came to dominate Miami’s expanding suburbs, reflecting colonial nostalgia and a desire to 
prove that Miami’s land boom was not a flash in the pan, but rather permanent, steady, and 
serious.44   
Merrick emphasized the supposed naturalness of the Spanish revival style in a front-page 
New York Times article intended to refute Northern criticisms that Miami’s growth was unstable: 
“Just how I came to utilize the Spanish type of architecture I can hardly say, except that it always 
seemed to me to be the only way houses should be built down there in those tropical 
surroundings." Merrick traveled to Mexico and Central America and became “more convinced 
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than ever of the possibilities offered by the adaptations of the Spanish and Moorish type of 
architecture. The gleaming white coral rock, the palm trees, tropical flowers and verdure seemed 
to me to provide a natural setting with which Spanish architecture alone would harmonize,” he 
said.45 Merrick’s architectural choices were meant to be there, he argued, gaining permanence in 
the landscape through their connection to colonial history. Aside from Spanish revival, Merrick 
incorporated Aztec and Mayan influences, as well as elements from other colonial nations such 
as South Africa. He, like other developers, adopted colonial practices such as the transplanting of 
ornamental plants and crops: Non-native palm trees from the Bahamas, Poinciana from 
Madagascar, and banyan trees from Latin America and India all contributed to a setting Merrick 
described first and foremost as tropical.  
But Coral Gables’ air of naturalness – from its Spanish architecture to its palm trees – 
was the product of a colonial fantasy made possible through the labor and skills of low-paid 
Bahamian workers planting flora from outside the region, and fashioning coral rock into bricks 
or laying limestone roads. Despite their importance in literally building the community, Coral 
Gables was a “sundown town” where Black people could work during the day (the Biltmore 
Hotel, for example, had a sizeable Black staff), but were not allowed at night without proper 
identification.46 Merrick, influenced by Shaker Heights’s mixed-income structure and the 
writings of Ruskin and Howard, believed Coral Gables should be accessible to people of 
different socioeconomic classes.  Like his contemporaries, he was not, however, interested in 
challenging the color line. For all his romantic writings about Black Bahamians’ knowledge and 
skills, his lobbying on behalf of a school for Black children, and his application for a pardon for 
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a former employee accused of murder,47 Merrick profited from segregation through his 
investments in Black housing. Merrick’s attitude toward Miami’s Black citizens was of a piece 
with the colonial-style paternalism that led Dade County toward ever more radical segregation. 
In 1926, just as Coral Gables was at the apogee of its fame, a Category 548 hurricane 
struck the boomtown. Many of Miami’s new developments were so poorly constructed they were 
totally destroyed. New arrivals were blindsided by the storm’s deadly second wind, which 
increased the number of deaths significantly. The storm burst the regional property bubble, 
crashing local markets, and sending shockwaves through national markets that would contribute 
to the Great Depression. Miami’s Black population, which served its white leisure industry in 
fair weather, was terrorized into rebuilding it in foul. As historian Marian Moser Jones has 
documented, Miami’s Black residents were spared the storm’s greatest initial impact because 
only whites were permitted to live by the sea. But Black citizens in Miami and the Everglades – 
where the storm had killed hundreds of seasonal workers – were forced to endure great 
additional suffering as whites demanded their free labor to clean up the city and dispose of its 
corpses.  The National Guard conscripted Black men and women in Colored Town, ordering 
them to join labor gangs and preventing them from rebuilding their own homes.  Anyone who 
failed to comply was threatened with beatings and imprisonment.49 
Like other Miami developers, Merrick depended on his investments in Black-only 
developments and the low wages he paid to Black workers to prop up his fortune, an 
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arrangement that the storm amplified. The 1926 hurricane ruined many of the land boom’s 
millionaires, and while Coral Gables’ well-built neighborhoods weathered the storm 
impressively, Merrick still lost most of his fortune as the costs of investments such as the 
Biltmore Hotel shot up. Merrick’s Coral Gables Corporation filed for bankruptcy in 1929, but his 
investments in Miami’s meager stock of rental property for Black citizens handed him an 
economic lifeline, the benefits of which he was keen to share.50 Addressing a group of real estate 
developers in 1937 to promote the construction of new Black housing units, Merrick said:  
 
Personally, I have handled several negro towns and know there is money in it! [...] I would not 
want any better monopoly than for me to be given the job of working this out in just one State of 
the Southeast. Let the Government give me a unit-loan facility on sound long-time base, and I 
can show any real estate Board the millions that are available in this! And in doing this kind of a 
job we can not only make Woolworth-Ford-type volume money but will make of this kind of 
population housing a blessing to our Southeast instead of the curse that its present housing is.51 
This speech showed how Merrick reconciled progressive justifications for segregation – or 
“population housing” – with the recognition of a business opportunity in the new political 
climate. In his next roles, he would apply this combination of approaches to a wholesale attempt 
to remove Miami’s Black population to the outskirts of the city. 
 
50 Connolly, A World More Concrete, 182. 
 
51 George E. Merrick, “’Real Estate Development Past and Future,’ Transcript of Address to the Southeastern 
Convention of Realty Boards,” November 29, 1937, RG 196, box 298, National Archives and Records Office. Cited 
in: John A. Stuart, “Liberty Square: Florida’s First Housing Project,” in The New Deal in South Florida: Design, 
Policy, and Community-Building, 1933-1940, eds. John A. Stuart and John F. Stack Jr. (Gainesville, FL: University 




1.2 The New Deal, the environment, and racial discrimination 
After the hurricane and the Depression, the New Deal’s focus on construction proved a 
boon for Florida’s economy. The state received a bounty of new funds from federally-backed 
projects thanks to  U.S. Senator Claude Pepper’s close relationship with the new President, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and its history as a region that had tied its economic fortunes to the 
health of the construction industry.52 These initiatives helped to promote economic recovery and 
community stability while furthering the interests of local elites. The New Deal engendered 
much that was positive, including closer working relationships between federal and state 
governments, but local governments also used New Deal funding, and the Federal Government’s 
preference for housing arrangements that preserved segregation, to further their own efforts to 
consolidate power.  
The flow of government money into South Florida did promote greater community 
cohesion and an economic recovery, both important goals of the New Deal. At the same time, 
however, local elites decisively shaped the content and implementation of federal projects. Thus, 
federal support helped to create a boom in local tourism and development, while allowing local 
leaders to undermine national priorities by promoting antigovernment views, as well as policies 
that increased racial and social inequality.53 Whether in the production of post office murals, the 
improvement of parklands by the Civilian Conservation Corps, the construction of the Overseas 
Highway that linked the Keys to the mainland, or the erection of low-cost housing in Dade 
County, federal funds reinforced existing economic, political, and racial hierarchies even as they 
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improved Miami’s infrastructure and amenities.54 All over the south, Democrats shaped the New 
Deal to conform with their priorities, particularly the maintenance of segregation.55 
Miami’s civic leaders took advantage of New Deal ideology to acquire federal funding 
for a new housing project, Liberty Square. Built between 1935 and 1937, the proposal gained 
traction with federal New Deal planners because unlike other plans that focused on groups that 
were relatively well-off, the Black-only development would further the New Deal goal of slum 
clearance, demolishing substandard housing to be replaced with better buildings.56  
Liberty Square’s origins lay in Miami business and civic leaders’ interest in clearing 
Colored Town, which they saw as an impediment to the growth of the small Miami downtown 
business district. In the early 1930s, developer Floyd W. Davis and his business partner, Judge 
John Gramling, formed the Southern Housing Corporation to apply for funds from the Federal 
Government’s new Public Works Administration (PWA) to build a Black housing site in 
northwest Miami, arguing that the new developments would help to ease the “menace” that the 
unsanitary conditions in Colored Town posed to the city. Miami’s business and political 
leadership widely supported the proposal, which Davis and Gramling submitted in 1933. Davis’s 
primary interest in the project came from the fact that he owned many of the unoccupied plats of 
land in Miami’s northwestern quadrant, where the development was proposed. Gramling was an 
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important city booster and used his position as a city judge to support of police clampdowns on 
Miami’s Black population.57 
Gramling frequently used public health arguments to promote the project in letters to the 
PWA, as the area’s unsanitary conditions left it rife with syphilis, tuberculosis, and influenza. He 
made it clear, however, that it was the white population that concerned him more than Black 
residents’ health. In October 1934, Gramling wrote: “This project will be one of the greatest 
blessings that Miami ever had. It will not only eliminate the possibility of fatal epidemics here, 
but fix it so that we can get a servant freed from disease.”58 While the initial proposal was 
unsuccessful, Liberty Square eventually received federal funding and the project was completed 
in 1937. Beginning with Liberty Square, Northwest Miami became the nucleus for relocation of 
Miami’s Black community beginning in the 1930s and continuing with urban renewal projects 
into the 1950s and 60s.59  
Merrick’s finances took a further hit from the 1935 Labor Day hurricane, which killed an 
estimated 408 people, including all of those working and staying at Merrick’s Caribbee Colony 
fishing camp on Lower Matecumbe Key. Dogged by charges of conflict of interest over his 
positions as both owner and commissioner of Coral Gables, Merrick received a vote of 
confidence, as well as much-needed income  when Governor Scholz appointed him to Dade 
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County’s first planning board in 1935.60 Planning boards, created by a legislative mandate, 
became central to the administration of New Deal programs across the United States. County 
planning boards passed proposals to the state and federal Works Progress Authority to acquire 
federal grants. At the first meeting, the board elected Merrick chair. His new position did not 
require him to give up his business, and he leveraged the appointment to help his projects 
prosper.61 These projects included roads, schools, drainage, post offices, infrastructure, and 
mosquito control. Many of the proposals he put forward, such as a police station, a fire station, 
and an art center, were within the borders of Coral Gables.  
Merrick’s big plans went beyond the removal of Miami’s Black population to its 
northwest quadrant. His Negro Resettlement Plan was part of a comprehensive planning study 
funded by the federal government and the county commission. He and the Dade County Planning 
Board proposed that three “model negro towns” should be built, one on the Western fringes of 
Dade County near the Liberty Square site, and two others west of Perrine to the south and west 
of Opa Locka to the north. The plan illustrated the dependence of Miami’s businesses and white 
households on the labor of Black citizens: Each of these areas was at least fifteen miles from 
Colored Town, but distance was not a problem, the Planning Board explained, since “an 
exclusive negro bus line service directly from these negro areas to the heart of Miami” would be 
established, permitting Black workers to get to domestic and service jobs downtown.62  
Promoters, including Merrick, claimed Black residents would prefer the new areas over the 
“slum sections” of Colored Town, which in turn could give place gradually to the logical white 
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development indicated by their geographical and other potentialities.”63 To Merrick’s mind, the 
destruction of Colored Town was not only natural and logical; Colored Town’s residents would 
indeed prefer their new surroundings. 
In May 1937, Merrick made a speech to the Miami Realty Board in which he outlined a 
vision for Miami’s future that combined his segregationist impulses with his hope for 
development that was sensitive to the region’s distinct climate. In addition to preaching the 
profitability of segregated developments for Black people, he painted a picture of Miami as a 
tropical city, quoting the pan-American views of deceased Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan, who had moved to Miami in 1912 and taken lucrative speaking engagements to promote 
Coral Gables for Merrick during Florida’s real estate boom. Under the presidency of Woodrow 
Wilson, Bryan had promoted deeper political and economic ties with Latin American countries.64 
Merrick predicted that “South Florida’s destiny lay to the south.” He argued that all of Dade 
County should have tropical planting just like Coral Gables and pushed for what would later 
become the Fairchild Tropical Botanic Garden. The Realty Board published the speech in a 
twenty-page booklet called Planning the Greater Miami for Tomorrow and distributed it 
widely.65  
Landscape was an important factor in a wide array of the projects that came across the 
desks of New Deal officials. The Civilian Conservation Corps – groups of itinerant young 
workers employed by the government – were an integral part of the New Deal, creating many of 
the parks and attractions associated with the South Florida landscape. Environmental planning 
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was woven, for example, into the calculations of local and federal officials working together to 
“redline” areas of Miami. The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was established in 1933 
to offer long term, low interest loans to those who could not secure regular mortgages or were in 
danger of losing their homes through default or foreclosure.  
HOLC appraisal committees, made up of local bankers and real estate professionals, 
surveyed urban neighborhoods assigning each to one of four categories from A to D. These 
decisions were plotted onto color-coded so-called residential security maps. In Dade County, 
local HOLC appraisers made surveys in 1936 and 1938. Areas designated as Black and Latino, 
as well as white areas that bordered them, received the lowest HOLC ratings. The top A or B 
ratings were reserved for a handful of wealthy areas: Miami, Miami Beach, and Coral Gables. By 
1938, local real estate businesses and banks had used the federal government’s neighborhood 
assessment protocols to redline all of Dade County according to racial demographics, effectively 
forcing minorities to pay higher rates than whites.66 
  In addition to judging the desirability of an area based on its racial makeup, the state of 
its infrastructure, and local amenities, the authors were concerned about the environmental 
hazards associated with settlement in certain areas. These designations articulated what has 
become increasingly apparent today: Many of Miami’s wealthiest communities – including Belle 
Isle, Miami Shores, and Venetian Islands – were particularly exposed to hurricane winds and 
storm surge. The difference was, while the presence of or proximity to Black Miamians was 
considered detrimental and significantly affected mortgage and insurance decisions, 
environmental concerns did not have the same effect on desirability. Belle Isle’s “A” rating was 
 




undamaged by its vulnerability to storm surge and hurricanes, while all areas designated Black or 
adjacent to a Black area received a “D” rating.67  
 
Figure 4: A redlining map of Greater Miami showing ‘A’-rated neighborhoods in blue 
along Miami’s shoreline despite their vulnerability to hurricanes (Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board, “Street Map of Greater Miami” (Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 1934), Residential 
Security Maps, 1933 - 1939, National Archives at College Park - Cartographic (RDSC)) 
The Planning Council’s papers gave an indication of the price of progress achieved 
through drainage – especially the level of maintenance demanded by drained land. Let us take, 
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for example, the area of mosquito control. Dade County’s Anti-Mosquito District oversaw more 
than 325 miles of ditches aimed at keeping salt marsh and domestic mosquito numbers down. 
Black work teams with white foremen went to work maintaining existing ditches, and cutting 
and dynamiting new ones. To the dismay of district administrators, the drainage of the 
Everglades worsened the mosquito problem. “Filled” land – land that had been drained and then 
raised through infill – was particularly hard to manage, the district’s 1937 report said, because of 
“a constant shrinkage of the land takes place and as it does, surface water stands and produces 
heavily, especially if it has a covering of grass.” The presence of so many mosquitos necessitated 
a constant battle against disease. In 1934, for example, there was an outbreak of Dengue Fever, 
and Dade County lived in fear of a resurgence of Yellow Fever in the United States as air traffic 
from Latin America increased.68 
While South Florida’s ties with Latin America increased fears of disease, it also offered 
opportunities to create new regional scientific alliances. Merrick petitioned the local Works 
Progress Authority and the Works Progress Weather Bureau to create a new infrastructure for 
hurricane alerts and evacuations after the 1935 storm. His requests included hurricane 
observation radio stations from the lower Keys to Lake Okeechobee. He also campaigned for a 
station in the Bahamas operated by the British colonial government and actively coordinate with 
the Belen observatory in Havana. Merrick argued that Miami would be the “logical center of the 
observation control area.”69 By 1943, the primary US hurricane forecast office was moved from 
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Jacksonville to Miami, creating a new National Hurricane Office, a precursor to the National 
Hurricane Center.70 
Miami’s landscape also became important to turf battles over Black zoning after Liberty 
Square was built. The developer, Floyd Davis, who had significant interests in the construction 
of properties for Black tenants, lobbied to build new developments further east, expanding the 
boundaries of the new Black neighborhoods toward white developments. Merrick and the rest of 
the Planning Board had argued that “the present eastern boundary of the Liberty Square project 
is as far east as the negro area should go,” and that Davis should be persuaded that he could sell 
the lots for a higher price to white people.71 To quell white fears about the expansion of Black-
only developments, developers like Davis proposed the use of landscaping. In a letter to the 
planning board, he argued that a park for Black people next to Liberty Square would be “well 
protected from the white section with a heavy bank of shrubbery along NW 62nd Street.” 
Meanwhile, a parallel street would be created for white people, separated by a “50-foot parkway” 
with heavy shrubbery and, if desired, a high woven wire fence down the center. A street for the 
Black community – devoid of cross streets that could enable Black and white people to cross 
paths – would run parallel.72 These parallel roads still exist today. The fence was constructed as a 
tall concrete wall, one of several “race walls” constructed around Miami.73  
Merrick’s influence on the Planning Board joined the New South racial priorities of the 
county’s white elite to the region’s colonial history and attitude toward ecology. Like the Bright 
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Plan, Merrick intended to expand designs to remove Miami’s Black population beyond the city 
limits, but he was also inspired by the writings of John C. Gifford, a part-time resident of 
Coconut Grove who also lived in Puerto Rico and the Bahamas. Gifford was a professor of 
forestry at Cornell University, specializing in tropical species. Merrick even suggested Gifford as 
one of his  preferred candidates to fill a post on the Dade County Zoning Board of Appeals, 
noting his  “labors in lines fundamental to intelligent planning and zoning.”74  For Merrick, 
Gifford’s work bolstered his opposition to the poorly-constructed housing for Black people that 
most real estate interests had favored. Merrick wrote: 
The life work of such men as Dr. John C. Gifford has essentially been used, as well as 
wide personal investigation through the Bahamas, Cuba, and through the West Indies by 
several of the members of the planning Council. It is believed that this negro subject, so 
fraught with the selfishness and greed of irresponsible promoters caring nothing for the 
future of the County, must be forever established along the lines set forth, in order to 
prevent a continual slum encroachment and sporadic development of such detached 
slums throughout our County. This is by all means probably the most necessary part of 
our County Long Range Plan to be forever fixed and settled.75  
 
The Negro Resettlement Plan envisioned the removal of Miami’s Black citizens to three “distinct 
county areas,” all of them over ten miles outside the Miami city limits: West Miami, west of 
Perrine in South Dade, and northeast of Opa Locka. Each location served a different purpose. 
The West Miami area, “free of any present white built-up areas or other white established 
construction or developments,” had good soil for “tree and vegetable purposes” as well as canals 
to provide drainage. The Perrine site was a “high rocky area adapted to the type of negro town 
referred to in the Bahama Islands, where the civilization is quite largely based on tropical fruit 
trees, which crowd each individual premise and yield a large portion of the families’ living. 
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Here, in addition to the usual fruit trees, such as avocado, mangos, guavas, bananas, cane, and 
papaya, etc., are the more unusual West Indian types embracing all of the anon family.” Finally, 
the Opa Locka site, at the time in an area dedicated to dairy farming, would provide cheap labor 
to the growing areas north of Miami, and North Miami Beach.76 
Lots would be zoned large enough (at least 100 feet by 100 feet) and in such a way as to 
avoid overcrowding. This commission hoped that the size would allow for families to grow their 
own fruits and vegetables, as well as raise small livestock, supplementing their incomes with 
subsistence farming. The commission also wanted enough architectural control to avoid “the 
ordinary shack-type from developing,” instead favoring “such design types as are in use in 
various Bahamian negro towns, where houses of sound proportion and attractive tropical 
appearance, and at a cost of around $500 have been in use through many years.” It argued that 
this zoning would encourage development along “model lines for a tropical community, 
somewhat as is done in […] negro communities of the Bahama Islands.” It continued:  
 
The cultivation of these tropical fruits in such a community would in great measure raise 
the standard of living of our Dade County negroes, make their home sites and entire 
towns attractive, encourage them into the use of our tropical advantages in many other 
ways to their economic and family good, but more than all else, will tie them to the soil in 
a more happy manner than they have ever been used to in Florida and will gradually build 
them into more loyal, capable and self-respecting citizens.77  
 
Gifford’s idealized view of Bahamian life accorded with Merrick’s. While Gifford was a 
conservationist, he did not see this stance in opposition to the view of development and progress 
Merrick and others shared. He even dedicated a 1911 book of essays on South Florida’s ecology 
to the late Napoleon Bonaparte Broward, the “father” of the Everglades drainage project, and 
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published it with the Everglades Land Sales Company.78 In one book, The Tropical Subsistence 
Homestead; Diversified Tree Crops in Forest Formation for the Antillean Area, Gifford laid out 
his vision for caste-based racial harmony through the spread of subsistence farming.79 He shared 
preoccupations with European colonial powers like the British, who devoted significant time and 
investment to planting crops from different countries in other parts of their empire, as well as the 
ability of white Europeans and North Americans to live in tropical areas such as the so-called 
“Torrid Zone” in which he placed the Bahamas and South Florida. But he was critical of the 
imperial model of crops tended by enslaved laborers, which he believed were recipes for 
environmental destruction and civil unrest.80  
Gifford argued that rather than try to impose “northern notions” on such regions, 
northerners should instead look to “the primitive man to learn how to support ourselves in case 
we are ever forced to go it alone against the wild.” For Gifford, the soil-depleting monocultures 
like tobacco and sugar that had been grown in the Caribbean and South Florida were inferior to 
farming with trees, which enriched soil.81 The ability to grow crops, Gifford believed, would 
raise standards of living sufficiently to stem “unrest leading to the ascendency of color.” He 
argued that low living standards and low pay posed a competitive threat to white hegemony in 
the Caribbean: 
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[T]he whites are losing and the blacks are gaining not because of climate but because the 
white cannot compete in such a low standard of living. The only way to correct this is to 
provide the black with small subsistence homesteads and by the proper kind of education 
to raise his standard of living.”82  
 
Gifford believed that this pastoral ideal should also be attempted in South Florida. By raising the 
living standards of Black residents – up to a point – he hoped it would fulfill the dream racial 
harmony while maintaining segregation. He wrote:  
 
A subsistence homestead demonstration area in Florida for the blacks is a good idea. It will serve 
as a sample for the whole Antillean Area. If properly guided by our government it will prove 
successful. They love the soil, are willing to work, and will probably strive to out-do the whites. 
They are fond of their homes and in south Florida you will find many unusual plants in their 
back-yards. In the cultivation of many things they are more successful than the whites and 
anything done to raise their standard of living will increase the demand for manufactured 
products.83 
 
Subsistence farming, for Gifford, entailed security from other ills. He said: “There are many 
people right now living on small tree homesteads in this Antillean Area who have never heard of 
the depression and were not in the slightest degree affected by the great World War.”84  In the 
same way, the Great Depression of 1929 proved to be particularly fertile ground for Gifford and 
other advocates of subsistence farming. Gifford’s book was released in 1934. Between 1933 and 
1935, the federal Division of Subsistence Homesteads created 34 New Deal-supported 
communities in places that included Phoenix, Arizona; Birmingham, Alabama; Reedsville, West 
Virginia; and Hightown, New Jersey, to encourage part-time farming in semirural 
neighborhoods. Inspired by the “back to the land” and garden city movements, the agency’s 
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director, Milburn Lincoln Wilson, cast subsistence farming as a cushion against the vagaries of 
the market, and garden cities as a solution to urban problems.85  
The spirit of cooperation did not extend to racial inclusiveness.86 The owner of Biscayne 
Gardens, a subsistence suburb, wrote to the Dade County Zoning Commission in 1941 to register 
his “unqualified objections” to a proposed development for Black residents in the northwest of 
Miami, to be named Magnolia Park. Biscayne Gardens marketed its one-acre tracts to middle-to-
low income whites for “$10 down and $10 per month.” For these white suburban homesteaders, 
however, their connection to the city was never in question. Biscayne Gardens promotional 
materials promised that residents would have security from the vagaries of the economy without 
having to give up work in the city: “An important consideration in getting ‘back to the country’  
is not to get too far back! Convenience to the city is important, particularly if you have 
employment there.” Photographs highlighted the natural bounty of the region, like an acre of 
papayas said to have yielded a crop of 100,000 pounds in a year. No farming experience was 
needed, according to the leaflet, due to the regular bulletins published by the Florida State 
Department of Agriculture instructing novices “what to grow, how and when to plant it, how to 
bring it to success.”87 
Arguments over whether new Black communities could be developed often hinged on 
incumbency and whether it could be argued that an area was originally Black or white. 
Alternatively, if the developer could contend that the area had previously been undeveloped – an 
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especially attractive quality to developers creating subsistence communities – the land could be 
zoned for either racial group. Developers like Davis would argue that areas like the Liberty 
Square site had been occupied by Black residents for many years, and that white neighbors had 
moved nearby knowing they were near a Black community.88  In contrast, Charles Brand, the 
developer of Biscayne Gardens , echoed the colonial ethos of other Florida boosters when he 
claimed that his company and customers had been “pioneers” in Dade’s backcountry: 
We should not have our property valuations lowered or the salability of the present 
development ruined for the benefit of a private enterprise that could well be located in an 
area where the direct harm would be negligible in comparison and an area where 
adjoining property, if and when improved, would be done so with the knowledge that the 
negro locality was then in existence. We created this development in an area entirely 
undeveloped and are continuously spending more money for the further enhancement of 
value of property in the area.89 
  
The Negro Resettlement Plan was not the only proposal Merrick made in connection to 
subsistence farming, nor was it the only one inspired by Gifford, Howard, and Ruskin. In 1934, 
he proposed the development of “Biscayneland,” a “country city” in South Dade near Peters and 
Perrine. A land-buying syndicate would purchase one hundred thousand acres of farmland, while 
a Community Foundation would sell bonds to help build homes and fund what he called “little 
factories” of homegrown food. The proposal – possibly linked to the later resettlement plan – 
also provided for a “model Negro community.” Biscayneland would have a beachfront resort and 
an educational center for Black students.90  
Merrick’s vision remained unfulfilled, incapable of competing with the cheaply-built 
housing most developers constructed for Black residents. The city and county were not 
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supportive either, evincing a lack of interest in enforcing regulations or denying proposals for 
low-quality construction in Black areas.  Some developers did seek to win business by promoting 
a better strain of segregated housing along the lines Merrick had set out, however. In 1941, W.I. 
Fickling, an agent for the Daval Corporation, wrote to Merrick with that year’s Grand Jury report 
finding extreme overcrowding and neglect in Colored Town – 40,000 people lived in an area 
covering 90 blocks. Merrick and other city dignitaries were landlords in the neighborhood, and 
the conditions there led to tuberculosis rates 600 per cent above those found among other 
populations.  
The Grand Jury found garbage was sometimes allowed to remain for weeks without 
collection, and several families had to use outdoor battery toilets at once. Roads were 
unmaintained and made only of sand or coral rock, creating pollution from the dust, further 
worsening lung diseases in the area. No more than 75 per cent of the “inadequate” street lighting 
worked.91 Fickling proposed to supply the housing specified in the Negro Resettlement Plan as a 
“self-maintained negro area outside any local municipality to include; bathing beach, public 
utilities, transportation, school, movie theatre, shopping center, and main roads to be bordered 
with landscaped park in addition to Public Parks within this area.” The homes would be of 
fireproof cement construction, with solar heat, indoor bathrooms.92 This proposal reflected the 
standards imagined by Merrick and New Deal housing officials, but these idealized plans for 
segregated areas were, in practice, unnecessary. While Merrick and his fellow white 
businessmen agreed that resettlement was desirable, they diverged on how to execute it. Overall, 
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Merrick’s plans were too costly for developers looking to make quick money out of Black 
housing. Subsistence farming and planned communities were expensive, while the city and 
county happily approved a patchwork of new developments that lacked almost any kind of 
facilities.  
The New Deal also marked the beginning of a more successful displacement: the removal 
of people living in the Everglades to make room for new parks. These people included members 
of the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes, as well as white glades dwellers.93 In Miami, however, 
as the Urban League noted that in 1943, “very little” had been done on the Negro Resettlement 
Plan – developers had simply been selling lots to mostly middle-class Black families in and 
around Liberty Square.94 The League, like many others, had bought the Miami businessmen’s 
claim that the solution to the squalor the landlords had profited from for decades was to remove 
residents to some other location, legitimizing their plans to expand the downtown business 
district. Miami planners kept attempting to displace Black people, but without success until the 
1950s, when they, local politicians, and slum clearance advocates used new and old 
environmental and health arguments to justify their decision to route the new Interstate 95 
expressway through Miami’s Colored Town. Until then, Miami’s planners were more successful 
in using landscape features, such as the placement of parks, to shape segregation and create 
natural-seeming barriers between Black and white communities and bounding Black settlements.  
By 1940, Black populations were concentrated in Colored Town, Opa Locka, Hialeah, 
Brown Subdivision (later Brownsville), Coral Gables (Coconut Grove), South Miami, Perrine, 
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Goulds, Homestead, and Florida City. Liberty City had become the second-largest area zoned for 
Black residency, swallowing Liberty Square and running beyond the city limits. Links between 
the new and old Black neighborhoods gave Colored Town a new moniker, Overtown, because 
Black residents had to travel “over town” from Liberty City to reach it. A study by the Urban 
League noted the importance of natural features and new greenery in creating barriers between 
areas identified as Black and white: “Generally speaking, in each community the Negro 
neighborhood begins on the other side of the tracks and runs to some other barrier – another set 
of tracks, a canal, undesirable land, or an artificial barrier set by zoning regulations.”95 In 1945, 
the Dade County Commission was discussing the creation of “the finest model negro community 
in the United States” as well as improvement and planned expansion of exclusively Black areas.  
Miami’s segregation efforts were both firm and long-lasting: By 1993, Black occupancy in the 
five pre-1960 housing projects ranged from 94 per cent to 100 per cent.96 
This history demonstrates how Miami’s segregation and efforts to displace the city’s 
Black population were deeply intertwined with elite environmental beliefs and anxieties. In turn, 
these ideological beliefs and narratives helped to shape Miami’s geography in ways that have 
had continuing impacts on prosperity, inclusion, and environmental quality. In the following 
section, I explore literature relevant to my thesis and map out the chapters to follow. 
1.3 Miami in context 
History 
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The shaping of landscape to enforce racial boundaries was not unique to South Florida. Ronald 
Bayor writes that “throughout the twentieth century city governments accepted racism as a basis 
for policy decisions and used their powers to maintain segregated societies. Using ordinances, 
zoning, physical barriers, separate land grants and public housing site and tenant selection, cities 
as diverse as Chicago, New York, Atlanta, Miami, Detroit and others added an important third 
force to the federal and private initiatives for segregation."97 As Karen and Barbara Fields 
demonstrate, segregation is a tool of racecraft – a term they coin to describe the modes by which 
race is produced and maintained as a tool to subjugate those raced as Black. Racism does not 
arise from race, but the practice of racism produces the illusion of race. According to the 
Fieldses, common formulations, such as the assertion that people are segregated because of the 
color of their skin, frame things so that “segregation disappears as the doing of the 
segregationists, and then, in a puff of smoke – paff – reappears as a trait of only one part of the 
segregated whole.”98  
Chanelle Rose’s research on the complicated racial politics of Miami exposes the 
confusion that often accompanied attempts to maintain segregation in a cosmopolitan city that 
hosted guests and new residents from the Caribbean, Latin America, and other parts of the 
United States, especially considering that identification papers force the mutable and contested 
categories of race into strict classifications. Foreign visitors who presented as Black received 
significantly more leeway from whites than those known to be Miami residents. But for those 
who could pass as Latin, segregated lunch counters and other forbidden spaces became 
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somewhat more open. Lighter-skinned Miamians, adopting the air of a Latin American tourist, 
could occupy white spaces that were normally forbidden to them.99  
Miami’s history as a destination for migrants and tourists was part of a carefully-
cultivated public image as a place where “the rules are different” – a tropical enclave within the 
borders of the United States.100 The urban historian Raymond Mohl has explored the way that 
such images connect to collective memory, and how they relate to Miami’s power dynamics. The 
“first” Miami describes the tourist destination the city’s boosters have carefully cultivated since 
the late 1890s, where natural and artificially constructed beaches and year-round sunshine 
attracted visitors from the United States and Latin America. The “second” Miami refers to the 
later image of “Vice City,” the Miami controlled by drug kingpins where planes from Colombia 
dropped cocaine shipments into the Everglades. Neither was a Miami with a long memory. The 
“third Miami,” meanwhile, describes a different city experienced primarily by its Black 
population, where memories of police brutality, race walls, displacement, and precarity run 
deep.101 Marion Moser Jones has explored the way the third Miami experienced environmental 
vulnerability. The 1926 hurricane devastated the poorly constructed and badly maintained 
housing in Colored Town, but white Miamians forced Black residents to rebuild white areas 
before they could turn their attention to their own homes. Poor areas of South Miami experienced 
a far longer and harder recovery than their wealthy neighbors.102 And today, in areas 
experiencing gentrification, activists and residents are concerned that the next powerful hurricane 
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could accelerate the pace of gentrification as it did in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, 
flattening older properties to make way for expensive new developments.103 
Understanding climate change 
It is easy to classify climate change as a recent and unprecedented phenomenon, but this study 
focuses on its historical contingency and its connections to myriad other events, regimes, and 
concepts. A historically informed view of what is termed as climate change is essential to 
understanding shared and distinct constructions of the climate crisis and what to do about it. For 
scientists, studying climate change has evolved as an exercise in temporal triangulation. Rising 
levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have already affected the Earth in ways measured and 
unmeasured since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Some scientists study climate 
models, feeding them information that yields possible future scenarios. Others study historical 
documents and natural artifacts – like ancient tree rings or cores of ice that contain air bubbles 
from thousands of years ago – to understand what the climate was like when the Earth had very 
different levels of carbon dioxide and other gases. Climate change’s timeline is one of lengthy 
time lags, slow change, and rapid derangements. Even if all emissions of greenhouse gas were to 
stop tomorrow, the world would keep warming.  
Climate change’s resistance to human comprehension – its uncanny scale and scope – has 
prompted the philosopher Timothy Morton to reframe it as a “hyperobject,” a disruptive and 
elusive entity that is intangible and yet weaves its way into everyday life in unsettling ways.104 
But while this understanding offers an original means to think about a force that operates on such 
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a huge scale, it can obscure the human agency behind the social construction of climate change. 
Historians of science such have shown that understandings of and responses to scientific 
phenomena are not universal. Ideas, technologies, and responses transform as they travel, 
influenced by human and nonhuman factors like norms, environments, and infrastructures.  
By applying communications approaches to questions concerning local responses to 
climate change, it is possible, as James Secord suggested, to cross boundaries of “nation, period, 
and discipline” that are “all too easily taken for granted” in fields like history and sociology.105 
As a communications dissertation, this project engages with publics such as voters, scholars, 
policymakers, and planners. David Livingstone has shown in Putting Science in its Place, when 
scientific concepts leave the “placeless place” of the laboratory, they are subject to myriad local 
interpretations as they travel.106 In this study, I examine Miami as a node for environmental 
communication, connected to local, national, and international flows. 
The dominant scientific understanding of climate change, as historians like Joshua 
Howe107 and Paul Edwards108 show, is historically contingent, stemming in part from Cold War 
research into the atmosphere that began with nuclear physics and gradually migrated into an 
understanding of climate. Edwards illustrates how Cold War thinking helped to shape a primarily 
globally-focused climate science.109 Howe shows how climate scientists were highly focused on 
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crafting a global climate science community that controlled the way climate change was 
conceptualized. This global community was, predictably, predisposed to pursue global responses 
to climate change that focused on global solutions, particularly on the issue of carbon dioxide 
levels in the air.110 
This concentration on global science and global solutions has, as Howe illustrated, meant 
that local climate effects and policies have until recently been relatively ignored. This enormous 
scale is an urgent problem. Global climate models lose resolution if you attempt to zoom in on a 
smaller area. Local climate models are seeing increasing demand as cities and regions attempt to 
forecast what might happen to them and – crucially – how much time is left specific effects are 
felt. But mainstream climate science is not a recent discipline, either. Christophe Bonneuil and 
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz argue in The Shock of the Anthropocene111 that environmental narratives 
asserting innocence of human-caused environmental changes, including climate change, only 
emerged in the past few decades and ignore the environmental knowledge that came before. 
Such understandings are not separate from modern environmental science and policy. 
They overlap, intersect, and influence each other. As my research demonstrates, the narratives 
that stem from these meetings inform the creation of infrastructure, policy priorities, and spatial 
practices. It has, for example, proven incredibly difficult to get rid of myths claiming that 
indigenous people’s land practices led to deterioration that requires intervention by “advanced” 
societies. To cite one specific instance, French claims that the lifestyles of nomadic farmers had 
led to the desertification of Algeria were proven wrong by scientists who showed that aerosols 
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from industrial pollution had disrupted the region’s climate, but the narrative is stubbornly 
repeated in international policy forums.112 
Nevertheless, climate and environmental policies have internalized imperial mythology, 
perpetuating it through measures that punish indigenous farmers. In Florida, poor white 
communities and Native Everglades dwellers such as the Seminole and Miccosukee were 
dispossessed as Everglades drainage dried out thousands of acres of land, killing vast numbers of 
plants and animals. Alongside the gradual creation of a national park in the Everglades, 
Everglades residents saw their impoverishment deepen. Following a trend of displacement and 
erasure all over the country, the Everglades ‘wilderness’ – or what was left of it – was reserved 
primarily for the leisure of wealthy whites.113 
Engineering projects represented attempts to conquer a tropical landscape but also to 
benefit economically from its allure. Miami’s tropicality became an important selling point to 
tourists and potential settlers looking for farmland. New Deal projects in Miami showed a wider 
awareness, not just of national trends such as the rise in subsistence communities, but of the 
imperialist and colonial global science that served as the ideological framework and justification 
for many decisions, especially as they affected Black communities.114 Climate-informed theories 
of race were marshalled to help to justify and imagine segregation in which everyone took their 
place in the “natural” order of things.115 In this way, two contingent concepts – race and nature – 
were naturalized and deployed to reinforce each other. 
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Local governments are once again competing for funds and prestige as they attempt to 
respond to a set of challenges that come together under terms ranging from sustainability to 
resilience to climate change. Funding for these projects comes from a range of sources, such as 
local taxes, philanthropic foundations, and foreign investment. The questions that inform this 
dissertation come from a curiosity about what it means to conceptualize climate – and more 
recently climate change – and what to do about it at a local level.  
This study situates understandings of climate change within Miami’s environmental, 
political, and urban history. Flooding, hurricanes, and extreme heat are all long-term features of 
life in the city, as are the responses – like air conditioning and flood defenses – that politicians, 
engineers, and entrepreneurs have relied on to offer residents and tourists a desirable standard of 
living. Ultimately, my dissertation will answer three questions: How have environmental beliefs 
and policies shaped segregation and displacement in Miami? How, in turn, has this history of 
segregation and displacement informed debates about the built environment? And finally, under 
what conditions were counternarratives that challenged the status quo able to come to the fore?   
Many of the extreme weather events Miami faces as the climate warms (high 
temperatures, more intense hurricanes, mosquito-borne diseases, flooding, and saltwater 
intrusion into aquifers) are already part of local consciousness. Drying and saltwater intrusion 
into the Everglades were observed early in the drainage efforts that exposed land for farming and 
real estate development. As indigenous oral histories and Merrick’s urgent calls for better 
hurricane observation show, South Florida residents have long been keenly aware of the region’s 
vulnerability to hurricanes, even as boosters attempted to minimize the destruction wrought by 
hurricanes in 1926, 1928, and 1936. Beyond communities with highly specialized living 
practices, such as the Seminole and Miccosukee or poor whites living in the swamp, Miami’s 
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livability has relied on transformative technologies, from air conditioning to drainage, that must 
be constantly maintained and expanded. 
“Climate change” has proven particularly capacious and elastic as a term, employed in 
turn to challenge and reinforce the status quo.116 During the early 1990s, Miami officials 
promoted emissions reduction and energy efficiency and were rewarded with national and 
international acclaim. The clerk of the courts, Harvey Ruvin, was invited to attend the UN 
climate negotiations at Kyoto in 1996, and subsequently testified before Congress on the local 
benefits associated with reducing emissions and adapting to the effects of climate change. Today, 
emissions barely arise in policy discussions about climate change as attention shifts to the 
intensified flooding associated with rising seas. Instead, the term “climate change” might be 
deployed as a means to allay the concerns of real estate investors as officials attempt to prevent a 
flight of capital from the city, which, like the rest of Florida, is dependent on real estate dollars 
for a large part of its income. It may also be deployed to describe what local activists see as a 
spike in gentrification as developers turn toward cheap land on high ground, which Miami 
officials had zoned for Black communities and subsequently neglected. According to Houston 
Cypress, an artist and activist who founded the Love the Everglades movement, Miccosukee 
leaders have only recently started using the term – they have more frequently used the phrase 
“global change” – in order to have a say in local policies that affect their home.117 
Climate science and climate policies are frequently uncritically portrayed as unalloyed 
goods, or at least morally neutral. This tendency becomes further entrenched in response to 
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attacks from the fossil fuel industry and the conservative politicians it bankrolls, as documented 
by Naomi Oreskes and Eric Schmidt in their book, Merchants of Doubt.118 These attacks and the 
scientific community’s understandable defensiveness have stifled important conversations about 
equity in climate science and policy responses. Native protesters and their allies arguing against 
another telescope at Mauna Loa – also the site where global carbon dioxide levels have been 
measured since the 1950s – are treated by some scientists as “irrational.”119 Local people do not 
want to see another sacred site refashioned into another “placeless place,” while the priority of 
influential scientists is to take advantage of the Hawaiian volcanoes’ dry air, which they argue 
allows for unsurpassed opportunities to explore the cosmos. Climate change, a term often treated 
as a natural fact in communication literature, shows itself to be highly particular and often 
contentious in local contexts. The smaller the scale, the less simple it gets. Local politics and, 
above all, history, are vital to understanding what people talk about when they talk about climate 
change. Indigenous environmental scholars have led the way in understanding climate change as 
a term with a history. Kyle Whyte, for example, frames climate change as a form of intensified 
colonization. Colonialism – and the expanded resources and cheap or enslaved labor it allowed 
access to – paved the way for capitalism.120 Therefore, the links between modern luxuries, 
environmental destruction, the elevation of Western thought (including science), and the 
exploitation of labor are shown to be inseparable. Unexamined ideas about climate change can 
retain assumptions rooted in colonialism and exploitation. 
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Many communications studies have examined media depictions of climate change, 
reasons for climate inaction, and the most effective ways to communicate climate science, 
especially to apparently unreceptive audiences.121 Few have taken a critical look at what happens 
when local leaders decide to act, however, and the literature has failed to tackle the subjective 
ways climate change is communicated and understood. Climate change itself remains a relatively 
unquestioned concept. Communications studies often treat climate policies as the end goal. Such 
policies are better conceived of as the beginning of a reckoning with the apparent incompatibility 
of business and governmental goals with the reduction of harm from climate change. 
International scientific and political institutions dedicated to climate change, like the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, were built with a grand, global framework for understanding and responding to 
the issue, and their work is still structured by this understanding.122  
Most climate action, however, is not planned according to internationalist visions, but is 
implemented in patchwork fashion around the world. Climate policies respond to local impacts 
according to local priorities, but little is known of how local governments understand and decide 
to respond to climate change. Especially in the United States, which has been mired in inaction 
for decades on the national stage, climate policies are driven by local decisions. It is increasingly 
urgent to close this gap between policy creation and local agency if we are to understand the 
changes to our warming world. 
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Climate communication scholars and researchers often argue against what is called the 
“two-step” mode of communication,123 the idea that a well-crafted message can be received by 
an undifferentiated audience. This results in climate communication research that criticizes the 
two-step model while inadvertently replicating it, focusing on messages rather than interchanges. 
Most of these studies look at national newspapers or conduct national surveys, a focus that 
abstracts the notion of climate change and obscures the local. Finally, another problematic 
tendency in the research is the focus that national surveys place on differences between 
conservatives and liberals, setting up a dichotomy that pushes scholars and activists to focus on 
what might persuade conservatives to “care” about climate change. Such studies do not question 
climate change as a historical and contingent concept with multiple meanings. My research seeks 
to help rectify such issues, and to show the stakes inherent in climate narratives and their 
consequences for environmental and social justice. 
Exceptions are beginning to emerge, however. In her book How Climate Change Comes 
to Matter, communications scholar Candis Callison illustrates how a socially-informed 
understanding of climate change is essential in understanding how different groups understand 
climate change through the lens of their experience and worldview, leading to diverse 
understandings and responses. Callison considers climate change as a form of life, suggesting 
vernaculars through which people “understand and articulate our worlds and the nuanced and 
pluralistic understandings of climate change evident in diverse efforts of advocacy and near-
advocacy.” Climate change is understood through international scientific processes and 
institutions, but to “engage diverse publics and discuss ramifications and potential actions, […] 
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climate change must become much more than an IPCC-approved fact and maintain fidelity to it 
at the same time. It must promiscuously inhabit the spaces of ethics morality, and other 
community-specific rationales for actions while resting on scientific methodology and 
institutions that prize objectivity and from politics, religion, and culture.124 
For the Inuit elders she spoke to, for example, climate change cannot be separated from 
the longue durée of change the world is undergoing. It represents a threat to interconnected 
lifeways and ecologies. Indigenous-led climate policies include the growing movement to grant 
rights to natural entities such as lakes. When Callison refers to “vernaculars,” she is describing 
group-specific languages that may be incomprehensible to other groups. She writes: “It is the 
way that climate change is articulated, used, circulated, and understood that creates its particular 
form of life and hence its meaningfulness for individuals and groups.”125  
In this dissertation, I propose an additional facet to the idea of vernacular: that of the 
local architectural style adapted to local climate and custom, and often taken for granted as 
natural and permanent. Features and the decisions behind their addition may fade into obscurity 
despite the role they continue to play; they may change in meaning, or they may be well known 
and visible.  Just as vernacular architecture is not necessarily uniform by area, so do local groups 
understand climate change in differentiated ways, sometimes to the extent of excluding one 
another from their activities even as they share interest in the umbrella term, climate change. My 
focus on the local highlights how differences in local understanding of climate change can be 
seen and felt in local attitudes but also in material forms, say, in the importance of pumps in 
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removing water from Miami’s streets and maintaining the confidence of local residents, 
investors, and prospective property buyers, or in the remaining sections of race walls in areas 
now feeling besieged by developers looking to parcel up enough land to create new 
condominiums, malls, and entertainment complexes. Further examples show how a focus on the 
local can have important implications for science and policy. To cite one instance, recent 
research shows how local news media in Miami often uncritically report on the city’s climate 
policies despite their potentially significant impacts on local communities, which include 
increased inequality in the city.126 To cite another, Liz Koslov’s research on Staten Island shows 
that residents are organizing together to move away from the coast and return their land to nature 
while avoiding talk of climate change almost completely.127 
Communications research methodologies also offer important possibilities for the study 
of climate change communication. James Carey saw the two-step method – or, in his preferred 
terminology, the transmission method of communication – as just one means of communication. 
This mode grew from religious missions to spread Christianity around the world, and from 
colonial methods of communication to send messages from center to periphery. While this has 
become the dominant view of what communication is and does, it is not the only one. Carey also 
names ritual communication as an important but neglected form. While transmission’s aim is 
control over a network, ritual maintains community in space and time. One is not necessarily 
better than the other, but to truly understand communication, researchers must expand their 
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inquiry beyond the transmission model.128 Stuart Hall does just that in his theory on encoding 
and decoding, which shows the ways that audiences can develop resistant readings of messages 
by powerful institutions such as television stations or scientific bodies.129 These readings may 
open up new ways of understanding and reacting to phenomena like climate change. 
Alternatively, ritual may be used to bolster power relations and demonize outside groups, as 
Andie Tucher’s work on the role of family stories shows.130 In this dissertation, I show how the 
transmission model is inadequate to describe the way that communication about climate change 
occurs. The communication I investigate is temporally layered and multi-directional. It shows 
that ideas about climate change are constantly circulating and changing according to physical 
realities, personal and community histories, and power dynamics. 
Power 
Miami’s historical power structure is mirrored in Floyd Hunter’s study of another Magic City, 
Atlanta, which Hunter found to be largely ruled by a “shadow government’” that consisted of a 
small group of businessmen who decided among themselves what would appear on the city’s 
political agenda.131 Miami’s elite, made up at least until the 1970s of white businessmen from the 
north of the country, were deeply involved in the governance of the city. In the 1970s, as the elite 
demographic began to include more wealthy Cubans, white businessmen decided to embrace 
 
128 James W. Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (Hove, U.K. Psychology Press, 
1989). 
 
129 Stuart Hall., “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse [Originally 1973; Republished 2007],” in 
Essential Essays, Volume 1, ed. David Morley (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 257–76, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/ 9781478002413-013. 
 
130 Andie Tucher, Happily Sometimes After: Discovering Stories from Twelve Generations of an American Family 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014).  
 
131 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of 




their behind-the-scenes power and formed a secret alliance called the “Non-Group,” which 
guided decisionmaking and set the agenda for over 15 years.  
Scholars have attempted to create more nuance in arguments over city power structures 
and to establish more sophisticated ways of  describing different cities in the United States, 
creating hybrid classifications that allow for levels of pluralism or the lack of it. According to 
one study, Miami is a city in transition, potentially moving from a fairly chaotic governance 
structure that strongly favors the development and tourism industries to one that is potentially 
less reactive to those interests.132 While the study of who actually governs has become more 
complex, research into the ideological terrain that maintains the tacit and overt agreements that 
keep Miami’s elite in place is essential. In individual communities and society as a whole, 
stakeholders wield decisionmaking authority that tends to distort social structures and dynamics 
as they create, disseminate, and impose a set of attitudes and values.133 
Despite Miami’s concerted push to be seen as a national and international leader in 
responding to the challenges of climate change, there are notable gaps in its policy discussions 
on the topic. For example, much of the elite discussion about climate change focuses on certain 
effects, such as sea level rise, and less on others, such as the extreme heat which tends to affect 
lower-income residents more severely. Discussion of the reduction of carbon emissions has 
effectively been sidelined, a development that demonstrates what Steven Lukes calls the third 
dimension of power.134 Power, according to Lukes, has three faces. It functions to 1) shape what 
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societies talk about, 2) determines which topics will fail to come to the fore, and 3) shapes 
perception itself, such that local communities might be seen to acquiesce to their own 
subordination.  
The importance of institutions – the state, the family, schools, and the law – in 
perpetuating symbolic violence and gender inequalities is vital to this work. Lukes writes that 
power is exercised not just through the decisions made or not made, but that the “bias of the 
system can be mobilized, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen 
nor the intended result of particular individuals’ choices.” He suggested ways in which 
controversial issues are “kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and 
institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions.”135 According to Gramsci, “submission 
and intellectual subordination could impede a subordinate class from following its own 
conception of the world.” Lukes added: “Gramsci viewed civil society in the West as the site 
where consent is engineered, ensuring the cultural ascendancy of the ruling class and 
capitalism’s ascendency.”136 But Gramsci also showed how dominant groups are constantly 
working to shape and reshape hegemony in response to external priorities and critiques.137 My 
work shows how, for example, Miami’s constant drive to maximize real estate values – which is 
so dominant it has taken on a normative quality – has nonetheless evolved to at least partially 
acknowledge ecological concerns, histories of displacement, and the arguments of housing 
activists.  
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Local environmental questions have been important to the examination of power by 
Lukes and others. Lukes cites Jonathan Gaventa’s study, Power and Powerlessness.138 Despite 
poor working conditions and dangerous pollution, miners in an Appalachian valley had failed to 
hold to account the mining company that controlled the town, a firm whose absentee British 
owner imposed punishing conditions on its workers. The “process of domination generates a 
hegemonic public conduct and a backstage discourse consisting of what cannot be spoken in the 
face of power.”139 Critics have pointed out that Lukes concentrates less on the “power to,” 
positive power that allows for the potential to make change. But other scholars have examined 
how power may be studied and challenged in the context of climate change. Power relations that 
are normally taken for granted become more visible in abnormal times, Lukes said. As Margaret 
Alston argued, post-disaster sites can serve as potential sites to expose and challenge them.140 
Hegemony in cities takes a form, according to John Logan and Harvey Molotch. They 
described city politics as a “growth machine” that concentrates powerful interests around the 
attainment of growth at the expense of all other political aims.141 Without vocal anti-growth 
interests like civic groups, growth machine politics sideline questions such as housing or 
environmental concerns or co-opt them to achieve growth that adopts the tone but not the 
implications of social movements. The city’s Black community in particular suffered as a result 
of Miami’s growth machine politics.142 While wealth may counteract the racial stratification 
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otherwise deeply felt in Miami, the social mobility of many still depends on the complex, and at 
times unique, ethnic categories that form an important part of Miami’s civic culture.  
State politics outside Miami civic leaders’ control also play an important part in 
buttressing the growth machine model. The state has ensured the continuation of a low-wage 
worker class through a 2003 pre-emption law that ensures no municipality can change the $8.46 
per hour minimum wage, contributing to a housing crisis in a city where rents are skyrocketing 
but wages for a large part of the workforce remain stagnant. The state’s weak tenants’ rights 
make it easy for landlords to evict low-income renters in pursuit of wealthier tenants. Changes in 
Miami’s elite governance structures contribute to the difficulty in tracing the effects of these 
policies. Where white elites under the New Deal proposed constructing new developments and 
providing transportation for the Black workers whose low-paid work formed the engine of the 
Magic City economy, today’s service workers face both longer commutes as they move to 
cheaper properties in North Miami, Florida City, or Homestead, and a policy vacuum that has 
little interest in helping them. 
At the same time, it is important not to class Miami as an “unplanned” city. As my 
research shows, policies intended to plan and direct growth – though never stop it – have been an 
important feature of politics both in Miami and in Florida generally. From the East Coast 
Railway to the Coral Gables master plan, the I-95 route to the urban growth boundary and the 
Miami 21 zoning plan, planning has been an occasionally influential feature of the Miami growth 
machine. My dissertation demonstrates the importance of a variety of objects in the Miami 
imagination, including redlining maps, architects’ renderings of a technologically-advanced 
future, and the drainage infrastructure that may only be widely noticed when it fails. 
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Infrastructure is the expression of ideology in the land.143 I show that power dynamics also shape 
what appears possible and desirable in Miami. Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim’s concept of 
sociotechnical imaginaries explains how local contexts, from incumbent infrastructures to 
conceptualizations of the good life, shape scientific understandings and policy responses. Their 
work performs an important act of synthesis, bringing the study of communications into 
conversation with Science and Technology Studies about what climate change is, and what it 
could become.144  
Critical studies of climate policy also inform my approach. Like other global cities, 
Miami is enacting climate governance through experimentation, creating “new forms of political 
space within the city, as public and private authority blur, and are primarily enacted through 
forms of technical intervention in infrastructure networks.”145 Policies such as tree planting, 
which may not have fallen under the classification of climate change adaptation or the new, more 
fashionable term, resilience, are now being classed as climate policies. As Mike Hulme has 
argued, “[T]he idea of climate change is now to be found active across the full parade of human 
endeavors, institutions, practices and stories.”146 
A growing body of research is showing that new environmental policies, enacted within 
frameworks that are accelerating gentrification, may simply be adding an environmental gloss to 
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practices that are making cities less and less livable for lower-income residents, raising rents in 
cheaper areas and forcing those who cannot afford them into environments that are more 
susceptible to climate extremes.147 Florida’s conservation movement has historically 
concentrated on areas it classified as wilderness rather than the social costs of environmental 
planning, in part due to its makeup. The dominance of wealthy whites within the environmental 
movement has kept issues like environmental justice peripheral to its overall goals.148  These 
patterns also appear in Miami, although environmental groups have begun to work to address 
justice concerns in recent years. As with other national parks, the conservation movement 
provided a rationale to displace Everglades residents. City planners used nature to separate 
communities designated as Black areas from those classed as white ones. This study will argue 
that even so-called “green infrastructure” – where, for example, mangroves and coral reefs 
protect shorelines from hurricanes and storm surge rather than more expensive man-made sea 
walls – can also form part of the segregated makeup of the city if concerted efforts are not made 
to address historic injustices. 
Narrative infrastructure 
I use the concept of narrative tradition to discuss the threads that connect Miami’s history and 
built environment to contemporary environmental beliefs and policies. In this way, I aim to show 
how the “Miami Way,” for example, has shaped environmental policies. I argue that individuals 
draw on narrative traditions to create shared meanings around concepts like climate change. 
Narratives may conflict, pitting Miami’s planning tradition against the Sunbelt drive toward 
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growth and sprawl, or they may allow for compromises such as the “Smart Growth” agenda that 
sates growth machine concerns while rhetorically addressing environmental arguments.  
Narratives may belong to a dominant culture or they might be marginalized, but these 
categories need not remain fixed. Campaigns for environmental justice and housing fairness 
have, for example, moved increasingly into the spotlight after decades at the margins of 
environmental and political discussions. Miami’s climate policymakers are beginning to address 
long memories of segregation and displacement in climate education and policy workshops. 
Narrative traditions are highlighted as spatial practices in landscape studies, where J.B. Jackson 
showed how human shaping of the land also influences language and beliefs.149  
1.4 Methods  
To excavate the historical layering of narratives about place, environment, race, and power in 
Miami, I conducted archival research focusing on several moments of crisis: the Great 
Depression and 1926 hurricane; the construction of the interstate highway through Overtown, 
which intentionally displaced thousands of Black residents; Hurricane Andrew in 1993; the 
recession of 2008; and Miami’s worsening flooding and extreme weather. I visited the University 
of Miami, Florida International University, the Black Archives at the Lyric Theater in Overtown, 
the HistoryMiami Museum, and the libraries at the National Hurricane Center and NOAA 
Hurricane Research Division. I also conducted 88 hourlong interviews in person and on the 
phone, and attended the meetings of the Miami Sea Level Rise Committee, the City and County 
Commission, Miami Climate Alliance, and other community organizations. 
 





1.5 Subsequent chapters 
In this chapter, I have explored how environmentalist, colonial, and planning traditions came 
together in plans to displace Miami’s entire Black population to the periphery of Miami under 
the rubric of the New Deal, turning features both natural and human-made into tools for 
segregation. The large-scale displacement city officials hoped for did not materialize, however, 
until a new federal project – the construction of the interstate road network – presented city and 
county officials with a new opportunity. Despite its image as a boomtown spreading rapidly and 
chaotically into the Everglades, I have established the central role that planning played in 
Miami’s development. 
In chapter two, I show how environmental and public health arguments permeated the 
city’s language in the 1950s and 60s as it solicited support for routing the I-95 expressway 
through Overtown, leading to the destruction of over 100,000 homes. From there, I turn to the 
ways that interconnected infrastructure – the road system, Miami’s limited light rail service, anti-
sprawl measures, and the drainage network – related to the city’s civil rights struggles through 
the 1970s and 80s. 
Chapter three examines the significance of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and its unequal 
recovery, which proved longer and harder for communities that had been redlined early in the 
century. I employ a mixture of archival work and interviews to understand the ways different 
groups like political actors, businessmen, the National Hurricane Center, and investigative 
journalists arrived at a collective understanding of the hurricane that challenged building 
practices, but not the sprawl and isolation that made Andrew the most destructive American 
hurricane until Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
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In chapter four, I chart the beginnings of a movement to connect Miami’s climate 
change vulnerability to the city’s always-present housing crisis and the environmental justice 
movement, focusing on the archival material of Power U, an Overtown-based grassroots 
movement. I compare the movement’s history-focused campaigns, which combined 
environmental justice arguments and Overtown residents’ most pressing concerns, to Mayor 
Manny Diaz’s attempts to turn Miami into a “green” global city, attracting “creative class” talent 
from around the world and revenue from a boom in condominium construction while overseeing 
a crisis in public housing. 
Chapter five focuses on the rising prominence of environmental and housing justice 
arguments in debates about the future of Miami as the city increasingly becomes a symbol of 
vulnerability – and action – on the national and international stage. I show how this movement 
has challenged the city’s understanding of climate change, especially sea level rise, as primarily 
a threat to tax dollars from the construction industry, leading to shifts in the makeup of 
committees and a new focus on affordable housing under the new umbrella term “resilience.” At 
the same time, Overtown, Liberty City, and Little Haiti – all previously neglected areas on high 
ground away from the coast – are under increasing pressure from developers looking to buy large 
parcels of land to create new megadevelopments, a shift that some activists suspect is the result 
of developers looking for land “safe” from sea level rise. I examine how climate change has 
become understood both as an impetus for gentrification and a galvanizing force for Black 
communities, despite the difficulties of pushing back development in a city where real estate 
interests are powerful, well-connected, and a key source of revenue. 
In chapter six, I summarize my argument before turning to consider Miami's narrative 
tradition of projecting a future in which current concerns are resolved through technological 
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fixes. As the limits of technological interventions become increasingly apparent, municipal 
officials are considering a different kind of approach that includes the incorporation of “green” 
infrastructure into climate plans and formulating new legislation that takes ecosystems’ role in 
protecting the land into account. Finally, I reflect on Miami’s history of environmental 




2. Environmental segregation 
A woman looks out of the window of her apartment onto Liberty Square and sees pleasant, two-
story homes set around a calm, green rectangle of lawn and shaded by palm trees. In its 1941 
report, the Miami Housing Authority was showing off the new life it offered its tenants: green, 
spacious, well-kept and, above all, improving. Men work in the garden, ensuring their property is 
tended, as good tenants should. In contrast to the crowded streets of Overtown, the abundant 
greenery of the nearly 10-year-old public housing development served to attract tenants, but also 
to show policymakers and the public how quality public housing can improve its residents.150  
 
Figure 5: Artist’s rendering of Liberty Square (Miami Housing Authority, Forward for 
Better Housing (1942) Florida International University Government Documents Collection.) 
By the late 1960s, Liberty Square’s green spaces had been all but swallowed up. The 
development had formed the nucleus of Liberty City, a collection of old and new neighborhoods 
that housed many of those displaced from Overtown by the city’s urban renewal policies. As 
developers rushed to build huge blocks as cheaply as possible, green space and amenities 
disappeared. With lax oversight from the city and county, Liberty City grew hot, crowded, and 
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lacking in basic amenities. The bargain Miami’s planners had offered Overtown’s Black 
residents – a better environment in exchange for leaving their newly valuable land – went 
unfulfilled. In their new situation, displaced families faced accumulating trash, disease, and 
infestations as bad as any in Overtown, but with the added blow of being forced from their 
homes in what was Miami’s largest Black community. 
This chapter examines Miami urban renewal and transportation projects between the 
1960s and the 1980s as a case of environmental segregation. As the result of policies ostensibly 
aimed at environmental improvements, Black communities experienced a different 
environmental reality than even nearby white and Latino neighborhoods. I examine 
environmental segregation in Miami in three ways: 1) through the distinct experiences of the vast 
majority of Black Miamians, which generated profits and savings for landlords, 2) through 
displacement that led to slum replication and even greater dislocation from Miami’s centers of 
cultural and fiscal wealth, and, finally, 3) through environmental policies that further ignored, 
displaced, and disadvantaged Black communities.   
Some planners and politicians, keen to decimate Overtown to grow Miami’s downtown 
business district, initially painted new developments for Black citizens as healthier, greener 
environments. The environmental segregation Black residents experienced in Overtown served 
as justification for their displacement to ostensibly improved conditions. But as Miami’s Second 
Ghetto grew after the Second World War and low-income housing became primarily the domain 
of private landlords, Liberty City grew increasingly crowded and hazardous. Rather than 
reversing environmental segregation, the displacement replicated it. Policies aimed at improving 
Miami’s urban environment, such as urban renewal spurred by federal funds for transportation 
projects, served to further disconnect and deprive Miami’s Black communities. Environmental 
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measures such as city cleanups and public transportation efforts to reduce the city’s energy 
consumption and air pollution all added to this unequal burden. New train routes favored white 
suburbanites and led to further urban removals, for example, while cleanups served to shift 
responsibility for Liberty City’s poor environmental standards away from the City of Miami and 
onto the individuals living there. Even as federal and state governments recognized the 
environment as a public good, the imperative to preserve and improve environmental equality 
did not extend to Miami’s Black neighborhoods. In the 1980s, new public transportation 
infrastructure was framed as an environmental initiative to reduce suburban sprawl and 
countywide energy consumption, yet they benefited wealthy majority-white communities and 
harmed low-income Black and Latino residents.  Even as this public transportation effort enacted 
further segregation, it also galvanized a new wave of anti-segregationist activism. Unions and 
other activists connected Black Miami residents’ plight with that of Black people in South 
Africa, drawing on the growing momentum of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States.  
 The built environment was not the only tool at the disposal of planners who wished to 
segregate cities. As discussed in the previous chapter, landscape also played an important role in 
isolating low-income Black and Latino populations while naturalizing their isolation, creating 
green barriers between ghettos and the rest of the city. These choices followed a colonial pattern. 
For example, after plague arrived at Dakar in 1914, the French administration established a 
separate African quarter, a solution formalized by colonial planning as a permanent feature of the 
segregated city in the 1930s. The urban planner Toussaint foresaw a green barrier between 
“European Dakar and native Dakar […] an immense curtain composed of a great park”151 In 
1914 the Miami Herald argued that “segregation is necessary” to prevent public health crises, 
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citing cases of leprosy in India, South Africa, and the United States. It commented: “If by 
moving the people complained of we can assist the colored man and his family to become more 
reliable, moral, and enterprising citizens, we are not only aiding the race, but are making white 
people safer.” 152 Consciously designed environmental barriers also restricted Black residents’ 
access to natural amenities, including most beaches. Until the 1960s, Black Miamians were 
forbidden on Miami Beach after dark unless they could produce identification proving they were 
employed by the hotels.153 
The legacy of environmental segregation continues today, but a continuing failure to 
acknowledge it has allowed so-called “colorblind” environmental and social policies to emerge, 
even as these policies have often threatened to worsen the situations of marginalized groups. 
This problem extends far beyond Miami. A study of the United States and Puerto Rico found that 
tree cover countrywide was distributed not by wealth but by race. Black, Asian, and Latino 
populations were more likely to live in urban heat islands without dense tree cover.154 Some 
theorists have used the term “eco-apartheid” to examine how environmental policies have 
harmed communities and helped to contribute to deep inequalities in environmental quality. 
Andrew Ross observed this situation in the prioritization of “green” policies over the basic needs 
of low-income populations in Phoenix. Environmental policies such as open spaces, mass transit, 
recycling, mixed-use zoning, and high-density zoning could not ensure clean air, affordable 
housing, decent jobs, public safety, and accessible healthcare most pressing for low-income 
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Black and Latino communities. Executives from firms relocating to Phoenix for its lax 
environmental laws simultaneously demanded a clean environment for their own housing and the 
cost savings they could reap from polluting poor communities.  
Urban sprawl contributed to the problems of city-center populations, pulling job 
opportunities and services to the urban fringe and demanding constant investment in new 
infrastructure.155 For Daniel Cohen, a future of eco-apartheid means that “longstanding 
environmental harms and the burdens of the no-carbon transition would be yoked to the necks of 
poor and racialized workers, while the spoils go to the rich – and especially, in Europe and the 
Americas, the white.”156 Even before Miami began planning a response to climate change, the 
city was already an example of environmental segregation. Without specific attention to the way 
environmental policies could disadvantage poor and racialized groups, the environmental divide 
between the wealthy and the rest is likely to deepen. 
 This characterization adds another layer to discussions of the United States as a 
segregated country. In Overtown and Miami’s newer Black ghettoes alike, residents were forced 
to live in isolated and harsh conditions, with substandard infrastructure, poor social services, 
inadequate educational systems, high rates of crime and violence, and a lack of green space – 
conditions Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton describe as American apartheid.157 As Miami 
began to grow in the early 20th Century, its geographic arrangement perpetuated Black residents’ 
social isolation and economic deprivation. This enriched the city’s landlords, both Black and 
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white, who could collect high rents without properly maintaining their properties. It benefitted 
business owners who could get away with paying meager wages to Black employees, and it 
served white workers who, by dint of their physical isolation from minority communities, faced 
little Black competition for better-paid jobs. In Miami, the historian Nathan D.B. Connolly 
argued, “Americans, immigrants, and even indigenous people made tremendous investments in 
racial apartheid, largely in an effort to govern growing cities and to unleash the value of land as 
real estate. Even today, land and its uses serve as expressions of acceptable governance. And 
between the 1890s and the 1960s, people built a sturdy and supple infrastructure for white 
supremacy that remains very much in place.”158  
Segregation proved a lucrative investment, especially in places where the maximization 
of land value formed the basis of the economy. Slumlords could extract high rents from people 
who were restricted to specified areas through the threat of racist violence, while profiting from 
cities’ laissez-faire attitude toward sanitation and upkeep in Black areas. As the urban scholar 
David Theo Goldberg writes:  “Any urban location becomes a potential site for the realization of 
commercial profit, and rent, and profit maximization tends to be blind to both history and social 
responsibility.”159 In a pattern that repeated itself from colonial African port cities in the 19th 
century to the contemporary United States and Europe, neglect, overcrowding, and poor 
sanitation – all of which boosted landlords’ profits and saved municipalities money – also 
produced a continuing justification for the isolation of marginalized populations on the grounds 
of their poor health and pollution.. The threat that marginalized groups might “transgress or 
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pollute” the social order created reason for its reinvention, “first by conceptualizing order anew 
and then by (re)producing spatial confinement and separation in these modernized terms."160   
Apartheid, a system linked with South Africa’s history, did not begin there, nor was it 
contained within the African continent. Goldberg identified apartheid as a system that circulated 
between colonial cities and cities in colonizing nations. Colonial urban planning created 
increasingly divided cityscapes in the first decade of the 20th century. In the years that followed, 
planning patterns in the United States and elsewhere began to reflect colonial city planning 
approaches, at least when it came to isolating populations. Through the Federal Government’s 
1949 Housing Act, urban renewal was administered through the Division of Slums and Urban 
Redevelopment.  
Urban renewal and public housing programs in the United States, begun in the name of 
slum clearance, began to produce increasingly divided cities. Between the 1930s and 1970s, the 
level of spatial isolation in northern U.S. cities doubled.161 These changes proved highly 
profitable for Miami’s developer class, and segregation remained good for business well into the 
1980s. The Southeast of the United States experienced a flood of new money in the 1960s and 
70s as industries from the northern and Midwestern states shifted their bases of operation to 
profit from low-wage southern labor. The region’s history of slavery and sharecropping, racist 
attitudes, and anticommunist hysteria created an environment in which states could pass laws 
that hindered unionization and guaranteed low wages.162 
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2.1 Environmental segregation and the reform movement 
Most studies of environmental activism in South Florida have focused on the exploitation of the 
Everglades, but a coalition of progressive activists also analyzed environmental conditions 
within cities. Although most women’s clubs might have considered conservation concerns to be 
limited solely to the wilderness, some concerned themselves with environmental problems inside 
the metropolis. Associations like the Florida Federation of Women’s Clubs did much to advance 
the conservation of the Everglades, for example, while also leading the drive for improved 
sanitary conditions, noise abatement ordinances, and trash collection in urban areas.163  
 In the early 20th century, most whites expressed indifference or professed ignorance 
about the conditions in Overtown and West Coconut Grove, but some reformers began to draw 
attention to the poor environmental condition of Black areas, connecting environmental and 
social concerns. Before Marjory Stoneman Douglas became a champion of the Everglades later 
in her life, she frequently addressed the subject of urban pollution and its unequal burden on 
Miami’s Black communities. Rather than treating the poor conditions as endemic to Black areas, 
or conceiving of nature as something that exists outside the urban setting, Douglas had grown to 
appreciate humanity’s interdependent relationship with nature, a principle that formed the 
bedrock of her environmentalism.164  
As a progressive, Douglas faulted institutions rather than individual, for society’s 
problems. In her weekly column, “The Galley”, she questioned the values of  “shining cities” 
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when poor children continued to live in “grey slabbed shacks in piney places”165 and called to 
account the boosters that exploited both nature and humans while commoditizing Florida’s 
unique ecosystem.166  The lack of health codes had allowed city leaders to deny basic amenities 
to low-income, mostly Black neighborhoods since Miami’s founding.167 But, she later said that 
slums were generally felt to be “only a natural necessity in a growing city. My feeble packings 
and scoldings only irritated people.”168 This indifference was replicated throughout Miami’s 
power structure, from politicians to developers and planners. 
Coconut Grove, where Douglas lived, was home to a small but well-off intellectual 
community. The West Grove, home to 4,000 Black residents was close by, yet the white 
community rarely acknowledged the plight of their neighbors in the historically Bahamian 
district. By the late 1940s, Douglas had joined her friend Elizabeth Virrick in highlighting the 
environmental and social neglect of the West Grove. In Douglas’s telling, Virrick, who moved to 
the area in the 1920s, only became aware of the neighborhood’s struggles because she lived so 
close that she could not avoid them. “Elizabeth Virrick and her husband owned an apartment 
house backing up to the black area, and that’s how she knew about it,” Douglas said in an 
interview.169 Virrick had attended a meeting of the Coconut Grove Civic Club in 1948 to protest 
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plans by local developers to put multiple units of Black housing on a tract of land in between the 
Black and white Grove. The reverend of the local Black church, Theodore Gibson, demanded 
white Grove residents take responsibility for the lack of enforcement of sanitation ordinances 
and white slumlords’ neglect, and vividly described the conditions just a few blocks away. “My 
people are living seven deep,” he told the all-white audience. Virrick visited Gibson the 
following day, and the two called another meeting where Virrick presented a plan of action. The 
meeting ended with the creation of the Coconut Grove Citizens Committee for Slum Clearance, 
with Virrick as chair and Douglas agreeing to oversee publicity for the group.170  
On a visit to the West Grove with Virrick, Douglas said they found that “there were little 
houses, but they didn’t have running water in them, and they had privies in the backyard and 
wells, and the white people’s laundry was being done in the backyards of those houses, with 
water that was polluted from these backyard privies. […] White people would build houses for 
the Negroes to rent that had no toilets or running water in them, and you could imagine the 
conditions.”171 The committee persuaded the water company to extend service to every street and 
lobbied the Miami City Commission to pass an ordinance through a referendum requiring a flush 
toilet, sink, and septic tank for every residence. Thanks to the help of several banks, it raised a 
fund to help homeowners comply with the upgrade requirements.172 With a $500 research grant 
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from the Department of Government at the University of Miami, Douglas and Virrick began – 
but never completed -  a book about slum clearance initiatives in American cities.173  
In this chapter, I argue that the city and county governments imposed environmental 
segregation on Black residents through a variety of mechanisms. Poor environmental quality in 
Overtown was the result of lucrative neglect on the part of landlords and lawmakers, while also 
justifying calls for urban renewal. Officials, determined since the 1930s to expand the downtown 
business area into Overtown, promised individuals who moved to remote areas in northeast 
Miami a better environmental quality. But as highway building and urban renewal programs 
focused on Overtown forced thousands of families to move, developers, landlords, and officials 
benefited from lax supervision to create a situation of even greater environmental inequality, 
compounded by increased isolation. Understood in this way, it is possible to see how Miami 
elites used the environmental concerns as cover to isolate Black Miamians while developers 
profited from the poor conditions. The neglect of Black neighborhoods added to their precarity, 
offering justification for displacing old residents with new wealthier ones whenever the land in 
question became coveted. 
I show first that poor sanitation, overcrowding, and lack of basic amenities in Black areas 
all formed the justification for urban renewal programs through which the city and county further 
marginalized Black citizens living on land whites desired, pushing them out, “into the sticks,”174 
as Miami native Sharony Green characterized the development her parents moved to. In these 
areas, slum conditions were quickly replicated to the benefit of landlords and developers. 
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Secondly, I explain how environmental policies ignored Black communities’ needs, worsening 
their situation while wealthy business leaders profited. City “cleanups” furthered the rhetoric of 
urban renewal while blaming residents for the poor conditions they lived in, and sent trash to 
incinerators that disproportionately polluted Coconut Grove’s Black community. Finally, I 
examine how rapid transit policies, ostensibly focused on reducing air pollution and energy 
consumption, ushered in new waves of gentrification while diverting money from buses, the 
transit system that most benefited Black residents. In this chapter’s conclusion, I examine how 
the global anti-apartheid movement’s influence helped to create an  understanding of Miami as 
an apartheid city, a rhetorical move that galvanized union and community opposition to 
transportation policies that benefited white commuters but worsened transportation for Black, 
Latino, and elderly residents. 
 Virrick enjoyed some successes in encouraging better code enforcement and the 
extension of utilities into Black areas, but she struggled in her campaign for better homes for 
Miami’s Black community. Miami’s powerful developers and other business leaders resisted, 
drawing on anti-communist and pro-segregationist feeling, as well as hostility to federal social 
programs.175 Local officials only became interested in slum clearance in Miami when plans to 
create an interstate expressway gained federal traction during the 1950s.  Plans for a highway 
system to connect the country with high-speed roads had circulated in federal government since 
the 1930s, but without success. By the mid-1950s, increased access to cars, affordable 
mortgages, and fears of Black encroachment on white neighborhoods drew many white families 
out of cities and into increasingly sprawling suburbs. At the same time, public transit ridership 
halved between 1945 and 1950, leaving cities choked by traffic jams. Traffic was what finally 
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led metropolitan, state, and federal politicians to agree on the necessity of an interstate system. 
President Dwight Eisenhower, himself more concerned about the ability to evacuate cities in the 
case of Soviet aggression, approved the legislation for the National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highways in June 1956.176 
Local officials were put in charge of deciding the route expressways would take through 
their cities. In Miami’s case, this put the task in the hands of the Miami City Commission. City 
planners entertained several routes, including a 1955 plan that followed the obsolete Florida East 
Coast Railway’s route into Miami, a trajectory that would have avoided built-up areas of the city. 
The Wilber Smith engineering firm rejected that plan in favor of a route several blocks to the 
west to provide “ample room for the future expansion of the central business district in a 
westerly direction.” This route would run through Overtown, and the highway planners located a 
four-level midtown interchange at the center of Overtown’s business district, connecting the 
interstate with an East-West Expressway. The East-West Expressway, which connected Miami 
Beach and the airport, would require even more demolition of Overtown’s buildings.177  
In 1956 the Miami Planning Board fretted that the Central Business District had not kept 
pace with the city’s overall population growth. It put forward its plan to regenerate the area with 
new buildings and, crucially, “a traffic plan to end all traffic plans, a very substantial part of a 
$193 million program” to ensure that the Central Business District “shall permanently become 
the most accessible place in a metropolis with upwards of 1 ¾ million inhabitants.” It 
recommended that the CBD should be expanded by 25 per cent to allow for new parking areas 
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and recommended traffic improvements including an expressway, arterial street plan, new traffic 
system, and the elimination of the Florida East Coast railroad terminal, all in the name of 
speeding up traffic.178 
Urban ills provided added justification for routing expressways through neighborhoods 
classed as troubled. Up and down the country, these neighborhoods were inevitably Black, 
Latino, and white ethnic neighborhoods with dilapidated 19th-century housing stock that local 
authorities had neglected for decades.179 Egged on by state and federal highway officials and by 
private agencies such as the Urban Land Institute, a pattern emerged of using highway 
construction to eliminate blighted neighborhoods and redevelop valuable inner-city land. This 
was the approach favored by Thomas H. MacDonald, director of the U.S. Bureau of Public 
Roads during the formative years of the interstate system. Combating blight with highways was 
also the policy of New York's influential builder of public works projects, Robert Moses.180  The 
interstate became a vehicle for the destruction of marginalized communities, pushed by 
downtown business interests and developers who saw opportunities in the expansion of the 
central business districts and the housing of displaced people. Profit maximization, displacement, 
and the creation of new infrastructure joined other forces in helping to cement Miami’s 
segregated order.  
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2.2 Displacement and the promise of a greener environment 
Enormous amounts of housing were destroyed in the process of building the urban sections of 
the interstate system. By the 1960s, federal highway construction was demolishing 37,000 urban 
housing units each year, and urban renewal and redevelopment programs were destroying an 
equal number of mostly-low-income housing units annually.181 Miami planners’ ambition from 
the 1930s onward had been to claim the land Overtown occupied for the expansion of the Central 
Business District. Twenty years later, their chance had arrived.  
Many of those displaced believed they would be able to return to Overtown. Derek Davis 
left the area in 1968 as part of the urban renewal process. He said:  
It was still that promise or that thought left with us that they were moving everyone out 
of Overtown so they could rebuild the city and make it better and everybody could move 
back in again; and so, it was that feeling that I had as a child. [...] Yes, we are moving out 
but one day there will be an Overtown that we can be proud of moving back in and very 
soon. What I didn't realize then is that the only way that we can get a city like that again 
is if the community or people in that community who are there fight to get that 
community back.182  
 
The opacity of the renewal process meant that few understood its consequences for their 
community. 
Renewal plans for places designated Federal Neighborhood Renewal Areas under the 
Metropolitan Dade County Urban Renewal Ordinance of 1960 and an influx of federal financial 
assistance under the 1949 Housing Act boosted optimism about the future of Overtown. The 
Atlanta planning firm Hill and Adley Associates Inc. was contracted to carry out the Central 
Miami Urban Renewal Area plans, The area, consisting of seven blocks bounded by the Florida 
East Coast railroad, was selected because it had “the highest concentration of substandard 
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housing in 1960 according to the US Census of Housing.” It also provided the “largest close-in 
area of housing available to Negroes,” easily accessible to downtown Miami and Miami Beach, 
thus providing a housing resource “vital to the economy and one worthy of the proposed urban 
renewal program.”183  
The plan listed areas for conservation as well as clearance and redevelopment to remove 
conditions that “created or contributed to the substandard character” of the area. It also 
recommended lightening traffic on residential streets and interconnecting neighborhoods, 
separating industrial and residential land uses, removing substandard housing, and reducing 
overcrowding, all while accommodating the “tentative expressway alignment proposed for this 
area.184 The city’s priority was to build the road, however, not to preserve Overtown. 
On paper, the city planned to create “an environment conducive to the redevelopment of 
a sound residential neighborhood and, in addition, to provide logical areas for the expansion 
and/or further development of commercial and industrial uses.” Where overcrowding could be 
limited, schools like Booker T. Washington High and Douglas Elementary could be expanded, 
and room could be made for “beauty and spaciousness.” But the plan also revealed the 
contortions necessary to rehabilitate a neighborhood while building an expressway through it. 
The road would slice through Dixie Park, further reducing the limited outside space available to 
Overtown residents. The planners’ response was to suggest the highway be raised to make 
additional space for a park – albeit one located underneath the roaring expressway. 
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The renewal plan provided detailed information about the projected displacement. 
Overall, the planners expected the expressway and renewal projects to displace nearly 7,000 
families. They believed there would be little trouble in relocating Overtown’s small white 
population because of the “fairly good supply of housing available to white persons.” But for 
Black residents, they said, new low-rent public housing would have to be constructed to take in 
the numbers that would be displaced. Many of Overtown’s wealthier families had already begun 
migrating out as new housing opportunities arose, with some Black Miamians beginning to move 
into previously all-white areas185 and others leaving several months before land clearing for the 
expressway began. But residents with fewer resources often stayed until they were forced to 
move.186 Amendments requiring greater local participation and oversight only kicked in after the 
rapid demolition of large parts of Overtown, first for expressways and then for renewal. 
Therefore, most residents received little more than 24 hours’ notice that they must clear out, with 
no relocation assistance save a directions to move to what Mohl termed Miami’s “Second 
Ghetto,”187 meaning formerly white areas and hastily constructed new buildings in the 
northeast.188  
The City of Miami Housing Authority played a key role in the relocation of Black 
Overtown residents to the northwest of the city.  It was formed in 1937 after Congress created 
the United States Housing Authority, the same year Liberty Square opened. Its task was to 
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eliminate slums through the construction of housing for low-income communities. This included 
Black citizens living in Overtown – the community the Authority called the “number one sore 
spot” in Miami – as well as whites living in shacks in places like Knightsville. In its publications, 
the Authority linked pleasant green surroundings with the promise of clean, healthy, productive 
living. It positioned decent housing as the key to the “stabilization of family life” and the 
antidote to the slums that had become “blots upon our ‘City Beautiful.’” The Authority 
luxuriated in its descriptions of the development’s tropical landscaping: “Liberty Square is 
beautifully landscaped with grass, bougainvillea around the doors, palms and tropical shrubbery 
throughout. The white stuccoed buildings radiate a spirit of cleanliness.”189  
According to Housing Authority literature, Liberty Square’s environment had allowed its 
residents to become model citizens, improving their grounds, keeping them clean, and submitting 
to a degree of surveillance. The leaflet claimed the residents welcomed advice, suggestions, and 
inspections. Tenants had adjusted to “the Liberty Square environment of thrift, health and 
happiness.” The development contained “the first basketball court for Negroes in Dade County,” 
hosting the first countywide basketball tournament for Black girls and boys. Alongside good 
habits, the Authority reported good health in public housing residents when compared to those 
still living in Overtown. Underscoring the link between health, good habits, and nature, the 
leaflet quoted Luther Burbank, a local naturalist: 
I give the plants upon which I am at work in a test… the best possible environment. So 
should it be with a child, if you want to develop it in the right ways. […] Plants should be given 
sun and air and blue sky; give them to boys and girls. […] All animal life is sensitive to 
environment, but of all living things, the child is the most sensitive. Surroundings act upon a 
child as the outside world acts upon the plate of the camera. […] A child absorbs environment. 
[…] In child rearing, environment is equally essential with heredity.190  
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In this way, the Authority echoed the refrains of Bright, Gifford, and Merrick in the decades 
before: a more humane form of segregation that drew on nature as an inspiration. 
The authority went on to build over twenty more developments.  By 1965, the authority 
housed over 300 Miamians displaced by expressway construction, code enforcement, and urban 
renewal programs. Competing with private landlords, the housing authority argued that it offered 
families an alternative to high-cost slums: “These low-income families would indeed have been 
‘victims of progress’ forced to move into other slum housing, to over-crowded small units, to 
pay 40 to 60 % more of their income for rent – had this community not provided this public 
housing resource.”191 Photographs compared the slum areas displaced families had left with the 
lush, green spaces and quiet courtyards in their new accommodations. 
  
Figure 6: Comparing slum housing to new public developments (‘Relocation Housing 
Report’ (Miami Housing Authority, 1965), Government Documents Collection, Florida 
International University.) 
In 1964, to comply with the Civil Rights Act, the Authority had passed a resolution 
stating that all its properties were to be available “upon choice to any applicant regardless of 
 




race, color, or creed. This action was one of the first of its kind in the South since it went beyond 
the requirements of the recent Civil Rights Act required only that public agencies agree to such 
provisions for all developments placed under contract subsequent to the date of the Executive 
Order.”192 The staff working on relocation and placement was integrated, and many Black 
families expressed their preference for placement in white buildings, a possibility for which the 
Housing Authority’s Haley Sofge credited Theodore Gibson in a letter dated 1966. Black 
leaders, however, argued that the system was not enough to create true integration. Donald 
Wheeler Jones, who had taken over Gibson’s role as head of the local NAACP chapter, asserted 
that the Housing Association’s policy of “free choice” was hardly likely to encourage integration 
given that a white family had little incentive to choose a Black development. Only automatic 
allocation could achieve integration in public housing. Martin Fine, the Authority’s chairman, 
defended the system as it stood: “I, personally, would never vote to force a man to move into a 
certain area. Under present policy we are not violating any federal provisions or intent. Our 
system is designed to prevent segregation and we are not obliged under the act to force 
integration.”193 
Still, displaced Overtown residents were placed in Edison Courts, Victory Homes, and 
other previously white developments.194 In its leaflet, the Authority accompanied images of 
shady greenery with quotes from new residents describing the “quiet,” the “large side yard” 
where children could play, and the ease with which residents could feel “comfortable and 
secure.” One tenant in originally whites-only Joe Moretti Apartments remarked on the 
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opportunity for social mobility relocation had afforded her: “Fifteen years ago, I was a maid for 
one of the families here and I used to think how wonderful it must be to have a home like this – 
and now here I am!” 195 
To head off competition from private landlords, Sofge pushed the Housing Authority 
(increasingly called “Little HUD”) to make public housing the primary venue for relocation. 
Little HUD would lease existing properties from landlords rather than build hundreds of new 
apartments and assign buildings new property managers to take over from private companies 
such as the Bonded Rental Agency, which dominated the private rental market in Miami.196 The 
move established the county as the largest provider of housing, but also marked the beginning of 
a stark decline in the quality of units its residents inhabited, as it took on poor quality units as its 
own, and inspection and upkeep suffered. 
Despite continued assessments of poor environmental quality and housing standards – 
both from outside officials and Black spokespeople demanding better conditions – Overtown’s 
displaced residents argued that the community still met many of its residents’ needs. Longtime 
resident Rosa Green argued that the exclusion of Overtown residents from the renewal planning 
process had left them without a viable community: “That's what happens when other people plan 
for you. Other people plan the expulsory systems and because they did we lost a viable 
community, a lot of people, a major high school, a florist, newspapers, and it... the list just 
continues. […] It was [...] self-sustaining.”197 Green’s words also paint a different picture of 
Overtown than one offered by white elites. In her view, despite the obstacles put in their way, 
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Overtown’s residents had created a vibrant community with thriving businesses, churches, and 
cultural centers. Urban renewal deprived residents of housing, but also of sources of prosperity 
and community. 
Further demolitions followed the construction of the interstate, but the process was 
patchy, as was the rebuilding. The incompleteness of Overtown’s renewal had created pockets of 
even worse deprivation, compounding neglect with decay. Commissioner Athalie Range testified 
before the National Commission on Urban Problems in 1967 that families were living in 
isolation next to empty lots. Range – who herself owned slum properties for which she charged 
high rates while neglecting repairs –  noted that the “concrete monsters,” the huge blocks that 
replaced shotgun shacks in Overtown and increasingly elsewhere, were built without a thought 
for anything other than the “bare necessities of life.” No allowance was made for play areas, and 
families with no closet space were forced to keep their clothes on the bed. Range noted that 
housing codes had recently been toughened up, but that as a result, landlords might be forced to 
evict more tenants to bring their buildings into line.198  
The Housing Authority stepped up its drive to encourage Overtown residents to apply for 
public housing placements. It used the rapidly declining character of the once-viable community 
to persuade residents to leave for new public housing developments, arguing that Overtown’s 
demolition was inevitable.  A 1967 leaflet distributed to Overtown residents told them that the 
preferential status granted to people living in urban renewal areas meant they could expect a 
better chance at receiving public housing. These leaflets promised the opportunity to live in a 
greener, healthier environment - as long as they relocated. Public housing units had “both front 
and back yards – with trees and grass and plants,” the leaflet explained, and were located near 
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churches, transportation, and shopping. “When a family moves into an apartment, it becomes 
their home,” it touted. “They would have the same privacy that they would in a home they 
owned.” By that stage, however, this description was stretching the truth to put a happy gloss on 
the poorly-built units that were springing up in Liberty City. 
The leaflet also promised public input into the urban renewal plans, while expanding on 
the theme of Overtown’s decline. It told residents that urban renewal workers, carrying 
identification, would visit each household to determine the kind of housing they needed. 
Overtown had become obsolete, the leaflet said. Ironically, given that the expressway had 
precipitated the displacement from Overtown, it explained the situation using the metaphor of a 
car:  
Neighborhoods are like automobiles. Automobiles provide many years of service and 
enjoyment. But as they get older they begin to wear out. For a while the worn-out parts 
can be replaced. But eventually they can no longer be repaired and new automobiles must 
be bought.  
 
The same thing happens to neighborhoods. For many years they provide a place to live, 
work and play. But they too get older and begin to wear out. For a while repairs can be 
made, but eventually new neighborhoods must be built.199 
 
Environmental conditions in Overtown were worse than ever by the end of the 1960s. 
The area had become “an urban wasteland dominated by the physical presence of the 
expressway. Little remained of the neighborhood to recall its days as a thriving center of black 
community life, when it was known as the Harlem of the South.”200 The expressway left the area 
with numerous dead-end streets and no easy route from north Overtown to Booker T. 
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Washington School.201  Charlie Brown, an Overtown resident who had served in an army 
reconnaissance unit that targeted transportation infrastructure during the Vietnam War, described 
the destruction of the area: “I'm looking at what happened with I-95 and the transportation 
activity and relocations of Overtown, it’s the same kind of destruction of a community or village 
that is going on except you didn't use fire power, you just […] in a sophisticated manner 
disassembled the civic support and then the economic pattern and then got everyone [...] 
separated.”202 Rebuilding Overtown certainly did not seem like a priority. Between expressway 
construction and urban renewal, about half of Overtown was razed, but only one urban renewal 
project out of four was completed in the area.203  
Into the 1960s, several waves of services and programs to manage urban renewal abruptly came 
and went. As programs failed to produce quick results or generated political opposition, they 
would be halted or allowed to die. As an account from the late 1970s described it, funding and 
institutional support for such programs “suffered from an unusual degree of temporal 
inconsistency,” such that “public housing, urban renewal, below-market-interest-rate subsidies, 
Model Cities – each has come and gone, leaving unfunded plans and half-finished projects in its 
wake.”204 Compared to the interstate project, renewal was fragmented and poorly run. 
Meanwhile, hundreds of reports justifying urban renewal continued to ignore the effects 
of segregation. As a 1966 report on “blight” in Miami claimed: “We do not yet know exactly 
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what it is that creates the lower class of life."205 At a meeting of the Sigma Delta Chi professional 
journalistic fraternity’s Atlanta chapter, Miami Daily News editor Bill Baggs criticized the press 
for perpetuating silence about the effects of segregation. “What press has been bold enough to do 
that basic job to be informing? Very few, very few,” he said. “Segregation is a form of slavery.” 
Reticence in the media and political classes meant that environmental segregation could remain a 
mystery, without clear causes or systematic responses.206 
The vagueness that allowed environmental conditions to continue unchallenged was 
evident in a 1967 appearance by Miami officials before the National Commission on Urban 
Problems, a body President Lyndon B. Johnson created that January to seek strategies to increase 
the supply of “decent housing for low income families.” Mayor Robert King High began with a 
sprawling speech praising Miami’s natural riches and lauding the “good and bountiful lives most 
Miamians live.” He called Greater Miami “a banquet for the senses — the cleanest, the most 
well-kept and beautiful metropolitan area that you have seen anywhere in your travels. Why is 
this so? Why is Greater Miami an oasis, a banquet, a garden, a hauntingly lovely place, even 
though it is an urban center of more than 1,200,000 people?”207 Displacement and dislocation 
due to urban renewal, as well as competition from Cuban workers, isolated Black Miamians from 
an economic boom in the 1960s and 70s and from the idyllic city King High portrayed in his 
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speech. While the wealth of white and Latino citizens was increasing, economic conditions for 
the Black community stagnated.208 King High, able to take advantage of the shared silence about 
segregation, could treat Black citizens’ dire environmental and economic conditions as a baffling 
problem with no discernable cause as he boasted about the superior environment enjoyed by 
Miamians who did not have the misfortune to live in slums. 
The logic of renewal did not apply evenly for Black and white neighborhoods. In June 
1966, city officials revealed another comprehensive plan to renovate and “arrest the decline of 
four of Miami’s older and potentially pleasant neighborhoods,” Edison Park, Buena Vista, 
Wynwood, and Santa Clara, which had become home to some of Miami’s “white slums.” The 
plan included the first of several efforts to gentrify Wynwood, which was home to a Puerto 
Rican neighborhood that overlapped with Overtown. Like Overtown, each of these 
neighborhoods had also suffered from the construction of the expressway, having lost their 
principal commercial corridors.209  
Home values had declined by up to 20 per cent, and 75 per cent of buildings did “not 
meet minimum code standards.” But unlike Miami’s Black areas, redevelopment of these white 
neighborhoods was designed to stop populations from leaving, an attempt to stem the flight that 
had already seen 13,000 leave Miami between 1960 and 1965. The plan’s “revitalization zones” 
targeted the places losing white residents fastest, in the hopes of attracting new arrivals by 
pricing out people of color, such as the area’s working-class Puerto Rican community. 210 
Planners believed the freeway would help cure sick neighborhoods and allow property values to 
 
208 “Affirmative Action: Semi-Annual Report.” 
 
209 Feldman, “The Role of Neighborhood Organizations in the Production of Gentrifiable Urban Space: The Case of 
Wynwood, Miami’s Puerto Rican Barrio.”  
 




recover. They directed federal money toward repair grants, sewer installation, and better code 
enforcement. Miami city and Dade County officials used grants and low-interest loans from the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to provide attractive amenities to prospective 
wealthy white residents, such as parks and libraries.211 This miraculous release of funds for areas 
in which Black residents did not live showed that, where city officials wanted to, they could 
produce urban renewal very effectively. Environmental segregation was a chosen condition, not 
an accidental consequence of funding difficulties or changes in government programs. 
2.3 Environmental segregation in the Second Ghetto 
In the days preceding the Republican National Convention in August 1968, a Miami Beach 
official boasted that the city was an ideal location for the event, having been spared the racial 
unrest roiling cities like Chicago and Washington, D.C. The boast was lifted straight from the 
Miami Way playbook – a booster’s assurance that Miami’s rigid racial order meant smooth 
sailing for outside investors. That hubris was shaken as, on the first day of the convention, a 
three-day uprising broke out in Liberty City. In its aftermath, a group of local investigators 
concluded that the unrest did not seem to have been a response to the convention as such. The 
official’s claim may have fanned the flames, they suggested, as might aggressive policing. Most 
of all, however, when the investigators went to Liberty City – home to 45,000 people at the time 
– they found deeply inhospitable conditions. Few trees blocked the searing August sun, and on 
the streets they observed ubiquitous piles of garbage and infestations of vermin. They did not 
blame a single event like the convention, even as the future president Richard Nixon used it as a 
platform to introduce his Southern strategy, which consolidated Republican power through the 
region’s opposition to civil rights legislation. Instead, they pointed to Miami’s history of 
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displacement and the unfulfilled promises of improved surroundings. They wrote: “A lack of 
effective planning and zoning controls, lax enforcement, of health, sanitation, and maintenance 
standards and the substantial profits to be derived from the construction and rental of high 
density low maintenance apartment units have destroyed the original concept of a more civilized 
and liveable [sic] low-cost housing area. Ironically, one of the reasons for the high population in 
the Liberty City area has been the displacement of blacks from other areas by various urban 
renewal and improvement projects without adequate housing provisions having been made for 
them elsewhere.”212 
The northwest section of Dade County, which included Liberty City and formerly white 
suburbs, was isolated. The growing neglect of this increasingly contiguous area helped to 
reinforce the effects of environmental segregation, even in wealthier areas. Sharony Green 
described her 1972 move to Miami Gardens, a formerly white community about twenty or so 
miles north of Miami: “Sand dunes and empty fields surrounded our often pastel-painted homes. 
We were in the boondocks.”213 Black residents’ movements into white areas of Miami had 
created what the historian Arnold Hirsch had noticed in Chicago: a “Second Ghetto” in formerly 
white areas that left Black communities more isolated than ever before.214   
Though Liberty Square had begun as an effort to create a healthier urban environment, by 
1968, it had lost most of its palm trees and open space. Even the park that white developers had 
envisioned to keep Black and white neighborhoods separate had not materialized as the lucrative 
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buildings multiplied. Urban renewal, in the hands of private developers, had become slum 
reproduction. New slums had emerged to house those displaced by urban renewal as well as 
incomers from other areas. Trash collection was so erratic in Black areas in the late 1960s that 
Commissioner Athalie Range reported garbage was allowed to pile up for weeks outside some 
apartments in Liberty City. Sanitation workers picked up trash in Black areas only when they had 
nothing else to do. After facing two postponements on an ordinance that would mandate garbage 
collection twice a week throughout the city of Miami, Range asked supporters to come to the 
next commission meeting with bags of trash, which they emptied on the commissioners’ desks. 
The order, finally, was passed.215 
Private landlords had initially profited from the relocation housing that government 
agencies had initially been tasked with providing. But by the early 1960s, they had constructed 
fewer than 800 of a promised 1,500 public housing units.216 By the late 60s, Little HUD began its 
policy of leasing existing buildings from landlords. This meant that public housing in northwest 
Dade would now occupy the concrete monsters despised by reformers and public housing 
advocates. Rooms were tiny and without air conditioning, and their surroundings were unfit for 
children to play in.217 Far from the improved conditions the Housing Authority had envisioned 
20 years earlier, however, the state instead opted to lower its standards to those of the slum 
landlords. 
Little HUD’s change in strategy coincided with a decline in environmental conditions 
throughout the Second Ghetto. As the 1970s rolled in, Miami’s Community Relations Board – 
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formed during the era of civil rights reforms – detailed a grim picture of conditions in Black 
neighborhoods. Demand for public housing had swelled while the federal government froze 
funds, only providing for another 2,000 additional units. Incidents of police brutality and neglect 
pushed Black residents’ patience to the limit: In Opa Locka a stray bullet killed a bystander and 
triggered a riot. In South Miami, a disturbance began when police tried to arrest a youth in a 
youth center. Rapid growth in Second Ghetto areas was overpowering local services. According 
to the Community Relations Board, residents of Carol City and South Dade in Miami’s outer 
reaches “saw their communities as orphans with deficient pools and parks, street lighting, water, 
sewerage, paved streets, and sidewalks.” In the Overtown renewal area, most lots were vacant 
and empty buildings bred rats. Combined with opportunities denied and brutal police treatment, 
the poor environmental conditions Black communities continued to endure were proof that 
optimism about Civil Rights Era measures that did not directly address the injustices Black 
people suffered was misplaced. The Board wrote: “America can no longer take refuge in the 
myth of the ‘melting pot.’ […] Once we have taken off the rose-colored glasses of the sixties 
which falsely suggest that we are ‘color-blind,’ perhaps then we can bring together the beauty, 
the energies, and the richness of those diverse societies as synchronized gears...” 218 Instead, 
policies purporting to be “colorblind” proliferated, and when applied, they only served to deepen 
the differences between Miami’s Black neighborhoods and the rest of the city. And beneath the 
surface, targeted discrimination continued. 
Entering the Reagan Era, Dade County showed little interest in maintaining public 
housing. Unlike private units, Little HUD units were not regularly inspected for code violations 
because, as a 1985 Grand Jury report noted, the department was exempt from requirements for 
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County building permits and inspections for repairs. Dade County had received approximately 
$18 million in Federal Community Development Block Grant funds. Each year, the county 
distributed around 35 per cent of that money for the rehabilitation of privately-owned housing, 
while “only a meager amount” had been used to upgrade public housing – around $500,000. The 
rest was spent on other projects. The City of Miami, meanwhile, received $14 million in block 
grants, 50 per cent of which went to the rehabilitation of private rentals. No City of Miami 
Community Development money went to public housing, even though over 60 per cent of 
Dade’s public housing was located within the city limits.  
Although Little HUD staff occasionally made repairs when other agencies inspected 
properties, the 1985 Grand Jury report concluded that their “actions were totally inept,” allowing 
properties and the neighborhoods where they were located to deteriorate further. In 
developments like Liberty Square, jurors saw “defective plumbing lines leaking over kitchens 
and onto food counters, kitchen cabinets falling away from the wall. Leaky roofs, exposed roof 
beams, exposed electrical wiring, non-functioning space heaters.” Mothers, the report said, 
“described to us how their children were exposed to raw sewage, rodent and vermin infestation.” 
In the face of these conditions, Dade County HUD had been “totally unresponsive and 
unsuccessful” in meeting the need for maintenance. The state of its housing made Dade County 
one of the “largest slumlords in Dade County,” the Grand Jury declared.219  
These conditions disproportionately affected the properties Black residents inhabited. In 
1968, Dade County assumed responsibility for public housing, overseeing the construction of an 
additional 5,500 units. The county also opened a separate Section 8 housing office, administering 
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certificates granting rent subsidy vouchers for private accommodation in better-maintained 
neighborhoods. The Section 8 office was well-maintained and funded, staffed primarily by 
Latino workers, and located in places that were difficult for Black applicants to get to. By 
contrast, the staff at the public housing office was mostly Black and had inferior facilities. An 
investigation for a 1989 lawsuit filed by Overtown activist Anne Marie Adker found that after it 
noticed that Black applicants tended to apply for housing in the north of Miami while Latino 
applicants mostly applied in the south, the county maintained separate north and south waiting 
lists. A report created by the prosecution with advice from Mohl found that until 1992, the 
county had excluded public housing residents – most of whom were Black – from the Section 8 
program.220 The plaintiffs won the case, and Little HUD agreed to distribute more Section 8 
vouchers to Black applicants, but the neglect of Miami’s crumbling public housing stock 
continued.   
 While purported environmental improvements in Black areas often amounted to little 
more than the destruction of existing housing stock, white areas in Miami took part in national 
efforts to “clean up” neighborhoods. From the 1900s to the 1970s, the National Clean Up and 
Paint Up Bureau sponsored community spring cleanups all over the United States, often 
involving parades and other activities. The bureau was created by the paint industry’s first 
national professional organization, the National Paint, Varnish, and Lacquer Association. 
Frequently drawing on a sense of neighborhood pride and patriotism in its marketing materials, 
the Association collaborated with the Federal Defense Administration to produce a short film in 
1954 called The House in the Middle. The clip used footage from Operation Doorstep - in which 
the United States conducted a nuclear weapons test on wood-framed homes, mannequins, and 
 




cars - to demonstrate how well-kept streets were less vulnerable to a nuclear attack than 
neglected ones. “The house that is neglected is the house that may be doomed,” the voiceover 
narrates. Full-scale mock-ups subjected to the test blast “simulate conditions you’ve seen in too 
many alleys and backyards […] in slum areas.” Architecture scholar David Monteyne argued 
that the film drew on the “kind of urban planning research that was used to justify slum 
clearance,” while claiming that a coat of fresh white paint could help protect decent middle class 
homes from the heat of an atomic blast. “It is unclear whether the producers intended to draw a 
parallel between the whiteness of the paint and the preservation of a segregated U.S. suburban 
society,” Monteyne continued.221 The white supremacist conflation of orderly, well painted 
homes and white skin formed the other side of environmental segregation, and the desire to 
maintain it guided decisions such as the siting of waste disposal facilities in Black areas and the 
concentration of environmental amenities in areas deemed white.240 In this way, the urban 
landscape and the environmental policies that shaped it contributed in marking who 
was Black and who was not. 
Miami’s annual Clean-up Paint-up Fix-up events were administered by the Miami 
Committee on Ecology and Beautification, founded in 1958 by E. Albert Pallot, the chairman of 
Biscayne Federal Savings & Loan Association and a member of the Metropolitan Miami 
Municipal Board. The committee, made up mostly of Miami’s white downtown elite, was one of 
the first to explicitly championed urban environmentalism, which it did under a banner of civic 
pride. The group organized anti-litter campaigns including its annual cleanups, planted royal 
palms along Biscayne Boulevard, and launched a beautification program with Miami Dade 
Public Schools. It also organized a week-long Royal Poinciana Festival Week each June to 
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celebrate the red blooms of a tree brought to Florida from Madagascar. The Committee, then, 
promoted Miami’s tropical environment, its natural resources, and its ecology. 
Like many other cities, Miami continued its annual clean-ups long after the National 
Clean-up Bureau was shuttered. The logic of whose property was worthy of rehabilitation was 
reflected in the pages of the Committee’s annual reports, which were predominantly populated 
by whites. In 1967, First Lady Claudia “Lady Bird” Johnson presented Miami with a trophy as a 
winner in the 1967 National Cleanest Town Contest, bringing the city “into the national spotlight 
[…] as one of the cleanest, healthiest communities in the country in which to live.” This 
assertion, often echoed in local politicians’ pronouncements about the city, reflected only the 




Figure 7: A ‘Clean-up, Paint-up, Fix-up’ parade through Miami (“Annual Progress 
Report” [City of Miami Committee on Ecology and Beautification, 1970], Florida 
International University Government Documents Collection.) 
Clean-up efforts deflected scrutiny away from neglect by municipalities and landlords, 
and directed it toward individuals by stressing personal responsibility for maintaining clean 
streets. Theodore Gibson continued to champion renewal a decade after expressway construction 
had begun. When a $28 million urban renewal project was proposed for Coconut Grove, a group 
of residents formed the Coconut Grove Homeowners Protective Association, which held weekly 
meetings. The organization’s president was E.W. Franklin Stirrup Jr., a major landlord in the 
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largely Black West Grove. Stirrup said urban renewal would be better termed “Negro removal,” 
warning that renewal had left those displaced in “worse circumstances than before.” Gibson, by 
contrast, called fear about losing homes “unnecessary hysteria,” brought on by a few whites 
independently looking to buy up property. Gibson told listeners to “repair their homes, clean 
them up, and fix up their yards.” To Stirrup’s derision, Gibson said: “Urban renewal comes in 
because an area is run down. And an awful lot of us here don’t want to repair our houses and 
clean up our yards.”222 Gibson’s argument was that if renewal came to the West Grove, it would 
be residents’ fault – a claim that ignored the neglect, poor environmental health,  and 
overcrowding he and Elizabeth Virrick had decried not long before.  
Miami’s clean-ups also necessitated that the garbage collected be disposed of somehow. 
An account of a 1966 clean-up tallied up 227,246 tons of garbage burned at incinerators No.1 
and 2.223 Incinerator No. 2 was a huge facility at the center the West Grove, which operated 
between 1926 and 1970. Stoneman Douglas wrote in 1950: “In the middle of it all, a run-down 
city incinerator from which the Negro people had no service whatsoever, day and night spewed 
out its reeking smoke and sooty ash into all open windows and its flaming, blowing, half-
consumed rubbish over the nearby frame houses constantly in danger of fire. No one paid much 
attention to the proper enforcement of city ordinances. There were no colored policemen.”224 
Toxic smoke lit with ashes and embers from the smokestack blackened laundry, forced residents 
and children at school at Carver High and Tucker Elementary to stay inside, and lit fire to the 
Grove’s wood-framed houses. Many Grove residents died from various cancers.  Delores Baine, 
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who grew up in the Grove and attended Carver High, recounted being “bathed in ash and ashes 
from whenever they fired Old Smokey.” Baine said she and her family had all suffered from 
asthma.225 
Despite protests from Grove residents, the City of Miami expanded Old Smokey’s 
burning capacity to 300 tons per day in 1960. The city promised a new smokeless incinerator, but 
the design was so flawed it deposited an estimated one ton of ash into the community every day. 
It was not until a nearby white community stepped in that things changed; the City of Coral 
Gables and 22 of its residents sued the City of Miami to shutter Old Smokey for good. Arlene 
Schokett Tobin, who taught physical education at Carver Elementary in the late 1960s, was 
family friends with Raymond Nathan, a presiding judge in the Miami-Dade County district court 
system. She asked Nathan to inspect the incinerator’s effect on the area, which was so bad 
children had to cover their faces to go out and play. In 1970, Nathan deemed the incinerator a 
nuisance and ordered it permanently closed.226 Like the “clean-up” tradition, new environmental 
policies also had a detrimental effect on Black communities. In this final section, I will examine 
the toll mass transit exacted on Miami’s Black and Latino communities, as well as the rise of a 
campaign by union leaders that compared conditions in Miami with the actions of South Africa’s 
apartheid state. 
2.4 Environmentalism, transportation, and the oil crisis 
In his 1973 State of the Union address, President Nixon turned to the “crisis of our cities.” Not 
long before, he argued, city problems had been so rife that observers had claimed cities were 
doomed as centers of “culture, commerce, and of constructive change.” Public transportation, he 
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believed, could lead to better public health and a better environment. To pay for it, he said 
federal money that had been earmarked for interstate highway construction would be redirected, 
and mass transit capital grants would increase by $3 billion. Nixon added: “Good public 
transportation is essential not only to assure adequate transportation for all citizens, but to 
forward the common goal of less congested, cleaner and safer communities. As I pointed out a 
few weeks ago in my message on the environment and natural resources, effective mass transit 
systems that relieve urban congestion will also reduce pollution and the waste of our limited 
energy resources.”227 The growing oil crisis increased federal attention to public transportation as 
a solution for the declining fortunes of urban centers, but public transportation planning in 
Miami primarily benefited Miami’s predominantly white suburbs, while it harmed the 
environmental wellbeing and prosperity of Miami’s Black and Latino communities. 
Urban “infill” – increasing density in cities – was becoming an environmental concern 
for officials worried about the effects of sprawl. This rising concern also reflected the desires of 
young professionals who no longer wished to commute into town from the suburbs. In 1974, a 
Town and Country magazine profile of Miami found that the infill plans meant that the “gangling 
adolescent” sprawling out into the Everglades was at last “maturing.” Alongside a changing 
debutante scene, good nightclubs, and its status as a magnet for tourists from a host of countries, 
the piece gave much credit to County Manager R. Ray Goode for his efforts to revitalize the city 
core. Goode had arrived in Miami in 1961 to work as a county budget analyst and had risen 
through the ranks. He was the principal architect of the Decade of Progress bond issue, a $553 
million capital improvement plan passed by voters in 1972. It qualified for $2 billion in matching 
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funds, leading to new libraries, the Metrorail transit system, and other municipal 
improvements.228   
Rail transit formed the basis of growing local government interest in reducing the 
county’s energy consumption and controlling sprawl. The Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964 had 
provided money for local governments to bail out private transit companies and improve urban 
transit systems. Dade County, like many other metropolitan governments around the country, 
bought up privately owned and operated local transit systems. Concern about pollution was not 
the only environmental issue driving local policy. Since the Arab oil embargo of 1973, the oil 
crisis had sparked efforts to conserve energy in local government that dovetailed with growing 
anxiety about the pace of urban sprawl, even as easily-permitted and lucrative low-density 
developments proliferated. Sprawl had caused higher-income Americans’ energy consumption to 
increase significantly since the 1950s, attributable largely to home air conditioning and longer 
and more frequent car journeys. Spurred by Congress’s 1978 Comprehensive National Energy 
Plan, Dade County’s Planning Department produced its own energy conservation goals and 
policies to be achieved through urban development. It recommended more transit-oriented 
development – energy efficiency ordinances for construction, solar easements, recycling, and the 
construction of homes around transit hubs and of mixed-use developments to reduce the length 
and frequency of car trips.229 
The planners hoped that where the expressway had failed, a new heavy-gauge line called 
Metrorail could revitalize the urban core. New zoning codes and the attraction of new rail 
stations would encourage urban infill, “revitalizing” the many pockets of the city that had been 
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allowed to fall to neglect. Miami would construct “towns in town” around some of the new 
stations, allowing wealthy workers to live within walking distance from their offices. A new 
civic center, for example, would concentrate public services in one place, from libraries to law 
courts. These projects, aimed at attracting affluent new residents and workers, failed to serve 
Black residents. In 1980, four police officers were acquitted of killing Arthur McDuffie after 
they ran him off the road on his motorcycle and beat him to death. Writing in the Irish Times in 
the aftermath of the 1980 riot, Sean Cronin described what he saw as a tenet of U.S. ideology:  
The riots were a dangerous fad, not the result – as a Presidential Commission had found in the 
1960s – that “America was de facto an apartheid society.”230 A blue ribbon commission found 
that "[t]he long-time residents of Overtown have been excluded from virtually all economic 
prosperity in surrounding areas such as the Garment Center expansion to the north, the 
OMNI/downtown area to the east, the Civic Center/Hospital Complexes to the west, and the 
Government Complex to the south."231 Metrorail added to the list of facilities located in 
Overtown that were geared toward affluent newcomers rather than existing residents. 
Metrorail continued downtown’s encroachment into Overtown.232 A 1979 analysis for the 
redevelopment of Overtown judged that its southern portion could become a “significant 
residential node, offering apartments, townhouses, and perhaps condominiums” to downtown 
workers. But to make the area attractive for new arrivals, the planners foresaw “significant 
clearance or rehabilitation of existing buildings and the provision of certain amenities. 
Residential development in Overtown will also require more evidence of security and area 
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revitalization.”233 After the Overtown Metrorail station was built, Dade County planned to ask 
the Urban Mass Transportation Administration for funds to demolish 260 homes over four 
blocks and relocate their occupants in order to make room for a “pedestrian plaza, street 
beautification and open space and recreation improvements.”234 This would constitute the largest 
number of families to be displaced by the rapid-transit system, and it was to happen in an area 
that had already been sliced into sections by the north-south I-95 and east-west I-395 expressway 
systems. T. Willard Fair, the director of the Urban League of Greater Miami, maintained the old 
claim that those living in poor housing in Overtown would have the opportunity to move into 
better circumstances and receive relocation expenses. Fair said the area’s proximity to downtown 
and the new Government Center meant it was “too valuable for low-income housing.”235 
In addition to displacing more Overtown residents, Metrorail gobbled up funds for Dade 
County’s bus service, which served over 250,000 riders a day, most of them Black, Latino, or 
elderly. Back in 1976 when the county commission campaigned for the new $1.25 billion 
Metrorail system, the referendum passed by a slim margin due to high Black and Latino turnout 
inspired by the promise of a fleet of over 1,000 buses. Many of Dade’s Black residents, including 
those who had moved into town from Florida’s rural hinterlands, relied on public sector jobs like 
those that would staff Metrorail. Public transportation also offered Black citizens access to 
desegregated schools, hospitals, public libraries, and jobs. Both through its employment 
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opportunities and freedom of movement, public transportation offered Black citizens a route to 
the middle class.236 
Around the same time, labor attorney Mark Richard visited the London headquarters of 
the Trade Union Congress (TUC) where he first heard of union boycotts of products imported 
from South Africa. One striking poster featured common consumer items from the country 
riddled with bullet holes and dripping with blood, and was emblazoned with text: “This is 
Apartheid – Don’t Buy It.” Richard bought dozens of the posters to bring back to the Executive 
Board of the Transport Workers Union (TWU) Local 291 in Miami. Dade County 
commissioners were demanding concessions from the TWU amounting to $6,000 per worker, 
and the workforce was 70 per cent Black and 20 per cent Latino. A TUC official told Richard 
that “in his opinion the apartheid mentality didn’t only exist in South Africa, it appeared to be 
alive and well in Miami.” The observation led to a breakthrough in the TWU 291’s strategy to 
fight Dade County Transit Authority in its strategy “to make minority workers and their 
communities pay for the mistakes of what experts say is one of the most mismanaged transit 
systems in the country.”237 This was a moment when global condemnation of apartheid was 
rising, drawing attention to the strenuously-ignored subject of segregation in the United States, 
and increasing the potential embarrassment officials faced as a result of the comparison. By 
publicly evoking apartheid, the TWU made it much harder to gloss over the county’s tactics as 
unintended consequences or the workings of the market. The frame of racism put Dade on the 
defensive. 
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Union members operated Miami’s bus service, which served 200,000 predominantly 
Black, Latino, and elderly riders every day. Ten years after the referendum that founded 
Metrorail, the county’s fleet of buses was the nation’s oldest, and had been slashed from 670 
vehicles to 500 –  a far cry from the 1,000+ buses the community had been promised.238 
Meanwhile, Metrorail trains served just 20,000 riders per day – most of them young, white, and 
male – while taking up 40 per cent of the Metro Dade Transportation Administration’s operating 
budget. Dade County commissioners planned make up the shortfall from the huge costs of 
operating Metrorail by cutting bus service and forcing bus riders to make rail transfers to connect 
to other lines, a shift that required many students in Black and Cuban neighborhoods to leave 
home two hours early to get to school on time. Black and Latino workers lost jobs after their 
suddenly interminable commutes made them late, and elderly people found it difficult to reach 
the county’s only public hospital. On top of this, Metro Dade Transit Association (MDTA) also 
planned to cut union members’ wages and increase bus fares by 33 per cent.239  
Over a long battle with the county commission, the union collaborated with the local 
Black and Latino communities to argue that like the apartheid government of South Africa, Dade 
County endorsed a dual system of wages, working conditions, and transportation – one for 
whites, and one for the Black, the Latino, and the elderly. Committees on media organizing, 
membership action, research and materials, and community partnership mobilized call-ins to the 
commission, appearances on radio talk shows, rallies, and candlelight vigils. One leaflet was 
headlined “Apartheid Strikes Dade Transit,” describing the dual systems the union identified. 
Another called a meeting of a blue-ribbon panel on transportation convened by the commission 
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and MDTA a “Ku Klux Klan meeting.”240  Union representatives were quoted daily on television 
and in newspapers. One TV news report showed 200 Black and Hispanic transit workers in front 
of a Metrorail station in a Black neighborhood with signs declaring “Stop Apartheid at Metro-
Dade.” Black rail and bus riders joined the workers in pouring rain. City councils in nearby 
Hialeah, Opa Locka, and Sweetwater were among several who passed resolutions for support, 
and the Florida Consumers Federation committed to providing trained organizers. National 
groups such as the Citizen Action lobby also showed support. Chicago and Cleveland officials 
told the TWU they would support the union if it wanted to call a boycott of conventions and 
tourism in Dade County.  
In mid-August 1986, the union made public a study it had commissioned from the polling 
firm Professional Research Institute, arguing that MDTA was discriminating against poor elderly 
Black and Latino transit users. That week, MDTA chief Joe Fletcher was fired and County 
Manager Sergio Pereira promised the union a better contract that would put the transport workers 
on a par with white-dominated unions. He also restored some of the canceled bus routes. 
Commissioners up for reelection said more buses would take precedence over rail expansion. 
After it emerged that Pereira was not delivering on his contract promises, the union filed unfair 
labor practice charges against the members of the Blue-Ribbon Task Force. After the union 
served the Task Force members with subpoenas, the county agreed to drop all but a few demands 
and grant union members the same raise other county employees had received.241  
 
240 Andy Ryan, “Union Plays Racism Card in Contract Debate,” Miami News, July 16, 1986. 
 




In linking the experience of Black, Latino, and elderly Miamians to that of Black South Africans 
living under apartheid, the Transport Workers Union connected with a national and international 
union movement against the South African government and struck a chord with local transit 
riders who depended on buses. It would not be the last time Black activists in Miami would 
invoke apartheid to achieve political ends. In 1990, Miami’s Cuban-dominated county 
commission snubbed a visit from Nelson Mandela due to his refusal to denounce Fidel Castro 
and Yasser Arafat.242 The Black Lawyers Association, led by H.T. Smith, persuaded Black 
organizations to boycott Dade County until its officials issued an apology to Mandela, took 
measures to promote Black economic interests, and reformed the political system to provide 
greater Black representation. Before the end of 1990, the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
National Organization of Women had canceled Miami conferences, resulting in a $60 million 
loss in convention business.  
In talks between Black and white leaders (the Cuban community was excluded), the 
boycotters won concessions that included a corporate-funded scholarship program at Florida 
International University, plans to promote Black workers in the Miami tourism business, and a 
retroactive statement from the Commission honoring Mandela.243 However, even after 
mobilizing formidable allies to participate in a three-year boycott, H.T. Smith’s demands and the 
white leaders’ concessions resembled Miami elite promises to Black communities after the city’s 
riots. They failed to tackle the causes of Black Miamians’ marginalization, promising greater 
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participation in Miami’s economic engine while stopping short of the measures that could 
fundamentally address the city’s systemic racism.  
In this chapter, I have explored the ways in which a system of environmental segregation 
perpetuated the economic and spatial isolation of Black residents, forced them to inhabit an 
unhealthy environment that shortened lives, increased exposure to extreme heat and illness, and 
enacted environmental policies that exacerbated the disproportionate environmental burden 
Black communities bore. I showed how downtown interests used environmental policies to 
continue attempts to displace Overtown residents. Far from being “colorblind,” the policies of 




3. Making Hurricane Andrew: Sprawl, Smart Growth, and 
Displacement 
In 1997, Bill Clinton addressed a room full of TV meteorologists on his vision for a United 
States response to climate change in the months before the negotiations for the Kyoto Climate 
Treaty. Warming up the crowd before Vice President Al Gore offered an early version the 
climate science presentation that would become An Inconvenient Truth, Clinton promised a 
formula for tackling emissions without tamping down the economic growth the United States 
achieved in post-war decades:244 
 [W]e must embrace solutions that allow us to continue to grow the economy while we 
honor our global responsibilities and our responsibilities to our own children. We have 
worked too hard here from the first day to revitalize the American economy to jeopardize 
our progress now. And furthermore, we cannot make changes that will leave whole 
chunks of that economy out in the cold without having a response to them. 
 
So the question is, can we emphasize flexible, market-based approaches? Can we 
embrace technology to make energy production more efficient and put fewer greenhouse 
gases into the atmosphere? Is there, in short, a way out of astronomical taxes or heavy-
handed governmental regulation that will permit us to gradually bring down our 
greenhouse gas production and still grow the economy and enjoy what we've been 
enjoying here for the last four and a half years? I believe the answer is yes.245 
 
As well as hoping to allay the concerns raised by Clinton’s predecessor George H.W. Bush about 
the effect emissions cuts would have on the economy, Clinton and Gore hoped that 
weathercasters – who had scientific training and enjoyed levels of public trust that would make 
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any politician or journalist envious – might talk to their audiences about climate change.246 
Among the well-coiffed crowd were John Morales and Bryan Norcross, Miami’s top-rated local 
weathercasters. Thousands of Miami citizens credited the two for saving their lives five years 
before on the eve of Hurricane Andrew. 
On August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew wrought $25.3 billion worth of damage, left 
250,000 people temporarily homeless, and killed 65 across the Bahamas, South Florida, and 
Louisiana.247 In Dade County, around 375,000 people – nearly 20 per cent the population – bore 
the brunt of the destruction to property. Ten per cent of the county’s total housing stock was 
rendered “useless.”248  An article in the Washington Post described a “sense of excitement” 
among critics of sprawl who imagined that Andrew had created an opportunity to rethink 
development patterns. Though they feared that a rush to rebuild could lead to the same old 
shoddy building practice and the continued proliferation of “strip shopping malls and cookie-
cutter subdivisions,” Andrew was also a “tremendous opportunity for sensible regrowth.”249 
Disaster experts called Andrew a “laboratory” for understanding disaster mitigation and 
suggesting new ways forward.250 Despite the excitement, however, the most consequential 
response to Andrew was reform to the South Florida Building Code, not an effective 
reevaluation of where building should occur. Development continued apace, but with stricter 
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rules governing what was built. In addition, Miami’s aversion to discussing the causes of racial 
inequality led to a general view that Andrew affected rich and poor alike, masking a starkly 
unequal recovery process and increasingly divergent levels of wealth. 
Clinton’s speech offered the prospect of “decoupling” economic growth from emissions, 
an approach that allowed enjoyment of the fruits of growth without the harm. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, Miami officials had been attempting their own feat of decoupling, allowing the city to 
grow and deepen its tax base by attracting wealthy new residents, while halting the creep of 
sprawl into agricultural areas and sensitive wetlands. The case of Andrew offers a window into 
attempts to decouple growth from its deleterious effects on a local stage. Studying this balancing 
act at a local scale shows that the harm inflicted on poor communities – especially Miami’s 
Black communities – through racially-discriminatory legislation and urban sprawl, were carried 
over into “smart” growth policies.  
Disasters expose the weaknesses of societies, but the narratives about the problems – and 
the solutions – that arise are just as likely to perpetuate them as to spur change. This chapter 
traces the path to a solution through the actions of several groups: meteorologists and engineers, 
builders, journalists, a group of businessmen tasked with coordinating the recovery, and 
architects who proposed a new paradigm of sustainable development in the region. From the 
interactions between these different groups, a solution emerged to solve the problem of poorly 
built homes. It avoided tackling the sprawl and growth that had put many in danger, or the 
discriminatory housing practices that helped to drive growth and left Miami’s Black population 
particularly vulnerable. Andrew was severe enough to displace a quarter of a million people and 
cause significant changes in Miami-Dade, yet it was still insufficient to spur many hoped-for 
changes. Instead, growth accelerated, but this time with a stronger building code and better 
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enforcement. While some argued that the storm was an admonishment of the unadulterated 
growth machine politics for which Miami was famous, Andrew’s story was an important 
illustration of the resilience of such coalitions and narratives. It illustrated the difficulty of 
recasting a landscape shaped by state laws that required a constant influx of people and racially 
discriminatory policies that had encouraged suburbanization, as well as a political consensus 
about growth. 
3.1 The growth before the storm 
Miami is frequently described a “growth machine.” 251 Its political system has been dominated by 
development interests since the city’s inception, but its scope has changed over time. This 
evolution coincided with a change in Miami’s political elites, evolving from a paternalistic 
system dominated by white bankers and developers to a Latino-dominated ruling class operating 
in a globalized development market.252 That move coincided with a shift in Miami and many 
other US cities toward a preference for “value-free development” – the notion that free markets 
alone should determine land use, and that land-use regulation endangers both the wider society 
as well as the specific places designated as areas of value. According to this reasoning, markets 
are the “only legitimate mechanism” for determining not only what is produced, but where and 
how production should occur, taking control of local business decisions away from communities. 
Cities like Miami instead did what they could to attract investors in the pursuit of aggregate 
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growth – a goal on which many of the city’s influential citizens agreed, from elected officials to 
academics.253 
Long before the ascent of Latino leadership, Florida already favored “growth machine” 
policies. As part of its drive to attract new settlers, the state’s constitution forbade the levying of 
income taxes. In the absence of income tax revenue, the state’s leaders realized development was 
one means to increase the state’s tax base, albeit one that necessitated a constant stream of new 
arrivals and developments. The policy made economic growth and development synonymous.254 
Increasing numbers of Cuban migrants beginning in the 1950s and 60s allowed this community 
to become an increasingly powerful force. The old Miami business elite joined forces with the 
new Cuban elite to make the most of the international business opportunities Miami provided.255 
The city’s internationalization had fostered the emergence of a political and socioeconomic elite 
dominated by growth interests. Miami’s dominating ethos of profit maximization as a social 
good - the Miami Way - meant that there were few impediments when the growth machine 
threatened public interests.256 
Miami’s early growth, which had been confined to the coastal ridge and Coconut Grove, 
had given way to a rise in homesteading in southern and western portions of the county during 
the Great Depression. That pattern had escalated between the 1950s and 70s with the resurgence 
of rapid suburban development in the county’s outlying areas. In 1980, the Mariel Boatlift 
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brought 120,000 Cubans to Miami, many of whom stayed permanently. After the U.S. 
abandoned its support of the right-wing Contras in Nicaragua in the late 1980s, an influx of 
working-class immigrants from Central America, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Puerto 
Rico, Cuba, and Haiti moved to the United States. Conversely, migration of whites from other 
parts of the United States had slowed, becoming negative after 1970. Many long-term residents 
left the increasingly diverse city: The white population reduced by 24 per cent between 1980 and 
1990.257 One former county manager who left government to work for the Babcock Company, 
one of the nation’s largest homebuilders, called the 1980s a “period of a silent hurricane,” when 
development went unchecked.258 Between 1970 and 1990, more than 70 per cent of the county’s 
residential growth occurred in unincorporated Dade. Forty-two per cent of Dade County’s 
developed land was devoted to residential housing, most of which was made up of single-family 
homes.259 
Four powerful building associations operated in South Florida: the Latin Builders’ 
Association, the Builders Association of South Florida, the Associated General Contractors, and 
the Associated Builders and Contractors. They were all in competition to house the Cuban 
immigrant community, who had gradually saved enough money to buy their own homes in the 
suburbs. A handful of companies had built South Dade’s new suburbs over agricultural land and 
wetlands, companies like Lennar, Miami Dade’s largest builder, and Arvida/JMB Partners, 
owned until 1987 by the Walt Disney Company. Developments such as Country Walk, Lakes by 
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the Bay, and Ridgeview Gardens were advertised as a “city beyond the crowd,” with wide 
streets, green spaces, and manmade lakes.260   
Following a nationwide pattern, Miami’s suburbanization after World War II intensified 
the racial disparities formalized through Jim Crow segregationist laws and practices that 
concentrated minorities – particularly Black Americans – into poor, isolated neighborhoods with 
few opportunities for wealth creation and limited job mobility.261 Policies that provided tax 
breaks for homeownership coupled with the Federal Interstate Highway Program, which 
connected city centers to cheaper land on the edges of the urban core, to disproportionately 
benefit affluent, middle-class households. At the bottom of the income spectrum, Miami’s Black 
population was excluded from these inducements and isolated in depopulating urban centers that 
were bleeding job opportunities and investment.262 Globalization compounded the problems. 
Writing in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, Yang Zhang said: “[U]uneven access to credit 
(both residential and commercial) and globalization-induced economic restructuring,”  which hit 
Black and Latino populations particularly hard due to the higher proportion of people in lower-
skilled jobs, “helped precipitate structural discrimination against poor residents in city 
centers.”263  Since 1900, there had been several Black settlements in South Dade: Homestead, 
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Florida City, South Miami, Perrine, and Goulds. Isolated by the mechanisms of environmental 
segregation, these rural Black communities also lacked basic amenities and infrastructure. 
As subdivisions sprouted in South Dade, the region had begun concurrently to try to 
mitigate coastal hazards from events like hurricanes and to preserve delicate ecosystems. Starting 
in the 1970s, officials began to discuss implementing an “Urban Development Boundary” that 
would prevent new developments from encroaching into the Everglades beyond a designated 
point. In 1985, Florida adopted the Growth Management Act in an attempt to curb the 
development encroaching on natural habitats all over the state. At the local level, Dade’s 1988 
Comprehensive Development Master Plan prohibited expenditure that subsidized extra 
development of public and critical facilities and mobile home parks close to the shore in the 
designated Coastal High Hazard Area. The plan required potential sea level rise to be considered 
in the design and location of public facilities, and aimed to concentrate growth and development 
around centers of activity, promote contiguous growth patterns and infill in “blighted and already 
developed areas,” and protect sensitive natural and agricultural lands to the west.264  The plan 
contained loopholes, however, allowing it to remain flexible in the face of developer demands. 
Hotel developers who wished to build in the Coastal High Hazard Area would gain permission 
by falsely claiming that the structures would be vacant during hurricane season, for example.265 
For its part, the anti-sprawl movement’s rhetoric, planning and legislation was almost silent on 
the roots of the sprawl problem in discriminatory practices such as redlining.266  As I show 
below, the ensuing measures sought to balance continued population growth and development 
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with environmental preservation, but they relied on old practices of displacement to allow for a 
theoretical decoupling of growth from environmental impact. 
3.2 Finding a narrative 
As engineers toured the disaster area in the days following Hurricane Andrew, poor construction 
began to emerge as a major factor in the scale of the devastation. Focus in the media and public 
forums shifted toward subpar building practices as the task force found widespread use of 
roofing staples instead of nails, and homes with roof trusses that were not anchored to walls. 
Reginald Walters, Dade's Planning Director until 1992, said the competition among builders to 
slash costs and pocket more profits had become cutthroat, and “shoddy construction” was the 
result. He said: “I've had builders say to me, ‘Reg, you wouldn't believe the competition, the 
fierceness, almost to the point of not good business practices.’”267 
In this section, I examine the emergence of a response to Andrew that promised stronger 
buildings, exploring how different groups coalesced to elevate this cause of the destruction above 
all others. I also discuss less-successful attempts to address the growing sprawl that was putting 
pressure on South Florida’s ecology and infrastructure. Finally, I show how Miami’s elite groups 
avoided addressing the role racial inequality played in Miami’s built environment and the way 
this inequality contributed to vulnerability and lengthened recovery times. This response 
emerged from elite conversations, but was aided by a network of factors: failing instruments that 
created a controversy over wind speeds, immigration patterns, earlier investigations into building 
practices, obdurate suburban infrastructure, disaster recovery legislation, and a lack of flooding. 
The case of Hurricane Andrew shows how, even when policies do not explicitly discriminate 
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against underserved communities, a failure to address underlying vulnerabilities and power 
imbalances can instead compound them. 
3.3 Meteorologists, journalists, and the boundaries of expertise 
Just after 4:30am on August 24, 1992, the storm blew the radar and anemometer – the instrument 
used to measure wind speed – off the roof of the National Hurricane Center in Miami. Andrew’s 
winds also decimated other official instruments in the hurricane’s wind field. While the 
Hurricane Center’s satellites, radars, and airplanes continued to track and forecast Andrew’s 
progress toward Louisiana, readings from all publicly funded weather stations in the storm’s path 
were inadmissible. Some broke in the wind. Others, like the one at Homestead Air Force Base 
were switched off or removed before the storm made landfall. Andrew’s eye – where the 
strongest winds are found – was only 15 miles in diameter, so it squeaked past the weather 
stations it failed to destroy. One report read: “Neither of the two conventional measures of 
hurricane intensity, central barometric pressure and maximum wind speed, were observed at 
official surface weather stations in close proximity to Andrew at landfall.”268 The limited number 
of observations meant hurricane scientists had a much harder time estimating Andrew’s 
maximum sustained wind speed and peak gusts as it hit land.269 To complicate matters further, 
hurricanes do not behave uniformly over land, especially in built-up areas where trees and 
buildings interact with the airflow, creating completely different circumstances that range from 
rapid, violent gusts to relative shelter. 
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The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration’s Hurricane Research 
Division, also based in Miami, released an advertisement in the Miami Herald calling for 
members of the public to send in measurements they had taken on instruments at home during 
the storm.270 Scientists visited the respondents to interview them and inspect their instruments. 
They discounted many for what they deemed to be nonstandard measurements, but they judged a 
few to be credible. A brother and sister living a quarter of a mile apart recorded nearly identical 
barometric readings, for example, that suggested Andrew had behaved unusually, strengthening 
over land when hurricanes usually get weaker as they encounter buildings and other obstacles.271  
The public call came despite the fact that the Hurricane Center knew roughly how fast the 
storm’s winds were. It had tracked Andrew using data from satellites, radars, and specialized 
“Hurricane Hunter” aircraft. Using these proxies, the Hurricane Center estimated Andrew was 
around a Category 4 storm with sustained winds of no more than 156 miles per hour.272 But 
without on the ground estimates of sustained wind speed and highest gusts, the strength of 
Hurricane Andrew became contestable. Based on studies of the wind damage to buildings, the 
Wind Engineering Research Council, a group of engineers who study the effect of winds on 
buildings, claimed the Hurricane Center had overestimated Andrew’s average speed over land, 
especially in the places that had been destroyed. Rather than Category 4, they put wind speeds at 
Category 2, indicating a sustained wind speed of 96-110 miles per hour. Compounding the 
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confusion, the meteorologists and engineers used different terminology and procedures to create 
surface wind analyses.273 
The groups attacked each other’s credibility. Bob Sheets, the head of the National 
Hurricane Center argued in turn that “so-called wind engineers” were relying on “overly 
simplistic models” to arrive at their conclusions.274 Sheets called the engineers “highly overrated 
in their ability to determine what the wind is on the basis of damage.” The engineers countered 
that the hurricane scientists were backing up claims by powerful people that Andrew was an 
unavoidable act of God, not a tragedy caused by careless growth. “Hurricane Andrew was not 
the monster that all the developers and all the politicians want to believe,” said Peter Sparks, one 
of the engineers. Sparks said Sheets “wants to give the biggest figures he can lay his hands on. I 
don’t know if he’s paid by the mile per hour or what.”275 These expert conflicts compounded the 
narrative focus on building techniques and inspection over other concerns. 
The numbers had a direct bearing on the outcomes of cases brought against builders 
accused of failing to build developments flattened in the storm to code. After the storm, 
engineers in Jeeps had fanned out into the wreckage of South Dade. In several areas, they found 
roofs insecurely stapled on and hurricane straps that did not connect to the rest of the house, 
spurring a crop of class action suits against the developers. If the engineers’ estimate were 
accurate, it would boost the plaintiffs’ case. Along with some politicians, developers like Lennar 
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contended that the winds were so strong that no house could have survived.276  State Attorney 
General Janet Reno called the Hurricane Research Division to check how strong the winds 
“really were to allay some of the rumors swirling around.” 277  Reno told local reporters: “We are 
investigating what damage could have been averted and if anyone was criminally 
responsible.”278  The fight also heightened conflicts between the insurance industry, pushing for 
more exacting housing codes, and builders who argued insurers were advocating for “bomb-
shelter-type homes” – ugly and, worse, expensive.279 
A piece in the New York Times hinted that the debate was not just about the correct way 
to measure hurricanes. With homeowners suing builders for fraud and breach of contract, a law 
professor quoted in the piece said the wind debate was a “classic jury question,” setting up the 
debate as “one expert versus another expert.”280 The Times wrote: “Which number sticks – 
particularly in the perception of Hurricane Andrew – will shape decisions about the way homes 
are built, what they will cost and who may shell out how much in homeowner liability 
lawsuits.”281 Expert opinions, then, were central in validating the experiences of those whose 
homes were destroyed, as well as in steering the direction in which narratives about Andrew 
would coalesce. 
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The controversy helped to focus attention on building practices in South Dade. Sheets 
had long been an advocate of protective measures like hurricane shutters. In an interview after 
the storm, he told a local academic about how hurricane shutters of his own design had been 
crucial to his home’s survival.282  Sheets advocated revisiting the strengths of past architectural 
styles. Unlike the engineers or insurers, he did not condemn the South Florida building industry, 
but focused on newer architectural preferences for airy wood-framed homes over traditional 
concrete block construction with small windows. At a conference the following year on the 
lessons learned from Andrew, he argued that the focus on poor construction was misplaced: “I 
think that the wrong message went around the country today, the message that I find out there is 
that they believe nearly all the damage was a result of ‘shoddy construction’. The fact is, that the 
great majority of the homes in this community that suffered considerable loss are much better 
built than 90 per cent of the homes in coastal areas from Texas to Maine.”283 He called Country 
Walk, the development most famous for its total destruction, “beautiful” and “reasonably 
priced.” The notetaker at the conference session expressed surprise that Sheet’s emphasis was on 
“short-term human and property safety.” not “long-term protection and restoration of the 
environment.” This presentation focused on examples of the hurricane’s effect on construction, 
but did not address the hurricane’s effect on the natural environment, nor the protection nature 
affords from hurricanes.284  The challenges to the Center’s wind speed measurements and the 
resulting push to strengthen the Florida building code appeared to have focused Sheets’ attention 
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on building practices, not the systemic causes of hurricane damage. This focus, whether 
calculated or not, meant that Sheets did not risk censure from local policymakers or the 
development community.  
Other scientists were taking a broader view, however. The National Weather Service 
(NWS), administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), issued 
a report on Hurricane Andrew that differed from its usual reports after major storms. “NOAA’s 
partnership role with states in managing the Nation’s coastal zone, NOAA’s trustee 
responsibility for marine resources, and other agency wide concerns compel NOAA to step 
outside of the traditional NWS format in this preface to comment on Hurricane Andrew’s 
consequences in south Florida and Louisiana,” it read. “We would do well to heed the warnings 
that population growth and land use practice in the Nation’s Coastal Plains have set a stage for a 
series of hurricane disasters and associated economic consequences of unprecedented 
proportions.” Improvements in warnings and forecasts had increased the lead times NOAA and 
the NWS could give emergency management officials to act. “But, if disastrous consequences 
are to be mitigated, the coastal zone and other areas at risk must be managed in recognition of 
the awful threat to life and property that hurricanes pose.”285 Compared to the National 
Hurricane Center, the National Weather Service was under less of an obligation to work with 
local municipalities, giving it freer rein to criticize development patterns.  
When the coasts were relatively undeveloped, natural systems recovered quickly from 
hurricanes. But according to the report, migration to the Sun Belt had brought more people and 
property to the coasts than ever before, and many newcomers had never experienced a hurricane.  
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The NWS report warned: “This inordinate burden is leading to evacuation times in some areas of 
the country that are double the effective warning times that the National Hurricane Center (NHC) 
can provide.” New construction nationwide had occurred primarily on barrier islands and coastal 
flood plains. “Such development almost never relates to natural geographic or geomorphic limits 
of areas vulnerable to hurricanes. In most places, infrastructure is designed and subdivisions are 
approved without reference to the need to evacuate low-lying areas quickly,” it said.286 These 
problems were exacerbated by the continued destruction of the land’s natural protective features. 
Localities all over the U.S. had paved over beaches, dunes, tidal wetlands, and mangroves, 
leaving hard surfaces where soft, yielding systems had once absorbed waves and wind. In 
addition to enforcing building codes, it argued, state and local officials needed to revise land use 
planning, approvals, and permits to consider the potential effects of severe storms. 
The Hurricane Center and its leader Sheets were prominent voices in the local and 
national conversation about Andrew, but the NWS’ warnings went largely unnoticed. The 
Hurricane Center’s involvement in the controversy over the strength of the winds meant it was 
pulled into the discussion about the correct way to build homes in hurricane zones, but it 
remained silent on the question of development while Sheets defended building practices in 
South Florida. Scientists at the National Hurricane Center and Hurricane Research division were 
not just professional observers. They were also residents of Miami and victims of Hurricane 
Andrew; James Franklin, a National Hurricane Center meteorologist, who flew into storms in 
“Hurricane Hunter” airplanes for the Hurricane Research Division, had not bought hurricane 
shutters in the months before Andrew. When he flew through the storm before it made landfall – 
an experience he likened to the “Tower of Terror” drop tower ride at Disney World – and then 
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had to return home and experience the hurricane again, feeling vulnerable and unprepared after 
dashing to the shops to buy supplies. “I was about as scared as I remember being. […], he said. 
Flying through hurricanes had always been fun. But after Andrew, “suddenly, it was less fun.”287 
Andrew was a personal event for Miami scientists, removing the privilege of experiencing it at a 
remove. This made their decisions more fraught as they contributed to the narrative about the 
storm, and it also left them and their families physically vulnerable. 
In workshops and seminars around the country, the Center did not comment on the pace 
of development in coastal zones despite the increasing demands it placed on predictive capacity, 
requiring ever greater speed and accuracy in hurricane science. Ed Rappaport, who was a junior 
hurricane forecaster at the Center in 1992, was its acting director when I interviewed him in early 
2018. He said: “We recognize there are a variety of important factors involved that make this a 
very complicated subject, including zoning laws, building codes, insurance, the history of the 
area, and risk tolerance within the community and for individuals. And so, while we want to 
illuminate these issues, it's also a potentially very politically sensitive concern. We are focused 
on the area of educating people about what the issues are as opposed to necessarily taking a 
particular position.”288 The Hurricane Center must ensure people are evacuated in time, but 
avoiding discussion of overdevelopment, which puts more and more people in harm’s way and 
forces hurricane scientists to keep pace with ever more accurate predictions, does not mean that 
they are avoiding taking a position. Logan and Molotch contend that local academics such as 
scientists, especially those connected in some way to growth machine interests, often encourage 
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and defend policies that further growth agendas, such as outside investment.289 But the case of 
Andrew shows the problem was more complicated than that.  As Rappaport explained, the 
Center had to work with a wide variety of municipalities – and any appearance of taking a 
political position could potentially harm important relationships that needed to be preserved so as 
to protect populations when a hurricane threatened.290 The importance of development to many 
coastal economies meant that the Hurricane Center did not talk about the risks overdevelopment 
pose to communities in areas susceptible to hurricanes, while the National Weather Service 
report went largely unreported. In the absence of a strong voice from local scientists about the 
risks of overdevelopment, local and national news media were integral to creating, amplifying, 
and prolonging the debate about the winds, helping to focus attention on the idea that 
strengthening the South Florida Building Code could help to ensure Miami was better prepared 
next time. After the initial impact, media coverage took to contrasting the destroyed suburbs in 
South Dade with other more sturdily built developments, some of which were just next door. 
This local and national press helped to promote policy discussion that focused on Miami’s 
building codes. An influential Miami Herald investigation uncovered systematic code violations 
long suspected in the area. Despite some focus on developers’ lobbying efforts to develop more 
and more land south of the city, media sources paid far less attention to the runaway 
development that had created such vulnerability.  
Early media reports focused on the storm’s strength and shocking footage of homes 
reduced to rubble. Andrew was compared to a machine: a freight train, a “blender,”291 a 
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“chainsaw.”292 The aftermath was “like a bomb.”293 Governor Lawton Chiles said, “I never saw 
anything like that. It’s like an air bomb went off.”294 The New York Times called the landscape 
“fantastical”: “Tall palm trees yanked out of the ground with balls of roots and turf still attached, 
leaving lawns looking like pockmarked green carpets.”295 Hurricanes are more common in South 
Florida than anywhere else in the United States, yet Andrew’s effect on the suburban landscape 
that had grown up in the previous decades seemed to unsettle observers. Just as the documentary 
The House in the Middle channeled anxieties about Soviet nuclear attack toward the suburban 
home in the 1950s, these descriptions equated Andrew’s destruction with hostile technologies. 
Yet this destruction could only have been produced through accelerated suburbanization that 
placed poorly constructed homes on land that otherwise would have diffused the impact of the 
winds. 
After every natural disaster, groups and individuals try to frame news coverage to their 
advantage, seeking to avoid blame and, potentially, emerge with a burnished reputation.296  
These sources, with all their biases and prejudices, “originate much of what appears on the 
airwaves, as well as the pages of newspapers.”297 State officials blamed the federal government, 
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helping to unlock funds and military aid – it was an election year, after all, and George H.W. 
Bush was trailing Bill Clinton in the polls. After engineers’ reports began to suggest buildings 
had failed, reporters sought to determine whether someone was to blame for Andrew’s 
destruction. Their sources weighed in on whether shoddy construction could have been behind 
the devastation in South Dade. Many officials – often those connected to the development 
industry – were fatalistic, echoing builders’ claims that the winds were so strong that nothing 
could have been done to prevent it and avoiding the question of whether so many homes should 
be built in hurricane zones. Some politicians sided with the developers. The director of the 
county Building and Zoning Department, Carlos Bonzon (whom the Latin Builders’ Association 
supported in his bid for County Manager in 1995298)  maintained that the South Florida Building 
Code was the strongest in the country. Eduardo Roca, a general contractor and former Dade 
building inspector, said, “My personal opinion, when you’re hit with winds of up to 160 miles 
per hour, something’s got to give.” Miami Mayor Steve Clark, who “hid in his house” after the 
storm and refused to help the immediate response, said, "There's nothing we could build today 
with home construction that would stand. I suspect the wind was over 200 miles per hour."299  
Despite these claims, the word “shoddy” became inseparable from discussions about the 
city’s housing stock. Some homeowners had suspected that construction was not up to par before 
Andrew hit. In 1991, owners at Hampshire Homes, a development 21 mile south of Miami, sued 
Lennar for failing to adhere to the South Florida Building Code after they said they discovered 
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“had gone through the plywood without hitting the trusses and that were much farther apart than 
the six inches mandated by the South Florida Building Code.”300 Andrew Lopez, a printer who 
lived in Country Walk, told the Associated Press: “It was the most beautiful neighborhood you 
could imagine. It was picture perfect, New England-style, wood-frame homes. It was our dream 
house, and in about 50 minutes it was gone. I didn't know it was badly built. Now I’ve been up 
on the roof. I’ve seen all the wood up there – all substandard stuff as far as I can see.”301 That 
hopeful would-be suburbanites – many of them recent immigrants – found their new homes were 
thinly-constructed simulacra was a potent metaphor. While older, whiter suburbs had survived, 
Andrew appeared to show that detached homes in leafy surroundings were not available in the 
same way to everyone. 
The destruction of the American dream of suburban tranquility – especially focused on 
Country Walk - became a major theme in news coverage. Sheets said he suspected part of the 
reason was that “some people from the media lived there.”302 Soon after Andrew, TV news 
programs aired frequent discussions on the area’s building codes. A CNN segment compared a 
home built by Jimmy Carter’s affordable housing nonprofit Habitat for Humanity, which only 
received minor damage, to the more expensive homes bought for $100,000 and $150,000 in 
areas like Country Walk, where builders had used wood frames and staples instead of the nails, 
thereby promoting recommendations for improvements in the South Florida Building Code, like 
a ban on the use of staples and particle board in constructing roofs.”303 
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Prompted by the “finger-pointing”304 between homeowners and builders in Andrew’s 
aftermath, Miami Herald staff met soon after the storm to plan an investigative piece that would 
get to the bottom of the controversy and achieve a more objective view of what – or who – was 
to blame for the destruction. Steve Doig, the paper’s research editor, had been working to make 
his home habitable in the first few days after the storm. When he came back to work, he said, he 
and his colleagues felt it was time to go beyond covering the day to day recovery. “A group of us 
began to look at the question: Was this an act of God, or was this somehow our fault?”305 The 
Herald’s investigation illustrates sources’ ability to frame the problems and solutions associated 
with Hurricane Andrew, as well as the role of “critical incidents” in bolstering the credibility and 
status of journalists.306  
In an interview, Doig said he was “primed” to write the story. He had reported on 
hurricanes for the Herald in the years before Andrew, and in 1991 he had published an article 
showing that given the relative frequency with which hurricanes made landfall in South Florida, 
the region was experiencing an unusually long dry spell. The Herald had also covered criticism 
from bodies like the Dade County Grand Jury concerning the weakening of the building code. 
Further, Doig had written articles on construction in the region that made heavy use of the 
information contained within tax records like the size of the property, its sale price, and the type 
and year of construction, among other variables. “I realized we could take the property tax roll, 
 
304 Steve Doig in discussion with the author, June 27, 2019. 
 
305 Doig in discussion with the author. 
 




merge it with this database of the damage inventory and see if there were patterns,” he said. This 
research yielded a “smoking gun”: the year of construction.307 
Doig’s analysis showed that many of the neighborhoods worst hit were not affected by 
the strongest winds. Rather, the best predictor of destruction was when the subdivision was built. 
Doig found that “houses built since 1980 were 68 per cent more likely to be uninhabitable after 
the hurricane than homes built earlier.” The Herald collated experts’ competing conclusions on 
the causes of the peculiar pattern of damage in South Dade, but Doig also offered his own 
analysis, drawing on county damage reports, scientists’ wind maps, and property tax records, 
among others. That December, the Herald published Doig’s work as the centerpiece of “What 
Went Wrong,” a Pulitzer Prize-winning special report. It wrote: 
Bad construction or big wind? Poor design or weak building materials? Experts rushed 
forward to explain. Meteorologists talked of 200 mph wind "streaks" that tore certain 
houses apart. Engineers saw numerous construction flaws in the rubble. In each case, the 
expert was forced to draw quick conclusions from a scant sampling of data. No one knew 
the overall pattern. No one had hard data to back up scores of impressions from the field. 
After a peak gust reading of 163 mph was registered at the National Hurricane Center in 
Coral Gables, many believed that a killer storm simply flattened South Florida, like a 
160-mph rolling pin.308 
 
The Herald had found the answer that others could not. It argued that the age pattern settled the 
debate over whether the wind was the only culprit, or whether poor design, lax inspections, and 
inadequate materials were also to blame. The investigation established the Herald as an expert 
voice as well as an adjudicator in the emerging local and national narrative about Hurricane 
Andrew. 
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“In the past, this would have been the kind of story where we would’ve quoted both sides 
and left it up to the reader to decide which one’s right and nobody would have had an idea,” 
Doig said. “But when we were able to get a look at the pattern and to say that new homes were 
more likely to be destroyed than older ones and to map them and show the quiltlike pattern of the 
damage and that even in the same winds you have some places that did great and others that were 
just completely destroyed. And that data went beyond just the words from both sides to show 
something that people could visualize and begin thinking about, that’s an important element of 
data reporting.” The Herald’s coverage aimed to take “anecdotal findings,” like previous reports 
by the Herald and other media outlets or the findings of Dade’s Grand Jury and put them into 
context. Doig’s analysis found that a contractor convicted in 1986 of bribing an inspector to 
approve roofing jobs had built 30 homes left uninhabitable by Andrew.309 The data Doig and his 
colleagues uncovered gave the Herald’s reportage added gravitas at a moment when Andrew’s 
meaning was still up for grabs. 
Doig stressed that journalistic expertise was essential to reading the results of his 
database investigations. “When you use a computer like this, it doesn’t tell you why,” he said. “It 
just tells you what happened, and you still have to do traditional reporting to find out why that 
pattern was there.” The report helped strengthen the case for building code reform. “The 
construction code has been stiffened,” Doig told Computerworld magazine after the Pulitzer 
announcement. “A new code about to go into effect will address a number of the problems that 
led to the patterns we found.”310 The code – which had been weakened in several areas such as 
allowing staples instead of nails for roofing – was strengthened, more inspectors were hired, and 
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inspections were made more rigorous. It was not the data alone, but the combination of 
quantification and interpretation that made the Herald investigation so authoritative.  
Doig suggested that the investigation alone could not have led to the prevailing 
understanding that the disaster was the result of poor building codes. It was also a politically 
convenient narrative that focused attention on a small part of the problem. The code changes 
were the most obvious consequence of the story, he added, in part because they were the “easiest 
to focus on.” The Grand Jury and the Herald had shown that the code had been weakened, and 
that there was a pattern of destruction linked to weakened codes and poor inspections. “There 
was movement to toughen the building codes and give more resources to the building inspectors 
and other of the easy fixes that could be done. It’s easy to pass an ordinance saying, okay, you 
have to use three quarter inch plywood instead of half-inch, or whatever. And then, the people 
who are making those decisions can sit back and say, ‘Aha, we’ve done something.’”311 
The question of whether the Herald would – or could – have pushed a solution that 
curtailed growth also brings into focus the role of the paper in the wider community. According 
to Logan and Molotch’s conception of the city as growth machine, anti-growth stances are 
antithetical to a local newspaper’s overall role in that machine. A pro-growth bias exists 
regardless of individual reporters’ coverage, or individual articles exploring growth curtailment 
or the economic inequalities and corruption that result from growth machine politics. They write: 
“The newspaper has no ax to grind except the one that holds the community elite together: 
growth. This disinterest in the specific form of growth, but avid commitment to development 
generally, enables the newspaper to achieve a statesmanlike position in the community. […] The 
publisher or editor is often the arbiter of internal growth machine bickering, restraining the short-
 




term profiteers in the interest of more stable, long-term and properly-planned growth.”312 Like 
many of Florida’s newspapers, the Herald had been a bullish advocate of growth in Miami’s 
early decades, extolling the benefits of investment in the area while minimizing the threat of 
hurricanes. After the 1926 hurricane killed 372 people and caused $100 million in damage, the 
Herald and fellow South Florida newspapers, minimized the scope of the damage and the danger 
of living in a hurricane area. Time and again, when devastating extreme weather struck, South 
Florida’s business captains and their allies in the press pushed to rebuild bigger than ever.313  
The Herald also investigated the Latin Builders Association (LBA), which had begun to 
amass members and wealth from the beginning of the 1980s and had pumped millions into 
County Commissioner races. The LBA grew from 100 members in the early 1980s to 1,000 by 
1992. In 1988, members of the organization helped get Joaquin Avino – the brother of a member 
of the LBA’s board – appointed as Dade County Manager. The LBA and other building industry 
groups had successfully campaigned for the approval of cheaper materials, like roofing staples 
instead of nails. When they asked for permission to push further into undeveloped South Dade, 
they also got it. Additionally, the Association helped to persuade the County Commission to 
open 2,800 acres of land in West Dade to development.314  
Despite this knowledge, the Herald investigation did not probe deeply into the role of 
overdevelopment in the disaster. Instead, the investigation touted the importance of good 
building practices, framing the problem as predominantly one of poor-quality construction rather 
than an inherently dangerous location. Its reportage spotlighted a developer whose subdivisions 
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suffered relatively light damage, for example. Raul Munne, developer of Munne Estates, was 
praised in an article for using thicker plywood, nails instead of staples, and roof bracing that 
ensured the homes on his estate did not collapse.315 In another article in a special section called 
“What You Can Do,” engineers, architects, and builders gave advice to future homebuyers. 
While most, like Herb Saffir, the Miami-based engineer who co-created the Saffir-Simpson 
hurricane scale, and the architect Gene Farmer, advised readers to obtain reports, hire engineers, 
and go onsite to inspect the building themselves, only one, Jose Mitrani, was quoted advising 
buyers to remember that 20 or 30 miles inland was still near the coast when it came to hurricane 
vulnerability.316 Despite individual investigations of corruption or critiques of overdevelopment, 
the newspaper as a whole remained committed to growth. This meant that while it could back a 
push for better building codes or criticize individual players, the prudence of growth itself was 
not up for sustained debate. 
3.4 Finding the culprits 
The Dade County Grand Jury had waged a long war against the bad building and insufficient 
inspections booming all over the region. Its investigations blamed builders and individual 
officials and departments, but it, too, stopped short of a systemic critique of the race to pave 
South Dade. Instead, it turned the blame on individuals and the community at large for failing to 
ask enough of developers and regulators. The Herald’s reporters used Dade County records from 
magnetic tapes to show that some inspectors reported making as many as 80 inspections in a day, 
four times the maximum number thought possible.317 The inspection figures corroborated 
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evidence from private investigators working for a Dade County Grand Jury three years previous: 
Inspectors were under pressure to meet the demands of the building boom in South Dade and 
were falsifying reports or carrying out no more than cursory inspections. A jury began to 
investigate the construction industry and county inspectors after one woman in Northwest Dade 
could not get compensation from her developer for irreparable roof leaks in her new $140,000 
home. It uncovered structural deficiencies in eight five-story, low-income housing buildings that 
were so serious that the floors and ceilings constantly shook. The jurors were “dumbfounded” 
that buildings could be code-compliant despite glaring problems like leaking roofs, buckling 
floors, and doors that did not open or close.318 
Private investigators had followed inspectors as they took early lunches and claimed 
impossible numbers of inspections. A 1989 Grand Jury report stated: “One electrical inspector 
reportedly stopped at fifteen sites during his eight-hour inspection day. In reality, he went to one 
commercial construction site for approximately thirty seconds after having spent thirty minutes 
eating breakfast and proceeded to spend the next hour at a bowling alley watching a woman 
bowl. [...] The inspector did not stop at any of the assigned locations on his route sheet which he 
indicated as inspected.”  Inspectors claimed to be carrying out a dizzying average of 28.7 
inspections per day, and that number later skyrocketed to 80.319   
The Grand Jury report from Fall 1992, filed that December, reflected the mixed emotions 
of Miamians. Many of the jury members had lost much in the storm, and their report turned the 
blame on “all Floridians” for failing to learn the lessons of previous hurricanes:  
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Each of us has failed to be sufficiently responsible to ask the necessary questions of our 
governmental regulators, of our construction industry, and of ourselves. Collectively, we 
allowed the South Florida Building Code to become outdated; we allowed our builders to 
use questionable construction techniques and materials; we allowed our enforcement 
agencies to lessen their diligence in code enforcement; and we allowed ourselves the 
luxury of never asking questions about the structural integrity of our homes or the 
appropriateness of the materials used. Andrew’s most obvious lesson was that we were 
not prepared for this hurricane, neither as individuals nor as a community. This mistake 
must not reoccur.320 
 
In this formulation, the idea of individual responsibility for hurricane preparedness echoed 
Sheets’ narrowing of the problem to making one’s own home hurricane-proof. Community 
responsibility, meanwhile, was constructed as individual homeowners knowing enough to band 
together and demand better from developers and inspectors, even in a situation where local and 
state officials had abrogated their regulatory duties. In a world of unregulated housing, 
individuals were tasked with policing the safety of their homes themselves. Excluded from this 
understanding of community was anyone with less control over where they lived, such as renters 
– especially those who had no choice but to live in substandard housing.  
The jury argued that whatever the wind speed, experts had concluded that the South 
Florida Building Code’s wind load requirements were insufficient and needed to be 
strengthened.321 Like the Herald, however, the jury only mentioned growth management 
practices briefly, and it expressed confidence that sufficient planning could safeguard the county 
against further hurricanes: 
Adequate building codes, enforcement, growth management and land use planning all 
need to be better integrated at the state and local levels. The present rebuilding is a vital 
component of mitigation and pre-disaster planning for future storm events. Yet, despite 
their obvious interrelationship, there is little policy integration between the Dade County 
Department of Building and Zoning, the Office of Emergency Management and the Dade 
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County Planning Department. Through proper planning, we can become disaster resilient 
and resistant.322 
 
In its follow-up report for the Fall 1992 term, the jury noted that the changes to the South Florida 
Building Code went into effect on June 1, 1993, incorporating almost all the reforms suggested 
by the Spring Term Grand Jury.323 One building industry representative recalled attending 
around 40 meetings at the Board of Rules and Appeals to negotiate the changes.324 The jury 
report exposed the difficulties in investigating national building companies, as well as the 
complex land deals that underpinned uniform-seeming developments. Locating documents 
became incredibly complicated. What appeared to be single large developments were in fact 
patchworks of smaller developments that involved numerous companies and models of home. 
And while the developers cooperated in handing over documents, they had to be retrieved from 
warehouses, sometimes in different parts of the country. The focus on building code enforcement 
also had unintended consequences.  
What kind of effect did this discourse have on public perceptions of the storm, its causes, 
and its remedies? In the first weeks after the storm, members of the public quoted in newspaper 
articles still generally blamed nature for the destruction.325 But that perception appeared to 
change with time. A telephone survey of South Florida residents published a year after the storm 
illustrated mixed understandings about the causes of the damage. Most respondents 
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overestimated the strength of the winds. Yet, the majority also blamed the damage on lack of 
code compliance rather than inadequate codes themselves. And despite their belief that the winds 
had been far stronger than meteorologists and engineers had estimated, most thought affordable 
housing could be built to withstand major damage in hurricanes.326 One winner of a competition 
for the top ten “ideas for Dade” after Andrew proposed distributing a list of the “worst 10” 
contractors in Miami to the media. Another suggested a classification system of homes based on 
their level of hurricane resistance.327 
Some professionals criticized Miamians’ decisions to live in a hurricane-prone area, 
emphasizing the importance of a sense of personal responsibility for the risks they bore. At a 
conference on the aftermath of Andrew, Eugene Lecomte, the head of the American Society of 
Civil Engineers, argued:  
It has become accepted that people have the right to live where they want […] along the 
sea coasts or the river’s edge, atop a mountain, over a fault line, or in tornado alley. By 
exercising the right to choose where they want to live, the following question arises: ‘Do 
individuals have the right to pass on the ‘risks’ associated with residing in hazard-prone 
locales onto the rest of society?’ […] Traditionally, our society has embraced concepts 
which anticipate that each individual will be responsible, and accountable, for his or her 
own obligations – including those for ‘risks’ knowingly assumed. In recent years, society 
has moved away from this tradition. Should an effort be made to reinstitute the old 
standards and call upon individuals to again assume the responsibility for their conscious 
decisions by taking the steps necessary to ‘prefund’ their potential losses?328  
The code changes were overwhelmingly popular. When, a few years later, the state 
incorporated South Florida into a statewide building code, over 5,000 people showed up to 
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protest against any potential weakening.329 Meanwhile, anti-growth measures remained relatively 
obscure and tended to be unpopular with local governments and the public. This is not because 
local governments are unaware of risk. As a 1998 study argued: “Many people view natural 
hazard risks, especially the long-shot ones posed by low probability/high consequence events, as 
facts of life and acts of nature that are often inexplicable and cannot be completely avoided. 
Popper (1983) noted that professional land use planners will act to prevent or reduce risks, but 
will do so fatalistically, without firm expectations that they will succeed.”330 
Discussion in the public domain remained focused not on where to build, but how. 
Scholars of community power have investigated the way that only certain questions may reach 
public debate. Publicly-made “decisions” may be bitterly contested, but they are unlikely to 
fundamentally harm the interests of the most powerful elites. In the end, Miami’s developers 
settled most of their cases without admitting liability, while stricter building codes posed no true 
challenge to their freedom to build. “Non-decisions” – the questions elites resolved behind 
closed doors – were instrumental in deciding the outcome of Hurricane Andrew.331 
3.5 We Will Rebuild’s business-friendly recovery  
In 1992, Miami’s power structure was in a “volatile limbo,”332 with the corporate entities that 
formed its power structure – companies like CenTrust, AmeriFirst and Miami Savings Bank – 
withdrawing from public life due to financial troubles. Miami’s Cuban elites, meanwhile, were 
 
329 Jeff Blair in discussion with the author, 2019. 
 
330 Philip R. Berke, “Reducing Natural Hazard Risks through State Growth Management,” Journal of the American 
Planning Association 64, no. 1 (1998): 76–96. 
 
331 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review 56, no. 4 
(December 1962): 947–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/1952796. 
 




rapidly consolidating power,333 but had not yet ascended to the dominant political and 
commercial position they would later attain. In the conclusion of their book City on the Edge, 
Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick chart the rise of a Cuban political class in Miami and 
conclude that while new immigrants had gained a toehold in the city’s power structure, it was 
Miami Dade’s “Anglo”334 business elite that dominated the Andrew recovery effort.335  This was 
no accident, however. Immediately after the storm, President Bush called on Alvah Chapman, 
the former chief executive of the Miami Herald’s publisher Knight-Ridder, to head up a private 
sector coalition to raise and distribute recovery funds. The new body would be called We Will 
Rebuild!, and it would follow the template of Rebuild L.A., the group formed to direct the 
reconstruction of Los Angeles after riots protesting racial discrimination destroyed large parts of 
the city in the 1980s. The group would go on to direct $28 million of donations to a range of 
concerns.336  
Chosen for his influence and connections in the region, Chapman had spent a lifetime 
amassing power in South Florida. A graduate of the Citadel Military College in South Carolina, 
he had been accused of managing Knight-Ridder poorly, yet enjoyed a reputation as a 
conscientious and civic-minded community leader. A former Knight-Ridder staffer said: “He has 
a sense of integrity that sometimes slops over into rectitude. Alvah prays every morning.” In 
business, he attempted to drive out or buy up competing newspapers on Knight-Ridder’s turf like 
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the independent Detroit News. A former editor of one of his publications said: “Alvah Chapman 
likes monopolies. He would have been happy running a utility like Florida Power and Light, 
except for the regulations.”337 
Chapman had long been part of Miami’s firmament of non-decisionmakers. Fittingly, he 
and Harry Hood Bassett, chairman of Southeast Banking Corp, had formed a fraternity of a 
dozen CEOs in 1971 called the “Non-Group” to meet once a month in members’ homes to 
discuss public business. Maurice Ferré, mayor of Miami during the 70s, called the group “the 
shadow government of Dade County.” Chapman was known as the “linchpin in the Miami 
Business Machine.”338 Merrett Stierheim, the former Miami-Dade county manager, told the 
Herald: “If I faced a problem as county manager, I could tell Alvah I would like to meet with the 
Non-Group. Things got done.” While critics argued that local governments were the proper 
entities to conduct public business, Ferré argued that the businessmen were filling the political 
vacuum created by feuds between Miami-Dade’s cities, all with weak-mayor governments 
structured to limit mayoral power. After the McDuffie uprising in 1981, Chapman needed just 
seven phone calls to secure $3.5 million for a redevelopment project in Liberty City.339 The 
project’s emphasis on business recovery and failure to engage with grassroots community leaders 
foreshadowed both the focus and the criticisms of We Will Rebuild’s work.  
The Business Assistance Center aimed to encourage the reestablishment of Black 
businesses lost in the riots, which would then provide jobs for inner-city residents. In the ten 
years that followed, however, results proved mixed. While the effort helped to create some 
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businesses, the record was patchy.  Overall, the local and federal assistance projects succeeded 
primarily in establishing businesses outside the target area.340 Critics argued that compared to the 
depth of neglect the Black community had faced, the scale of investment from this private 
philanthropy-backed initiative was meager.  
Compounding the problem, Miami’s elites tended not to speak to Black leaders within 
affected working-class areas like Liberty City or Overtown, and instead invited middle-class 
Black citizens to discuss possible responses to the unrest. One Liberty City leader said: “They 
invited the middle-class Black people downtown who did not participate in the riot and asked 
them, ‘Why did you all riot?’ They didn't know, so what they did was articulate their own 
frustrations, which were ‘We're not in business, so if you put us in business we will not riot.’ 
And so the white community went out and raised seven million dollars to put us in business [...] 
but the riots didn't occur because Blacks are not in business and the folks who rioted couldn't go 
into business tomorrow if they wanted.”341 White leaders in the business community disagreed 
with their critics, arguing that their effort was unprecedented in the country. After white 
businesses owners had committed walking the extra mile, they claimed, “Blacks must start 
helping themselves.”342  By condensing the Black community into a monolith, Anglo elites could 
avoid engaging with people whose needs went far beyond the business-focused responses they 
were prepared to offer, spending millions on ineffectual solutions rather than engage with the 
violence, segregation, displacement, and environmental deprivation that structured life in the city 
and lay at the heart of Miami’s uprisings. 
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In the 1980s, the Non-Group was a force to be reckoned with, supporting favored 
political candidates and involving itself in questions such as homelessness. Still, only unofficial 
narratives acknowledged its existence. One union official reportedly described the group thus: 
“The Non-Group is an organization of billionaires and multimillionaires who control the destiny 
of Miami and all the surrounding municipalities, including Miami Beach. They control those 
cities politically, and they think they own them. […] Several Cubans have been allowed to join, 
but they’re the leaders of the Latin Builders Association. The only reason they got in is that they 
have money and political power. There are no women or blacks in the Non-Group.”343 The group 
was initially formed from Miami’s two most powerful factions, bankers and developers, and 
operated for over ten years before the Herald finally wrote an article about it, a delay possibly 
attributable to the presence of several Herald affiliates on the Non-Group’s roster. The paper’s 
1985 feature on the group listed members from the construction industry including Charles 
Babcock Jr. and Ray Goode, the Chairman and President respectively of the construction 
materials firm Babcock Co, and Charles E. Cobb the chairman and CEO of Arvida Disney Corp, 
one of the builders accused of shoddy construction in 1992.344 
With the Non-Group’s co-founder Bassett, Chapman selected 56 contacts to serve on We 
Will Rebuild’s board, an “invitation-only group of insiders.”345 Most hailed not from Miami’s 
new, international political and business elite, but from its older, Anglo core. Board members 
who were also part of the Non-Group included Ray Goode and Martin Fine, a lawyer who 
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represented developers. It initially conducted its meetings privately, in violation of Florida’s 
sunshine laws.346 We Will Rebuild! began with a $500,000 grant from the Ford Foundation; it 
held its first two board meetings less than two weeks after Andrew, with businesses loaning their 
executives as staff and office space in Coral Gables lent by IBM.347  
We Will Rebuild! possessed significant power. Together with county commissioners, it 
selected two South Dade neighborhoods for special help, agreeing that volunteer contractors 
would not need special licenses to rebuild, creating an exception to a rule that had hamstrung 
volunteer construction. They selected Country Walk, a largely white middle-class area, and 
Richmond Heights, a mostly Black working-class area.348 We Will Rebuild! also turned a 
damaged 43-acre park in Homestead into a youth and community complex, spent $500,000 
repairing and rebuilding 14 churches, issued a $750,000 loan to create cheap housing for 
migrants, hired consultants to advise local leaders on how to keep the government from shutting 
down the Homestead Air Force Base, and supporting the South Miami Chamber of Commerce 
and the Greater Homestead/Florida City Chamber of Commerce to the tune of $226,500.349 
WWR funds were also allocated to projects located in Homestead, including approximately $3.3 
million in grants, of which the lion’s share was used to build a youth and community center. An 
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additional $1.2 million was granted to Homestead Habitat for Humanity to build two major 
housing projects.350 
Like the Non-Group, We Will Rebuild! was remiss in recruiting members other than 
white males. Only 11 of the 56-person board and 30 of 160 trustees were women, while Blacks 
and Hispanics where similarly underrepresented. Chapman was described by an interviewee for a 
study about We Will Rebuild! as a “frightening man” who could jeopardize the career of anyone 
who crossed him, and he and his chosen colleagues resisted any suggestions that would change 
the makeup of the group.351 Chapman publicly claimed the board had formed by chance, and the 
diversity of the group at the outset was dictated by who volunteered, insisting that members “are 
what they are.” Yet, he added that the group was founded in response to President Bush’s request 
for “community leaders” – not the grassroots – to take charge. “You don’t get grassroots leaders 
to come together and start leading,” Chapman said. 352 In drawing this distinction, the President 
may have been indicating who he believed had enough power to enact a response, but his 
comments also suggest that leadership – for Chapman and for  the President – entailed a certain 
amount of understanding of the way things were traditionally done. Grassroots activists would go 
on to take positions on some of We Will Rebuild’s committees, but none gained entry to the 
board. 
Community leaders argued that the mostly-elite group was out of touch with the 
problems of underserved communities, focusing on long term business recovery at the expense 
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of immediate needs like housing and childcare. “They don’t know the community they’re trying 
to serve, and therefore don’t know the nature of the problem,” said Marie Lee, the chief 
executive of Homes For South Florida, who had waited months for news on a grant proposal. 
She added: “It’s an uptown group trying to deal with a downtown problem.”353 We Will Rebuild! 
could not address the community’s needs because it did not know the community. Lee also 
hinted at the reality of segregation in her comment: White elites from “uptown” were ill 
equipped to address the needs of the mostly Black and Latino communities who were struggling 
to survive even before Andrew hit “downtown.” Further, women were significantly more likely 
to care for close and extended family, but their needs received little attention. Childcare facilities 
in tent cities and at community centers were lacking, and domestic violence increased to crisis 
level. Researchers found one group of mostly women and children living in trailer park with no 
access to a phone because the owner had forbidden it.354 
In December 1992, activist Lisa Versace helped form a coalition of 36 women’s groups 
dubbed Women Will Rebuild – without the exclamation point - in order to address the lack of 
attention toward women’s and children’s needs.355 Steven Mainster, head of the Centro 
Campesino Farmworker Center, a community development corporation in Florida City, observed 
that it was difficult for grassroots leaders to attend We Will Rebuild’s meetings. “We tried, but 
the meetings are so frequent and so much time is involved that we couldn’t get any work done.” 
Like the Non-Group, We Will Rebuild’s board eventually expanded, rising to 62 members from 
47, including women and Black and Latino members. According to Chapman, the revamped We 
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Will Rebuild! was “the most culturally diverse, geographically diverse, gender diverse 
organization of this size and significance that I’ve known about in my 32 years in the 
community.”356 
By early 1993, the group had raised around $25 million in gifts and pledges for 
distribution, plus about $2.3 million more to cover operating costs. But despite meeting weekly 
for months, it had distributed only $7.2 million. Some frustrated community leaders privately 
dubbed the group “We Will Remeet.” Chapman argued that the group was focused on long-term 
recovery: “We did not want to rush out without knowing exactly what we might do that could 
make a difference. We could’ve gotten rid of the money real fast if we’d wanted to do that. If 
we’d just divided it up and given every person who’d had a serious loss $300, that would’ve 
ended the program right there.”357 But the enterprises that emerged, including a NASCAR 
racetrack in Homestead, had more than a whiff of the pork barrel about them, focusing disaster 
recovery money nominally intended to reduce the area’s vulnerability to future storms on 
projects that had no long term hurricane mitigation benefits beyond the broad goal of economic 
growth in the region.358  
Community leaders also questioned the group’s focus on supporting business 
organizations at the expense of new housing. Chapman argued the following year that there was 
“no point in building houses unless people have a place to go to work and get a paycheck.”359 A 
group of Florida-based researchers investigating the recovery found a widespread belief that 
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rebuilding groups did not need to focus on building new homes. One attendee at a redevelopment 
planning committee meeting asserted, “[W]e don’t need to worry about housing, it will take care 
of itself.”360 The individual made that statement as conversation veered toward housing, their 
assumption being that the market would take care of housing without intervention. As the 
researchers noted, this confidence overlooked failures in market mechanisms that existed even 
when a disaster was not present. The market did not provide housing for low-income households 
– many of whom were  people of color.361 Several new housing developments were built, but 
they served specific ends; one of the largest housing projects to be funded by We Will Rebuild! 
served as accommodations for migrant agricultural workers, effectively subsidizing 
agribusiness.362  
This neglect of housing was neither inevitable nor automatic. In the weeks immediately 
following Andrew, We Will Rebuild’s Housing Committee was exploring the use of 
prefabricated housing – which had generally stood up well to the hurricane – as a possible way to 
house moderate- and low-income families. Goode, Fine, and others solicited recommendations 
for prefabricated housing manufacturers who might take future contracts. We Will Rebuild! 
arranged for two sample houses to be constructed in Homestead by World Housing Inc.363  The 
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organization was also grappling with the need to create a projected 32,000 units for migrant 
workers needed to pick that year’s harvest.364  
The group’s focus appeared to shift over the subsequent months, however. In private, 
members were circumspect about funding affordable housing. Innovation Committee chair 
Sandy Lynn argued the group should stop thinking about building new affordable housing in 
areas that “don’t want it” and focus instead on rebuilding communities.365 Who counted as a 
“community” depended on fine economic and racial distinctions. Poor, displaced, people 
appeared not to belong to a community at all. Leaders in Goulds, a poor rural town, for example, 
had pushed back against plans to build low-income housing and a center for homeless people, 
arguing that the town should not be forced to take on facilities that “other communities would 
not stand for.” One said: “You're not going to see one of these places in Coral Gables. If we're 
not careful, we're going to end up looking like part of Overtown.”366   
The group seemed out of touch in other ways. We Will Rebuild’s supporters praised its 
civic-minded dedication, but detractors argued the group was slow to rise to the challenge posed 
by a disaster in a deeply unequal community and unreflective of the community it served.367 The 
group would tour stricken areas sweltering in the late summer heat by air-conditioned bus.368 
Additionally, Non-Group members benefited from We Will Rebuild’s activities. After the 
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committee decided to award rebuilding contracts for large areas to single developers, it gave the 
contract for Country Walk exclusively to Arvida, the builder that had constructed the faulty 
development in the first place, claiming that using a single contractor would make the rebuilding 
more efficient.369 We Will Rebuild’s innovation committee explored other means to bring 
economic growth to the region, emphasizing the group’s preference for business-friendly and 
neoliberal solutions. Homestead instituted a foreign trade zone – allowing businesses to receive, 
warehouse, and re-export products duty-free - at the suggestion of its assistant city manager, as 
well as bidding to become the winter training home of the Cleveland Indians and for the 
relocation of the Miami Grand Prix. One member suggested a project be instituted in South Dade 
to aid in weaning people away from welfare. The project would take the form of a lending 
institution, similar to the Gramman Bank in Bangladesh, and present entrepreneurial 
opportunities for people below the poverty line who want to start their own small businesses. 
This required $50,000 in seed money,370 and We Will Rebuild! allocated $236,000 to the joint 
Homestead/Florida City Chamber of Commerce in part to fund the plan.371 
The group steered the recovery in the direction of its leaders’ priorities and interests.  
True to the growth machine model, it favored business growth over addressing the causes of 
poverty in the area. One of We Will Rebuild’s projects appeared to contradict Miami’s favored 
model of growth at any cost, however: its sponsorship of brainstorming sessions to guide the 
rebuilding process. For some planners and architects, Andrew appeared to offer an opportunity to 
remake South Florida according to a less-sprawling template and in harmony with community 
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needs. The model beginning to take shape in South Florida’s planning community became 
increasingly influential in its attempts to manage growth, reduce the state’s impact on nature, and 
reduce the vulnerability to hazards like hurricanes. However, while the plan proposed to 
“critique old problems and propose new strategies for reconstruction,” it avoided discussion of 
the fundamental reasons for Dade’s vulnerability.372 This evasion meant that despite attempts at 
community involvement, the ideas that emerged from the brainstorming process risked 
displacing even more people who would never benefit from improved planning and 
infrastructure. 
Although much of the rebuilding process focused on projects rated and funded as they 
emerged, We Will Rebuild! also provided money for a more systematic approach to rebuilding 
after Andrew. Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, a practicing architect and professor at University of 
Miami, received $100,000 for a proposal to create a new comprehensive master plan for South 
Dade that would focus on ecological revitalization and a smaller footprint on the land. This plan 
was to be produced through workshops where invited professionals and locals could collaborate 
on new ideas.373 For the planners, the Andrew’s destruction presented a “tremendous 
opportunity” to implement sensible ideas.374 Projects like Plater-Zyberk’s seemed like a breath of 
fresh air, but an overreliance on design to solve problems in the face of entrenched structural 
predispositions toward sprawl and overdevelopment hampered the effectiveness of such 
endeavors. 
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In the weeks after Andrew, faculty at the University of Miami’s School of Architecture 
had begun to contact colleagues at other universities that had experienced natural disasters and 
connect with community members to see how they might help. The School formed the 
Architectural Recovery Center (ARC) as a temporary umbrella organization made up of work 
groups on building technology, historic structures, landscape, and master planning. Each group 
involved faculty, professional groups, government agencies, interested persons and groups, and 
students. In the 1990s, the University of Miami’s architecture school was becoming an important 
hub for New Urbanism. The style’s adherents – Plater-Zyberk very much included – favored 
communities based on “neo-traditionalist” design principles: mixed-use communities built 
around green spaces, with roads designed to encourage walking and bike use. Her firm, Duany 
Plater-Zyberk had distinguished itself as one of the most prominent voices of the movement. 
New Urbanists offered “traditional” development as an alternative to the suburban development 
that had characterized much of the latter half of the twentieth century, emphasizing regional 
planning over case-by-base approvals for developments. South Florida was becoming an 
important site in the evolution of New Urbanism, with planners and architects coalescing around 
what they saw as the problems of sprawl in the years to come – especially in Miami. 
Rather than root Dade’s destruction in its poor inspection practices, Plater-Zyberk and 
her colleagues attributed it primarily to poor design. “Long before the hurricane, South Dade had 
been recognized as poorly planned, lacking community facilities, and with little sense of 
neighborhood or community identity,” wrote Richard Langendorf, a professor of architecture at 
the University of Miami, participated in the program through the school of architecture’s 
computer lab.375 New Urbanist principles such as the addition of community centers, he argued, 
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would have “greatly aided in responding to the immediate needs of the hurricane victims.” He 
contended that rebuilding efforts should not simply restore the previous development but seek 
“sounder development patterns.”376  
To achieve this end, Plater-Zyberk proposed the use of a practice that was emerging as 
New Urbanists’ favored planning tool: Workshops called “charrettes” to brainstorm ideas and 
solicit contributions from experts, representatives, and community members. The term charrette 
comes from the French word for “little cart,” and in professional circles, it refers to a period of 
intense work before a deadline. During the 19th century, students exhibiting at the École de 
Beaux Arts in Paris would jump on the little cart used to collect final works before their 
exhibition and add final touches to their drawings. The New Urbanists’ charrettes took place 
over several days, with contributions from groups with specific expertise and a stake in the 
community. They were deliberately fast-paced, involving multiple simultaneous discussions on 
different aspects of the plan, with organizers and consulting experts overseeing proceedings. In 
an interview, one architect noted that the process was either “useful or useless, depending on 
how it’s run.”377 At a We Will Rebuild! Innovation Committee meeting, the chairman Modesto 
Maidique said if the charrette were the only major thing accomplished by the committee, its 
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Other collaborators on the project included Florida Atlantic University and Florida 
International University’s Joint Center for Environmental and Urban Problems. Other invitees 
included representatives from the Army Corps of Engineers and Environmental Protection 
Association, elected officials like the mayors of Homestead and Florida City, and citizen 
groups.379 Charrette organizers emphasized that the process would be “non-exclusive” and that 
contributions from South Dade’s communities would be vital to the project’s success.380  The 
event took place over three weekends in November 1992, culminating in a community 
presentation.381  
New Urbanism emphasizes specific attention to local and regional ecosystems, and the 
participants’ work included digitizing a large map of Florida’s natural environmental systems at 
the turn of the 20th century to inform regional plans.382 The plans that the group presented  
included a regional ecosystem restoration plan, a vision for the Redlands that would include 
parks, a museum of agriculture, and a village for migrant workers in Florida City called Little 
Guatemala, designed by the architect Roberto Behar.383 The plan for the Redlands, for example, 
aimed to increase the profile of the area’s agricultural community through eco- and food tourism 
as a means to fend off more suburban developments in agricultural land.384  
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In the case of Florida City and Homestead, the groups proposed neighborhoods organized 
around a main street to encourage walking, and a “Pioneer Village” that would house shops, 
civic buildings, and a visitor’s center. The idea was not merely to restore Florida City, for but to 
recreate it, allowing the community to “rise from the hurricane wreckage with a series of model 
neighborhoods, each with its own public park and community center, and an old-fashioned main 
street.”385 The charrettes invited some bemusement. A Herald article noted: “So far, everything 
presented in a series of charrettes – a word describing the manic idea sessions – remains just that: 
a jumble of ideas.” Even the head of the Enterprise Foundation, a not-for-profit that had funded 
the Homestead charrette, said the plans were overambitious. “In some places, it’s a bit unfair to 
raise expectations too great,” he said. “Many things are probably unrealistic.”386  
In the years after Andrew hit, the nature of the charrette tool – its speed and its 
dependence on a single coordinator - raised concerns about whether it can be as equitable as 
intended.387 In the case of the South Dade charrette, results were mixed. Despite efforts to make 
sure the charrettes were inclusive, residents raised serious concerns about some of the plans. 
They worried that certain ideas threatened to displace residents of communities already 
suffering. While one charrette – in the small suburb of Naranja -  resulted in an amicable 
agreement with residents who wished to move and make space for Everglades restoration, the 
Homestead and Florida City workshops proposed the relocation of low-income residents to 
create commercial spaces. While Florida City officials supported the plan, residents complained 
that the city was focusing too much on future economic development and not enough on 
 
385 Beth Dunlop, “Designers Unveil Plan for New Florida City,” Miami Herald, November 3, 1992. 
 
386 Todd Hartman, “Will Brainstorming Sessions Bear Fruit in S. Dade?,” Miami Herald, August 22, 1993. 
 
387 Sophie Bond and Michelle Thompson-Fawcett, “Public Participation and New Urbanism: A Conflicting 




immediate housing needs.388 The new affluent residents that the city was hoping for may never 
come, while existing residents risked being pushed out.389 The plan was eventually scrapped.   
In Homestead, resident groups were particularly opposed to plans to demolish a 
farmworkers’ neighborhood to create the Pioneer Village – so-called because Homestead was 
one of the earliest rural settlements in the county. The Pioneer Village plans included a wall and 
gate separating it from the city’s primarily Haitian and Hispanic West neighborhood, and 
planned for new homes that would be unaffordable to most of the agricultural workers that had 
previously lived in the area. Although the plan included some low-income housing, more 
expensive properties took priority. Leaders from the African-American, Hispanic, and Haitian 
communities formed a coalition in 1994 to demand input into the plan.  The developer in charge 
of realizing the Homestead plan, Bill Finley, argued that he was simply dong as the Homestead 
City Council had asked when it adopted the charrette. Yet, he also betrayed his own prejudices. 
Echoing earlier justifications for displacement focused on unsanitary conditions and undesirable 
people, he added: “We came up with a plan to rejuvenate downtown and clean up a crime-
infested neighborhood of flophouses. This city has suffered from successive waves of 
migrants.”390 City officials also portrayed the agricultural workers’ area as dominated by single 
men who would drink in the streets. But others said this characterization unfairly demonized the 
area, which also provided homes for families. The Enterprise Foundation, a not-for-profit that 
had funded the Homestead charrette, withdrew its support for the plan two and a half years later, 
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calling it “urban removal” and criticizing the lack of concern for low-income housing.391 
Homestead’s city council still invested $30 million to implement the project.392 
Observers noted other concerns with the long-term viability of the plans. Even in places 
that had been almost completely demolished, recasting the landscape would not be easy. 
According to some participants, existing roads, utility lines, and property lines were not given 
adequate consideration.393 Additionally, the charrettes focused on problems of “traditional 
suburban development” rather than on reducing risks from future extreme weather.394 A review 
of the projects in 1999 found that the most significant outcome of the charrettes was a bikeway-
greenway that followed the route of the former East Coast railway along Miami’s coastal ridge, 
but many of its other plans were shelved.395 Resident outcry, cost, viability, and existing 
infrastructure, in different combinations, scuttled many of them. 
While participating architects like Dan Williams insisted that the plans had the long-term 
development of South Dade in mind and were not intended to be put in place straight away, the 
journal Progressive Architecture deemed the outcome of the charrettes a “professional 
disappointment.”396 In an interview after Hurricane Katrina, Andres Duany, Plater Zyberk’s 
business partner and husband, reflected that based on his experience after Andrew, the fruits of 
charrettes conducted after disasters would be broadly visible in 10 to 15 years, and observed that 
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the rebuilding required by disasters can speed up the planning process. “You can design all you 
want, but most cities have to molt,” he said. “Things have to be knocked down and reassembled. 
Here, you catch it at the rebuilding. The outcome is still years away, but it's fast for planning.”397 
Miami Commissioner Dennis C. Moss, elected in 1993, used HUD Community 
Development Block Grant money and $73 million from FEMA to extend water and sewer lines 
along the Highway 1 corridor, the “old”’ road that extends from downtown Miami to the Florida 
Keys. Moss organized workshops in eight communities along the corridor to identify priorities, 
like affordable housing, new libraries, daycare centers, and services, incorporating projects that 
had been “legitimized through public meetings” from the earlier charrettes.398 Half of the 
projects funded went toward the rebuilding of existing properties, and the other half went toward 
new projects.399 Consistent with the New Urbanists’ vision for expanded public transportation, 
which they hoped would combat sprawl by concentrating development around transit hubs, Moss 
was instrumental in obtaining a new express bus link along the Flagler rail line that ran from 
Dadeland to Florida City.  
The New Urbanists’ failure to take Miami’s history of displacement into account 
resonates with sustained criticism of the movement by architects and urban studies scholars. 
David Harvey called New Urbanism a neoliberal “antidote” to suburbanization that touts the 
“sale of community and boutique lifestyles to fulfill urban dreams.” He argued, however, that 
New Urbanism had much to recommend it beyond doing battle with the conventional wisdom of 
development interests such as bankers and developers. He supported its commitment to thinking 
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about new developments as parts of a region rather than as isolated units. He also lauded its 
focus on public space and civic architecture as “arenas of sociality” and its ability to incorporate 
an “ecological dimension to design,” as well as its challenge to car-based forms of urbanization.  
But in practice, Harvey contended, many New Urbanist developments had themselves been 
“greenfield” developments “largely for the affluent.” Worse, New Urbanism was not capable of 
“getting to the crux of urban impoverishment and decay,” he said. The emphasis of firms like 
Duany Plater-Zyberk on “traditional” design as a salve for social ills could not repair the tears to 
the social fabric caused by the disappearance of jobs and the persistence of racial stratification.  
Despite many of the planners’ good intentions, several of the initial charrettes and later 
plans that applied New Urbanist principles to larger areas of South Florida implicitly relied on 
the displacement of underserved communities to achieve their ultimate goal of economic growth 
without sprawl. Beginning in 1994, for example, a new series of South Florida charrettes 
employed New Urbanist ideas to consider how western portions of Broward and Dade County 
would be developed. Participants recognized the available land within the boundaries set for 
urban development would soon run out. Building further into sensitive ecological areas in and 
around the Everglades was not an option. Roy Rogers, a developer working for Arvida, coined 
the term “Eastward Ho!” to sum up the ethos of several initiatives to encourage development 
within the “eastern urban part of the region.”400 The resulting report, also titled “Eastward Ho!,” 
begins with a “look back from 2025,” listing the benefits the plan would have achieved by 
tackling the problems of growth. It would allow South Floridians to “acknowledge – and work to 
correct – racial, ethnic, and social tension stemming from the lack of economic and social equity 
 






in the region.” It would reallocate funds required to maintain the now-vanquished sprawl back 
into existing communities, and “green” technologies like public transportation, vehicles that emit 
less pollution, and energy-efficient homes would promote a healthier environment.401  
The urban area Eastward Ho’s planners were eyeing – known as the I-95 corridor – had 
become home to increasing numbers of South Florida’s poorest new residents, as well as 
Miami’s low-income Black communities. Despite the deep influence that the racial politics of 
space has had on urban settlement patterns, especially on the emergence of suburbia and its 
perpetuation of segregation in new forms, New Urbanists rarely tackled questions of race 
substantively. The same went for “Eastward Ho!” An article by Florida Atlantic University 
professors Robyne Turner and Margaret Murray argued that while, if successful, the impact of 
the redevelopment would initially include a significant amount of gentrification, planners failed 
to mention it. Further, they limited their community engagement to elite groups, avoiding the 
task of understanding the needs of Miami’s diverse citizenry.402   
The planners’ portrayed the perceived blight of the I-95 corridor as a problem that could 
be addressed with an “infusion of residential and business investment,”' ignoring the underlying 
causes of that blight. This resulted in a “power-evasive planning technique.” By glossing over 
how it would ensure that low-income communities’ lot would improve, the report implicitly 
relied on the displacement of less-powerful groups while promising to avoid it. While the plan 
discussed the importance of increasing affordable housing, for example, it failed to substantively 
address where it would be located or how locations would be determined. It discussed the 
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importance of participation and local support – but only of the plan as outlined. As Turner and 
Murray observed: 
[P]olicy attention on environmental encroachment in the South Florida region may, in 
fact, be an unintentional subterfuge to ignore racial and social tensions that exist in this 
urban area that are a result of inequities in economic and political power. Planning 
studies can evade issues of race and power and, instead, make physical and spatial change 
and associated deterioration the focus of public policy. We have found that in the 
necessity to protect the ecological balance, planners and policy makers have not 
considered the implications that such a population shift will have on the social, cultural, 
and political fabrics of existing neighborhoods.403  
 
These consequences raise important questions about the approach of the New Urbanists. While 
they have advocated thoughtful regional planning centered around public transportation, their 
work too readily glossed over the exploitation, segregation, and displacement that lay behind the 
archetypal communities they sought to recreate. Their models of community engagement risked 
tokenizing local input in cases where residents were particularly vulnerable. 
Faced with stubborn infrastructure and existing development patterns, planners and 
architects had hoped that the destruction wrought by Andrew might be the catalyst to spur 
development that puts less pressure on the fragile South Florida ecosystem. Federal disaster 
legislation made funds available for rebuilding but aimed to encourage replacement structures 
that were more resistant to future extreme weather. Whereas the Category 4 hurricane that hit 
Miami and the Beach in 1926 was “huge, slow and sloppy,” destroying an area stretching 60 
miles from Moore Haven on Lake Okeechobee all the way to Homestead, Andrew was “like a 
killer pit bull – small, strong, quick and incredibly mean.”404 Andrew’s eye was only 10 miles 
across, and while it recorded a 16.9 foot maximum storm surge that destroyed Burger King’s 
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national headquarters, Andrew was a relatively dry storm that did not inundate much of the 
floodplain.405  
Because it was so fast-moving, the hurricane was unable to build up a large envelope of 
water that would have created massive storm surge and flooding. Richard Olson, the Director of 
Extreme Events Research at Florida International University, said: “You want to look at the 
hurricane hazard as wind, water and flooding. Andrew, in a sense, was a partial lesson because it 
didn’t teach the water lesson. […] Water events teach you land use lessons; wind events tend to 
teach you building code lessons.”406 The lack of flooding during Andrew meant that many homes 
were rebuilt without considering future flood risks, even as sea levels rose. Under the National 
Flood Insurance Plan, homes in floodplains damaged by over 50 per cent of their market value 
had to be rebuilt or replaced. But FEMA agreed to relax its standards in the case of Hurricane 
Andrew, meaning that neighborhoods that could have been retrofitted remained vulnerable to 
future flooding 407 Some national media discussion aside, moreover,408 the narrative of Hurricane 
Andrew did not include a discussion of climate change. 
After Andrew, neither the advocates for a stronger building code nor those attempting to 
redesign South Dade examined the reasons why so many homes were destroyed. Neither the 
press nor advocates for improved mitigation examined why so many Miamians were choosing 
suburbia. While new subdivisions were multiplying on greenfield sites, Miami’s inner city was 
being vacated. Racial policies had created a situation that growth-oriented politicians – and many 
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others – were keen to avoid discussing. There is a reason that anti-sprawl initiatives have more 
frequently been associated with environmental ends than the desegregation of urban and 
suburban space.409 
3.6 An unequal recovery 
Miami’s pursuit of growth had necessitated the suppression of discussions of racial inequality. 
The geographer Jan Nijman wrote that the “twinning of growth and internationalization has 
resulted in social polarization with an important ethnic dimension. Miami’s growth strategies 
tend to deprive Miami’s blacks (natives and immigrants such as Haitians) of equal opportunities 
in sharing the benefits of growth.”410 Nathan Connolly took the argument further, contending 
that Miami’s growth was based on violence against and oppression of its Black population. 
Black people forced into ghettos had to pay high rents to landlords – many of whom were city 
elders, both Black and white. In this way, segregation served as a steady flow of cash through the 
city’s boom and bust cycles. Segregation, violence, and the absence of access to education and 
higher-paying jobs also meant Black workers were a reliable source of cheap labor to support the 
service economy.411 The growth machine relied on an absence of discussion of this history.  
Post-Andrew rhetoric often repeated the claim that the hurricane was a “great equalizer,” 
affecting rich and poor alike.412 When one public official on a helicopter tour of the devastation 
saw a damaged swimming pool outside an expensive home, he exclaimed, “Look … look at 
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that… No one escaped the impact of Hurricane Andrew.”413 This story about the hurricane 
obscured the far longer and harder road to recovery for poor, mostly Black neighborhoods. A 
year after the storm, wealthy neighborhoods like Whispering Pines were almost completely 
rebuilt with new roofs, new gardens, and new cars. Neighborhoods that had been redlined were 
less likely to have received insurance payments or, if they got anything, to receive compensation 
the full amount lost.414 Many residents were living in condemned houses. “One of the most 
disturbing things is the disparity, in terms of ethnic and racial differences, in insurance coverage 
and the reports of underpayments and the consequences for their recovery,” noted Walter 
Peacock, a sociologist at Florida International University who surveyed residents about the 
aftermath of Andrew.415 The researchers found that the number of people who were uninsured, 
underinsured, or whose insurers did not live up to their agreements, was significantly higher in 
neighborhoods that had been redlined. Segregated areas were not only more vulnerable to storm 
damage due to ageing housing stock and neglected infrastructure; they were susceptible to the 
redlining practices that have long guided the banking and insurance industries.416  
Andrew drew “national attention to the need for housing in low-income communities,” 
leading Habitat for Humanity to increase its presence in the area and build a 200-home model 
community. Various public and private ventures were established to promote homeownership, 
but efforts to build low-income housing were much slower. Researchers reported a “reluctance 
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even to rebuild the grossly inadequate stock of subsidized apartments.”417 This meant that despite 
programs designed to assist the development of modestly- and low-priced homes, the housing 
recovery “remained a middle-class phenomenon.”418 Making matters worse, landlords with 
properties in white neighborhoods were accused of refusing to rent to Black applicants. Others 
evicted low-income tenants to charge higher rents to wealthier prospects.419 Rental housing fared 
much worse in rebuilding than single-family units. Ray Goode, president of We Will Rebuild!, 
said up to 80 per cent of damaged homes were in some state of habitability, but rental units were 
much less likely to be repaired. In Homestead a year after Andrew, only half of the 4,500 rental 
units owned by absentee landlords were under reconstruction. A mere eight of 1,100 mobile 
homes left in the community were still standing. Most who lost their residences left Homestead, 
and the majority of those who moved into the mobile homes that FEMA brought into the area 
were low-income residents who were permitted to stay in the trailers for 18 months.420 
While the federal government supports building in disaster-prone places, recovery in the 
United States is a “market-based,” insurance-driven process.421 The many gaps in this approach, 
such as the higher likelihood that Black households will be uninsured or underinsured, were 
expected to be partially filled by volunteer associations. Rather than discuss the inequities in the 
insurance market, officials pointed to philanthropic organizations as a solution to the slow 
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recovery of Black areas. The few civic organizations that existed in the poor rural parts of Miami 
were badly damaged in the storm. Lieutenant Governor Buddy McCay argued that Homestead’s 
relatively speedy recovery compared to the even needier communities nearby was due to its 
ability to create “civic infrastructure,” coordinating volunteers to help rebuild the city.  
McCay emphasized the importance of building new neighborhood associations, 
community development groups, and social service centers. “There’s going to be an effort to 
utilize the private not-for-profit sector to the maximum extent,” he predicted.422 Civic 
organization was necessary to attract resources and to navigate the complex process of making 
individual claims for repair and other aid. Kristin Goss, a journalist for The Chronicle of 
Philanthropy wrote: “The rebuilding could take two to three years in the best-organized areas, 
such as the City of Homestead. It will take much longer in other communities, such as Florida 
City, Naranja, Perrine, and Richmond Heights, which lack strong political and non-profit 
leadership.”423 
A group of 30 churches, businesses, community development groups, and educational 
organizations formed the South Dade Alliance to coordinate “competing and conflicting plans 
for redeveloping the area” and to direct state and federal dollars to “appropriate recipients.” The 
Alliance aimed to have the region declared an enterprise zone to attract businesses with the 
promise of tax breaks and a light rail extension to the area.  Bethel Missionary Baptist Church’s 
Reverend Carlos Malone, who helped organize the Alliance, said the hurricane “made us keenly 
aware that those of us with leadership skills are held accountable for leadership in the 
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community. Sometimes it takes storms to get people to see things as they should be.” We Will 
Rebuild’s Non-Group DNA was apparent in its emphasis on philanthropy to fill the gaps in 
services that members noticed in poor rural areas of South Dade, which had been consistently 
neglected by the government. The group donated $500,000 toward a “one stop center” for social 
services provided by local community groups in a damaged 5 1/2-acre strip mall in Homestead, 
purchased by the Salvation Army. Chapman said “social-service infrastructure” in South Dade 
“wasn’t very good to start with. We hope we’ll leave it better than it was.”424 Like the responses 
to the uprisings of the 1980s, these measures reflected elite disinterest in tackling systemic 
problems. Where Hurricane Andrew exposed the inequalities in South Dade, it was clear the 
ready solution would not be government attention to historically underserved areas, but 
philanthropic stopgaps. 
In the wake of Hurricane Andrew, initiatives to aid low-income Black and Latino areas 
were primarily geared toward boosting business, weaning people off welfare, and philanthropic 
support. However, the most common approach to racial disparities was to ignore them as much 
as possible. “The regression of blacks in Miami’s development is rarely addressed explicitly in 
public debates, except by blacks themselves,” wrote Nijman. Racial conflict damaged the city’s 
image and its potential for growth. “Thus, structural conflict must be avoided and, if it persists, 
must be played down in rhetoric.” When car rental agencies handed tourists maps of areas to 
avoid after eight tourists were killed in nine months between 1992 and 1993, it would “never be 
explicated that these are Black areas.” In fact, rather than discuss the structural problems that 
Miami’s growth strategies created for the Black population, city officials and businesses 
applauded Miami’s multiculturalism.  
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In Miami, the problem was particularly bad because racial groups were so stratified. 
Nijman said: “Miami’s ethnic elites do indeed share a common purpose in terms of preferred 
economic growth strategies. But even if elites share the same interests in the city’s growth 
strategies, the large majorities of the respective ethnic groups remain largely segregated. […] 
Money can function to bridge those gaps to some extent or to render one’s ethnic identity 
partially irrelevant. But this solution only applies to the wealthy.”425  Miami’s 
internationalization and emergence as a Latin success story overshadowed the experiences of 
many Hispanics as well as Black people of U.S., Haitian and other Caribbean origin.426 Public 
debates rarely addressed the situations of Black residents. Stories in local newspapers 
documenting crime and deprivation would allude to an “underclass” but rarely discuss racial 
discrimination as a fundamental driver.427   
While rural South Dade’s neglect became national news, the storm’s most iconic images 
were of destroyed suburbs. It was not Florida City that made the headlines, but Country Walk 
and the lost promise of suburban prosperity that became emblematic of Andrew’s destruction in 
local and national media discussion. And rather than address racial marginalization, responses to 
the crisis targeted sprawl and the building companies that profited from it. The Grand Jury 
emphasized the sheer level of media interest in the destruction of the “planned unit divisions” 
that had contained most of Dade’s recently-constructed housing at the time: 
The sheer graphic, widespread and apparent uniform destruction of many of these 
developments invited the focused examination of disaster analysts, the community, and 
the media. Film crews, locally and from all over the world, documented the widespread 
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destruction. Daily film clips revealed the domino-like rows of collapsed roofs and walls 
of what were once thriving family communities.428  
 
Most post-Andrew narratives excluded South Dade’s low-income Black population. South 
Miami was portrayed as a district of new arrivals, but Goulds, Perrine, and Florida City were 
home to many third- and fourth-generation citizens. Refusal to count them among the affected 
“family communities” allowed for the unequal, incomplete recovery they endured to go 
unnoticed. 
Anti-sprawl commentary, though less mainstream than the focus on building codes and 
vow to rebuild, also excluded the experience of Miami’s Black communities.  The Herald 
columnist and writer of Florida noirs, Carl Hiaasen, was one of the most vocal critics of the way 
sprawl had spread across South Dade. Appearing on NPR’s All Things Considered to criticize 
overdevelopment, he said: “You know, there is something traumatically equalizing about a 
hurricane like this. It is an incredible reminder of the fragility of this peninsula that we're on – 
how low it is, how vulnerable, not just to flood surges, but to this kind of raking, horrible wind. I 
mean, if nothing else, people ought to be thinking twice about even moving down here. […] 
What happened down here, as tragic as it is, was inevitable by the way we developed this place.” 
 Hiaasen blamed the “engine” that ran the state from the turn of the century onward – the 
compulsion to develop – but did not address the discrimination that fueled it.429 The lack of this 
understanding among the growth management community obscured the interconnectedness of 
Miami’s problems of inequality and environmental destruction, and allowed for the emergence 
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of plans that avoided the discussion of inequality while relying on the existence of a vulnerable, 
displaceable population to achieve the ends of urban infill and gentrification. 
Immediately after the storm, approximately 100,000 people or 28 per cent of South 
Dade’s population left neighborhoods covered in refuse, which had stood for days, weeks, and 
even months without electricity, running water, or security430 Most went north, away from 
Miami altogether. At the same time, many stayed due to factors such as a lack of economic 
resources. While whites were the most likely to leave, South Dade’s Black population increased. 
One study showed the cruel irony of residential segregation: While predominantly Black 
neighborhoods were more likely to encounter barriers to recovery, their residents also found it 
much harder to relocate after disasters.431  
 Evidence of insurance redlining prior to Andrew meant Black and Latino low-income 
households were more likely to be stuck in structures that were unsafe.432 In the years since 
Andrew, South Dade remains one of the few places in the metropolitan area where it is still 
somewhat affordable to live. According to anecdotal evidence, areas like Homestead and Florida 
City are becoming the new homes of people displaced from central neighborhoods by rising rents 
and taxes. At the same time, a new generation of Black leaders emerged from South Miami after 
Andrew. In 1993, Dennis C. Moss was elected County Commissioner for District 9, which 
contains much of South Dade. Larcenia Bullard, later State Senator for Richmond Heights, was 
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voted into the Florida House just months after Andrew and fought other legislators to keep 
federal hurricane dollars in South Dade.433 
In contrast to South Dade’s long, slow recovery, the injection of federal aid and insurance 
money spurred a boom in South Florida more generally. The Wall Street Journal reported:  
[I]n spite of— some economists suggest because of— Andrew, Florida rebounded. 
Hurricane Andrew may have been a physical and environmental disaster, but it was an 
economic godsend. The catastrophe jump-started the economy by creating a massive 
source of investment from insurance claims and government assistance.434  
 
Despite the efforts of the charrette organizers, most of South Dade was rebuilt according to 
existing planning incentives. South Dade’s population grew from just over 300,000 in 1990 to 
nearly 528,000 in 2017, and the region added 75,000 units of housing.435 Andrew spurred more, 
not less, sprawl, albeit with some islands of New Urbanist planned communities. The debate 
over wind speeds and building codes gave the impression of resolving the problems exposed by 
Andrew, even as sprawl absorbed many of South Dade’s rural areas, manifesting in new 
subdivisions with Spanish-sounding names and walls to protect residents from the noise of the 
highways they often back onto. 
Despite their bad press, construction companies profited from debris removal and new 
construction. P&Z Construction Company allegedly combined the two. After it was hired by the 
Army Corps of Engineers for $14.4 million to ship half a million tons of debris to sanitary 
landfills, workers claimed that it instead illegally dumped the debris into trenches on a site where 
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Lennar planned to build a new subdivision.436 In 1998, the new Republican governor, Jeb Bush, 
commissioned a survey that found a strong majority of respondents wanted more state 
involvement in regulating sprawl. Bush appointed a blue-ribbon panel – most of whose members 
were connected to real estate interests – to suggest “real” reforms. Its recommendations died in 
the Florida legislature under pressure from lobbyists.437  
In the years since the hurricane, charrettes have become a common occurrence in the 
planning process in Florida.438 Plater Zyberk has been instrumental in shaping the Miami 
landscape with interventions such as the Miami 21 building code. New Urbanists have also been 
active in other post-disaster contexts, such as the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. 
The University of Miami’s Center for Urban and Community Design was founded in the wake of 
Andrew to promote collaborative planning processes that focus on resilience and 
sustainability.439 New Urbanists continued to be visible as well, quickly establishing new 
charrettes after Katrina. Critics, however, remained vocal. Writer Mike Davis called the New 
Urbanists an “architectural cult.” He reported to readers of Mother Jones that during the 
Mississippi Renewal Forum, “Duany whipped up a revivalistic fervor that must have been 
pleasing to […] descendants of the slave masters.”440 
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Peter Sparks of the Wind Engineering Research Council continued to argue that the 
Hurricane Center overestimated Andrews wind speeds. Overall, he claims, high wind speed 
estimates let planners and builders off the hook for bad construction and overdevelopment.441 
But that was not the end of the story. In 2002 –  timed to be released 10 years after Andrew hit 
South Florida – Hurricane Research Division scientists retroactively “upgraded” the storm to 
Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale based on recent findings about the eyewall structures of 
major hurricanes.442 Originally designed as a simple metric to warn those living in a storm’s path 
of the level of damage they could expect,443 the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale had also become 
a measure of the hurricane’s significance for posterity. This shift affected climatologists and 
hurricane researchers seeking to understand long term hurricane patterns and suggested a new 
hierarchy of knowledge in the co-production and communication of storms, in which past 
measurements are scrutinized according to present standards.  
Hurricane Andrew’s upgrade also served a much wider audience including insurers, 
building code designers, and emergency managers. For example, the number of Category 5 
storms to have hit South Florida affects models of risk. According to the Hurricane Center’s 
analysis – and counterintuitively - the upgrade potentially lowered the chance of a storm like 
Andrew hitting South Florida. Insurers like AIG have argued against assuming that another 
Andrew is less likely as a result. They argue that the number of people now living in South 
Florida puts even more people in danger should an Andrew-sized hurricane hit the region. 
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Jordan Commons, the 187-unit affordable and energy efficient New Urbanist community in 
South Dade, received the attention of the Clinton administration through the Sustainable 
America program. Harvey Ruvin, the Clerk of the Court who was chair of Dade County’s Urban 
Carbon Dioxide Reduction Project, showcased the development when he testified before the 
Committee on International Relations in 1997. Citing concern about the city’s vulnerability to 
sea level rise, the group worked with 14 communities – five in the United States and nine others 
around the world – to develop local action plans. He said: “[A]lthough we are talking at the 
national and central government level in Kyoto, many of the powers that are needed to put in 
place the measures that we talked about are vested in local governments.”444 Unlike many of the 
other policy responses to Hurricane Andrew, the Habitat For Humanity-built Jordan Commons 
concentrated on the needs of low-income households, offering affordable housing that would 
also conserve energy and thereby lower the community’s bills. As a result of his work and the 
spotlight let by Andrew, Ruvin went on to represent the United States at the Kyoto climate 
negotiations as an expert in local climate politics. 
Miami’s attempts to decouple growth from environmental harm appeared to receive a 
boost after Andrew. Planners and architects talked about South Dade as a blank canvas that 
promised new opportunities to reimagine growth with more attention to regional planning, 
environmental hazards, and human-scale neighborhoods that could alleviate some of the stresses 
of sprawl. But rather than challenge the sprawling building patterns that had come to dominate 
South Dade, the debates about what or who was to blame for the destruction centered around 
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how homes were being built, not where. This focus was abetted by challenges to scientists’ 
authority, journalists adjudicating the debates over wind speeds, and criminal investigations into 
poor building practices, as well as the specific character of the storm itself, a hurricane that could 
teach the “wind lesson” of the need for better structures but not the “water lesson” of the 
consequences of poor planning practices.  
Miami scholars describe a shift in power from the Anglo elite to a globally-facing Latin 
cadre of business-owners and politicians. Most Anglos of the Miami business elite – a group that 
benefited from the inequality in Miami – took a paternalistic stance, adopting tax-deductible 
philanthropic initiatives in response to crises such as Hurricane Andrew and the uprisings that 
had preceded it. The city’s Latino elite did not operate in the same way, focusing instead on 
creating global business connections. The two approaches paralleled the shift away from 
segregation-era spatial politics, which paved the way to urban sprawl through discriminatory 
lending, and toward the new globalized economy, which reinforced urban dispossession while 
rendering segregationist policies less visible through narratives of multiculturalism and equal 
opportunity. The impacts of segregationist policies continue to be felt but not addressed, leading 
to anti-sprawl initiatives that replicated and exacerbated their effects. 
Among those who wished to draw attention to the effects of sprawl, the white elite that 
dominated We Will Rebuild! focused on its own interests. According to its response to Andrew, 
growth management could be part of the rebuilding process, but only if it coincided with 
strategies to bring in investment. This focus overshadowed other concerns such as housing and 
childcare. While the New Urbanists offered the chance to reimagine a more sensitively-planned 
South Dade, in practice, its designs could not address entrenched problems such as racial 
inequality and infrastructure conducive to sprawl. New Urbanism has continued to be an 
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important part of Miami’s growth management and climate change policies, but its lack of 
detailed attention to racial inequalities has left open the possibility of uneven outcomes such as 
the gentrification of the I-95 corridor.  Miamians’ aversion to discussing the causes of racial 
inequality led to a general view that Andrew affected rich and poor alike, masking a starkly 
unequal recovery process and increasingly divergent levels of wealth.  
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4. Competing dreams of a green city 
Newtown, Gainesville, Georgia’s tiny Black community, opened Sheila O’Farrell’s eyes to the 
links between urban renewal and long-term assaults on environmental health. The segregated 
community was built on a landfill site after a tornado tore through Gainesville in 1936. 
O’Farrell’s organization, Environmental Community Action, joined Emory University and the 
Newtown Florist Club – a community fixture that bought flowers for local funerals and cared for 
the sick - to document the fact that Newtown’s residents were disproportionately dying from the 
same kinds of cancer and lupus. “That’s really when my education started, you know, about how 
bad it was,” she said.445 O’Farrell’s career as an activist began in the 1980s with a campaign 
against toxic dumping on the land where her family hunted and farmed, joining forces with other 
affected populations until the group successfully defeated attempts to make the South a dumping 
ground for waste from all over the world, and adding impetus to the burgeoning environmental 
justice movement.  
After honing her organizing skills at the Highlander Center in Tennessee,446 O’Farrell – 
who is white – had worked undercover as part of the anti-Ku Klux Klan network, and worked to 
bridge the differences between white and Black through another organization, Carolina Fair 
Alliance. It was there that she met Denise Perry, a union organizer working in South Florida. 
“We met and could tell we had a similar racial analysis, and an analysis of social change in 
common,”447 said O’Farrell, who moved to Miami to take a union organizing job. Barry 
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University gave the pair space to found Power University (or Power U), an environmental justice 
group that would focus, like the campaign in Newtown, on urban environmental problems. 
O’Farrell and Perry focused their campaigning efforts on one place: Overtown. 
 The environmental justice movement helped to redefine what is considered as the 
environment, expanding the term to cover everything from inner cities to more remote 
environmental “sacrifice zones,” and it broadened the conception of who might be considered a 
“green” subject.448 By the 1990s, the term “environmental racism” had moved into widespread 
use in social movement, scholarly, policy, and media networks. In 1994, President Clinton 
signed an executive order decreeing that “each Federal agency shall make achieving 
environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, 
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.”449 The movement 
had begun in small towns and remote counties like Love Canal in New York, addressing the 
unequal toxic burden working class communities and communities of color faced .450 But work 
by activists, scholars, and policymakers was increasingly envisioning the city as an 
environmental space, too – with environmental justice as an organizing model for urban 
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communities.451 Recognizing nature in urban environments was an important environmental 
justice priority in itself. 
In this chapter, I examine two opposing environmental imaginaries that each centered the 
city as a place of environmental concern and considered environmental regeneration a 
fundamental part of the remaking of Miami’s urban fabric. Manny Diaz, the city mayor from 
2001 to 2009, saw improvements to Miami’s environment as a key part of his mission to turn 
around a city that had lost its urban core and reduce the pressure its expansion was putting on the 
surrounding ecosystem. Power U, an environmental and social justice organization based in 
Overtown, also campaigned for environmental improvements in the urban core. Both challenged 
imaginaries that separate the urban from the natural, attempting to build new environmental 
understandings. Both spoke not just to their local constituencies, but to national and international 
environmental networks.  
For Diaz, environmental policymaking – and especially his war on sprawl – served as a 
way to connect with other powerful “green” mayors such as New York’s Michael Bloomberg. 
City planning was so important to his administration that it became the central plank of Diaz’s 
climate policy. But while suburbanization was partly to blame for the gutting of the city center, 
Diaz’s “global city” policies also ate away at the security of all but the wealthiest Miami 
residents. In contrast, Power U sought community legitimacy, connection, and mutual support by 
tying together environmental and social justice concerns – particularly in relation to housing – 
under the banner of the Right to the City Alliance. The most fundamental difference in the two 
visions of urban nature was in their construction of “green” subjects. Diaz’s priority was to use 
Miami’s environment to attract new, wealthier citizens, while Power U and its allies argued for 
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better eco-health for Miami’s existing constituents. Although the discussion of sea level rise was 
absent from both environmental visions, this battle over who might be seen as “green” has 
become increasingly important as Miami real estate has again increased in value even as regular 
flooding puts additional pressure on the city fabric. 
This chapter uses these two contrasting examples to explore how the redefinition of 
nature to include urban environments can be used to challenge – or accelerate – the displacement 
of low-income populations. In the case of Diaz, environmentalism was key to his bid to raise 
Miami’s status as a world city, a position he continued to benefit from, most recently as the co-
chair of Bloomberg’s 2020 presidential campaign. While promising that all Miami citizens 
would benefit from a better-planned Miami, Diaz, the city, and the county also presided over the 
worst housing crisis Miami-Dade had yet seen, adding the unspoken caveat that low-income 
residents who could no longer afford the global city’s high prices were not included in his green 
vision. By linking environmental justice arguments to Overtown residents’ more pressing 
concerns about housing, Power U was able to mobilize residents to successfully fend off the 
Crosswinds development, a rare achievement for a majority Black area of Miami. Even though 
Power U did not speak about climate change during its anti-gentrification campaigns, it helped 
bring arguments that combine environmental and housing justice to the fore of the city’s climate 
politics.   
4.1 The battle for Overtown 
In 2005, city Commissioner Arthur Teele died by suicide, shooting himself in the lobby of the 
Miami Herald at 5:30pm – just in time to make the local evening news. That day, the Miami New 
Times had published a story repeating unsubstantiated allegations against Teele from an 
investigation report by the office of Miami’s District Attorney, Katherine Fernandez Rundle, 
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accusing him of a laundry list of indiscretions that ranged from accepting Gucci bags full of cash 
from drug dealers to regular liaisons with sex workers. According to his friend, the Miami 
Herald columnist Jim DeFede, it was the last allegation that hurt the most; how he would face 
his wife and his church? DeFede, who had illegally taped the off-the-record conversation with 
Teele, was fired hours later, ostensibly for the breach of Florida’s strict rules on consent in audio 
recordings. Others believed the Herald was glad to get rid of DeFede, who had made a career 
muckraking against Miami’s developer-politician class. In addition to a tape for his wife and one 
for DeFede, Teele had left a folder of documents for the reporter about Crosswinds, a planned 
condominium development that would take up three blocks of public land in Overtown. Police 
gave the bag straight back to Teele’s widow after deciding it had no “investigatory merit,” so 
DeFede never saw the documents. “What are you gonna do,” he asked. “Wrestle the widow 
[…]?”452 
Teele, a former army ranger who had served as national head of Blacks for Reagan-Bush 
in 1980, had risen to the head of the Urban Mass Transit Administration within the federal 
Department of Transportation, giving him the power to send $220 million in federal funds to 
Miami’s Metromover and Metrorail transit systems in response to the Overtown and Liberty City 
uprisings of the 1980s. Later, Teele moved to Miami to work as a lawyer, dealing with the 
mostly white Non-Group headed by Alvah Chapman Jr., the Herald’s publisher. Teele was 
elected to the county commission in 1990 and in 1993, he became commission chairman.453 
Despite the Herald’s endorsement, Teele lost a bid for the position of county mayor in 1996 to 
Alex Penelas, a Cuban-American Democrat.  
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The campaign had been a fight over development issues: Teele criticized Penelas for 
approving a no-bid contract to redevelop the destroyed Homestead Air Force Base into an 
industrial park and commercial and residential center. Penelas in turn pointed at Teele’s support 
for a county decision to use tax revenues to pay for the Miami Heat’s new basketball stadium on 
the downtown waterfront that bordered Overtown. After the loss, Teele moved to the city 
commission454 where he was also in charge of the Overtown and Park West Community 
Redevelopment Agency. The previous year, Teele had been arrested for chasing an undercover 
officer who was following his wife, and he suspected  Diaz, the city manager Jose Arriola, 
Herald executive editor Tom Fiedler, white developers, and Fernandez District Attorney Rundle 
of conspiring against him due to his opposition to Crosswinds, a project he had called a “land 
grab.”455 
In previous years, city and county officials had found it difficult to persuade private 
developers – their preferred custodians of development – to build new projects in Overtown.  
Overtown’s CRA had been attempting to attract private developers to build new condominiums 
on public land since the 1980s. In 2005, the city gave the project to Crosswinds Communities, a 
residential housing and development company based outside Detroit, in a no-bid process to build 
luxury homes. 456 The company’s urban development director, Matthew Schwartz, had 
previously worked for the City of Miami and had written an Overtown revitalization plan in the 
1980s. The plan had called for the clearance and acquisition of several city blocks, some of 
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which had since been developed into projects such as the nearby Miami arena.457 City officials 
believed Crosswinds was the city’s best hope for attracting higher-income residents to Overtown. 
Minimum yearly income to qualify for a home in the new development would be $40,000. A 
study found that monthly rents over $350 would be too high for most Overtown residents, while 
the market rate for a one-bedroom apartment in Miami-Dade County was $775 per month. Most 
Crosswinds apartments would be rented at market rates, while 1,000 or more of the units would 
sell for between $200,000 and $300,000.458 
Beyond the details of the case, it was illustrative of much longer histories of Miami’s 
racial and economic alliances and divisions. Journalist Tom Austin wrote an article in the 
Columbia Journalism Review discussing the local media’s deep involvement in Miami’s 
development politics: “Essentially, Crosswinds is a symbol of two contrary development visions 
for Overtown. A generally white power structure believes that condos will fix pretty much 
anything, with Crosswinds in particular raising property values in Overtown and ushering in the 
return of the black middle class, which is still connected to Overtown's powerful churches. On 
the other side of the equation are residents who worry about the toll of gentrification on these 
gritty but authentic neighborhoods for the poor and working class.”459 The Herald had gone 
some way to represent a broader swathe of Miami in its reporting, staffing, and opinions,460 but it 
remained a firm supporter of establishment-backed developments like the publicly funded Miami 
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Performing Arts Center, which had been opposed by Teele and others, and the American Airlines 
arena. Knight Ridder’s head Tony Ridder was a leading proponent of both. As Austin noted, 
“every publication in Miami continues to be fed by condo ads.” The Herald had always pushed 
for the arts center, and “somehow [the center] had finally kick-started Overtown’s manifest 
destiny, namely condominiums.”461 On July 28, 2005, a Herald editorial opined: “It’s time to 
move forward on the Crosswinds project in Overtown, Miami's historic – and blighted – black 
neighborhood.” The piece conceded that gentrification could displace low-income residents, “but 
only if the redevelopment proceeds in a vacuum that doesn't take poor residents' needs into 
consideration.”462 The editorial board’s hedge illustrated the unequal conflict at the heart of the 
newspaper’s coverage: It could not ignore the threat to Overtown, and individual reporters might 
publish critical articles, but as a business, its alliances and economic stake in the real estate 
sector were stronger. 
In 2006, Crosswinds spokesperson Mark Coats said the development was designed to 
build up the neighborhood and attract the workforce community, reaching out to “the middle-
class blacks who need to be a part of Overtown to really make it work.” Fifty of the 1,000 units 
would be donated to the city to house current Overtown residents; 20 per cent of the rest would 
be set aside for affordable housing. Critics, however, remained unconvinced. Perry, Power U’s 
co-founder, was quoted as saying: “The project is environmental racism, serving only the interest 
of the wealthy. The project disrespects Overtown's legacy of a rich black historical community. 
The project does not offer affordable housing options.”463 
 
461 Austin, “Miami Noir.” 
 
462 Austin, “Miami Noir.” 
 
463 DeFede, “DeFede: Development for Overtown Not the Wealthy.” 
192 
 
4.2 Miami’s chief architect 
It took Jeb Bush until his second term as Florida’s governor to realize that although Floridians 
want to see growth, they also demand protections for the environment. Reacting to the 
disapproval of voters frustrated with his failure to address environmental concerns, the former 
developer launched a campaign to purchase and preserve “environmentally sensitive” plots of 
land, particularly in the Everglades. Bush signed the Florida Forever bill, a huge land-buying 
program that recognized the economic value of protecting Florida’s natural beauty.464 Unlike the 
governor, who focused on the pull of the places that Florida still classed as “wild,” Manny Diaz 
focused on improving nature within the city. Bettering Miami’s urban environment was part of 
Diaz’s plan to pull Miami into the trend of urban revival that began in New York, Chicago, 
Boston, and other U.S. cities in the 1990s.  
When Diaz was elected, Miami’s population was still declining as wealthier citizens 
streamed into move the suburbs.465 The new mayor’s plan to attract money back to the city was 
also his plan to make Miami more sustainable: a focus on increasing density, attracting people to 
return to the city’s urban core through a combination of planning and development money from 
around the world. Diaz hoped the strategy would secure Miami’s status as a global city – a node 
in the global flow of information and capital, imagined to be untethered by national boundaries 
and regulatory systems.466 Diaz reflected on this conceptualization of a “sustainable” city by 
design in a 2016 speech: “City design was not a part of my campaign platform. It certainly was 
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not my first priority on day 1! Yet, the single most critical step for environmental and economic 
sustainability is embracing smart growth, designing a city that makes sense, a city that works. I 
knew we needed to plan our future. The status quo was unacceptable!” A city’s mayor, he 
continued, had to become its “chief architect” and recognize that city design is “at the heart of 
everything we must do in order to make our city livable and sustainable.”467 According to his 
speech, planning could cure many of the urban ills he connected to suburbanization, but despite 
his apparent concern for residents experiencing problems such as crime and disinvestment, his 
focus was on another kind of resident all together. Diaz’s plan was far more concerned with the 
type of people he wished to attract to Miami: new urban residents drawn by, as he put it, “new 
transportation options, walkable communities and quality of life.” The “magic” formula for 
attracting and retaining the “best and brightest” was to design “a great place to live; designing a 
city that works.”468 To this end, Diaz proposed Miami 21, a new master plan the city. Rather than 
push Miami’s sprawl further into the Everglades, the mayor hoped that his plan would promote 
growth within the city center. 
Although the plan was his flagship strategy for raising Miami’s profile, improving living 
standards, and making the city greener, Mayor Diaz’s underlying focus was to attract 
international investment. While waiting for the code to be implemented, he lost no time in 
encouraging a rapid increase in development, bolstered by allies on the city’s commission and 
increasingly easy credit. The New York Times wrote in 2008 that since his election, “More than 
100 million square feet of residential and commercial space has been added.”469 Diaz’s plan to 
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attract new residents was working; the new condominium buyers included baby boomers moving 
south and, to a greater extent, new residents and investors from abroad, especially Latin America 
and Europe.  
The city had lacked a code since the 1980s, and even that one had never formally been 
adopted.470 Despite their criticism of the city’s previous building regulations, which were widely 
agreed to be vulnerable to manipulation, the mayor and city commission overwhelmingly voted 
in favor of new developments – even large, controversial ones. When development within the 
city had slowed in the period before Diaz’s election, the quirks of Miami’s zoning code were less 
obvious even as they allowed developers significant leeway. During the building boom of the 
early 2000s, however, “the mechanisms of government were overwhelmed.”471 A developer 
could build a tower block in a low-density neighborhood and the city could do no more than 
request alterations, leading to the odd spectacle of enormous condo buildings jammed up against 
two-story single family homes in several residential neighborhoods.472 By 2004, the high-rises 
had spread from Little Havana to Coral Way, and along Biscayne Boulevard, with another 69 
approved major projects in the pipeline. Activists, such as a coalition of 20 city homeowner 
groups called Mami Neighborhoods United, asked for a moratorium, but the mayor and 
commissioners showed little interest in slowing the boom.473  
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Condominiums were easy to build, but Diaz also planned to revive a number of stalled 
large-scale projects that he hoped would “inspire buyers to fantasize and dream,” he said, and 
create an attractive community for future residents. Among these were a tunnel connecting the 
port to the expressway to reduce traffic; a new stadium for the Florida Marlins baseball team 
(now the Miami Marlins); boundary expansions and time extensions for redevelopment projects 
in Overtown and the downtown Omni area; a light-rail streetcar system; city contributions to a 
new performing arts center; and the construction of Museum Park, which would house the 
Miami Art Museum and the Museum of Science.474 Diaz moved to connect the developments 
together as a single project, creating what he called a “mega plan.”475  
The systematic dismantling of Overtown’s urban fabric over 40 years had left many large 
empty lots that could serve as space for big projects. Many of these endeavors – development in 
Overtown, the performing arts center, and Museum Park – would be sited through the 
establishment of a Community Redevelopment Area (CRA), a tool for redevelopment created by 
the Florida government in 1969 to funnel money from property tax increases into community 
projects. To qualify, local governments had to find that “one or more slum or blighted areas” 
existed in a community.476 Diaz’s plan, comprising all the projects, was approved in 2007. Upon 
their completion, four new high-rise buildings stood across from Museum Park, serving, the 
mayor said, as advertisements for “the advantage of buying a condo in the area because of the 
surrounding neighborhood: a symphony hall, an opera and ballet house, art and science 
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museums, and a beautiful park overlooking the bay, all within short walking distance.” When the 
waterfront was completed, Diaz claimed it had “few rivals in the world” and formed an “entirely 
new urban core for Miami.” To rebuild the city, bring in new residents, and populate a “24/7 
downtown Miami,” the city needed amenities to be enjoyed.477 As Frommer’s South Florida 
warned readers, downtown, “desolate and dangerous at night,” was undergoing a renaissance due 
to the condo boom that would transform it into “the new South Beach.”478  
The new developments caused property prices also began to rise in nearby Overtown. 
Diaz argued that the Overtown CRA should be part of the mega-plan to bring investment to “a 
neighborhood that had gone ignored.”479 But rather than focus specific policies on the needs of 
Miami’s poorest areas, the city instead took the approach that increased economic activity would 
improve the lot of every citizen. Diaz portrayed critics as “civic activists who […] cried that I 
was thinking too big, pushing too large of an agenda.”480 But this was not their only critique. 
Activists were also concerned that the new performing arts center was focused on attracting the 
upper-middle class, not serving Overtown’s existing residents whose median income was only 
$15,000. One interviewee for a 2008 study complained: “The mayor’s vision is Miami as a hub 
of international activity with no neighborhood left behind. But [...] there are structural 
weaknesses that need to be dealt with. [...] There is a veneer of prosperity in the city that masks 
what is really going on.” Another interviewee who supported Diaz described the mayor’s vision 
in similar terms: “The mayor’s objective is to increase the international economic activity and 
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have it trickle down to the powerless communities in Miami, particularly the African-American 
community, by expanding real estate and articulating to people in those communities the 
importance of foreign trade.”481 Overtown’s neglect had turned it into the first place the city 
looked to create the new infrastructure of a global city, justified by the promise that the rising 
tide of capital would lift all boats. That infrastructure has since grown to include other large 
projects, such a high-speed rail station geared toward corporate travelers and tourists. The 
execution has not always lived up to the plan’s ambition, however. To cite one example, the 
private Brightline rail corridor currently only extends to West Palm Beach, just 72 miles away.482 
Like George Merrick in the 1920s, Diaz wanted to shape the urban landscape rather than 
reactively approve projects piecemeal. He sought to promote a different kind of planning process 
and code, organizing the city around the form of its buildings, not the use to which they were 
put. This was the approach New Urbanism advocated – encouraging mixed-use development 
organized around key landmarks which would serve as reference points for future development. 
Miami-based architects Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk were the lead consultants. 
Both had been at the forefront of the New Urbanist movement, and their firm, Duany Plater-
Zyberk (DPZ), was heavily involved with the charrette process after Hurricane Andrew. The 
plan they arrived at would have to both accommodate growth but shape it into the template of a 
global city. 
Miami 21, finally implemented in 2005, was a rezoning plan that, according to one 
analysis, “accepted the existing landscape of capitalist urban development while coordinating six 
 
481 Juliet F. Gainsborough, “A Tale of Two Cities: Civic Culture and Public Policy in Miami,” Journal of Urban 
Affairs 30, no. 4 (October 2008): 419–35, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9906.2008.00406.x. 
 
482 Jesse Saignor and Eric Dumbaugh, “South Florida’s Brightline: The Public Costs of Private Rail,” Institute of 




elements, including economic development, transportation, parks and public realm, arts and 
culture, and heritage preservation.”483 While New Urbanism’s core tenets include the creation of 
mixed-income neighborhoods, in practice, Miami 21 left significant room for interpretation on 
this front. It offered developers bonus building capacity in exchange for contributions to a 
“Public Benefits Trust Fund,” which would bankroll workforce subsidies and affordable housing, 
create and maintain parks and open spaces, preserve historic structures, restore brownfield sites, 
and promote green building standards. The city decided how to distribute the funds every year 
based on the City Manager’s recommendations.484 The plan was an exercise in reconciling 
Miami’s high-rise cityscape with New Urbanist principles like low density, pedestrian-friendly 
neighborhoods. According to this argument, the condo boom in itself served the ends of 
sustainability. Diaz wrote: “Every residential condo built in downtown Miami means one less 
residential suburban development encroaching on the Everglades.”485 Development could 
continue apace without the environmental damage Florida was famous for. 
If Clerk of the Courts Harvey Ruvin chose an affordable housing project (one designed 
by DPZ) to represent Miami’s climate leadership to the UN a few years earlier, Diaz chose the 
high-rise condominium. As cities like New York began to take the international stage in climate 
negotiations, Miami 21 also became the basis of Diaz’s climate plan. While President George W. 
Bush refused to ratify the 2005 Kyoto Protocol and his brother Jeb remained mostly silent on the 
issue, Diaz was among the first signatories of the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement to 
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implement Kyoto standards in cities around the world.486 Mayors had become “first responders” 
in the struggle against climate change, and smart growth was the core of Miami’s rescue mission. 
Diaz said: “What had started as my strong belief that a city must plan for its future had become 
an integral part of the fight against climate change. All of a sudden, you connect city design to a 
city’s carbon footprint.”487  Miami 21’s focus on greening and easy transit provided a ready 
answer for how the city would reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. 
Two additional features of Miami 21 would become important to the city’s future as the 
effects of climate change became more intense. First, although flooding such a problem that the 
city had to install pumps to remove water from the streets when it rained, Miami 21 did not 
factor sea level rise or building elevation into its zoning requirements. Second, in 2009, the city 
approved a new measure called a Special Area Plan (SAP) that allowed planners and developers 
“with contiguous holdings to play outside the strict lines of the zoning code,” according to the 
Herald.488 SAPs allowed far greater height and density, as long as the developers created new 
public spaces, streets, and amenities and gave planners and the city commission a greater say in 
the form of the final product. The first SAPs were granted in Miami’s core, resulting in 
developments like the huge mixed-use mall Brickell City Center. But as I discuss in chapter five, 
later developments began to spring up in residential neighborhoods on higher ground, many of 
which have historically been low-income Black and Latino communities due to white elites’ 
preference for shorefront developments. The Herald reported in 2017 that “as SAP applications 
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proliferate across the city for everything from tech villages to mixed-use residential and 
commercial districts and even school and hospital redesigns, the sheer size and scale of some of 
the proposals is giving many city residents pause, if not provoking outright alarm.”489 The scale 
of Special Area Plans meant that they could represent “instant gentrification,” according to the 
Miami New Times.490  Even though the Congress of the New Urbanism has in recent years 
sought to use planning to address the joint problems of climate change and discriminatory land 
use policies and to foster density and low-carbon transit systems,491 Miami’s experiences suggest 
that without a committed administration, New Urbanism, like other planning regimes that do not 
demand specific remedies to inequality, can become a tool of green urban removal. 
Special Area Plans have emerged as a way to tailor the city toward the preferences of 
new residents who are deemed desirable. Shortly after Diaz came to power, Richard Florida’s 
book, The Rise of the Creative Class, was released, helping to shape many mayors’ idea of what 
the new iteration of city resident could look like.492 Rise, as Florida often referred to his book, 
framed the influx of people to cities in the 1990s as a phenomenon led by artists and bohemians. 
This precipitated a shift that made urban centers the hubs of a new “creative” economy driven 
not just by artists, writers, and musicians, but academics, entrepreneurs, restaurateurs, and 
workers in the media, science, and tech sectors. The artists at the leading edge were seeking, 
according to one article, “walkable neighborhoods with distinctive architecture, a diverse 
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population, a vibrant street and cultural life and amenities like cafes, bars, parks and bike 
lanes.”493 Mayors from Diaz to Bloomberg, along with business groups and urban activists 
hoping to stimulate an “entrepreneurial revolution” in cities embraced Florida’s articulation of a 
newer kind of urban renewal spearheaded by unconventional, “creative” people. In 2016, 36 per 
cent of workers nationally made up the creative class, according to Florida. On the face of it, the 
creative class mirrored national demographics: White workers held 73.8 per cent of creative class 
jobs, compared to 12 per cent for Black workers. But this ratio did not hold from city to city. 
Service-economy cities like Miami had the lowest rates of Black employment in the creative 
class. Florida’s study was a reminder, he said, that race and class overlap at the “upper reaches of 
the new economy” as well as in professions where wages are lowest. 494  
Miami’s Wynwood neighborhood was exactly the kind of district developers and the city 
were hoping to transform. Under Diaz, Wynwood quickly changed from a Puerto Rican barrio, 
home to car shops and other small industrial outfits, into a magnet for the creative class.495 The 
city and DPZ identified Wynwood as a “Priority Development Area” that could attract “media 
production industries.”496 In the early days of the development and in defiance of regulations, 
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Diaz even told the developer of studio lofts that if artists wanted to sleep in their workspaces, 
there would be no reprisals.497  
In 2012, Florida, who had just moved to Miami, called the city a “great laboratory,” 
citing Wynwood and the neighboring Design District, which had been remade by developer 
Craig Robins into a luxury retail district where designer watches and sports cars could be bought 
from shopfronts guarded by private security. Florida was intrigued by Diaz’s attempt to 
manufacture neighborhoods desirable to the creative class in places he would not have deemed 
desirable – glossing over the fact that Wynwood, especially, had been a viable neighborhood 
before its makeover. “Can you create it? That’s what’s uber-interesting to me,” he said. 
“Wynwood and the Design Center are not great places like Georgetown or London. But there is 
an urban scale that’s being rescued in a magnificent way. If these people in Miami can really do 
it, then you might be able to do it just about anywhere.”498 The Miami 21 partners claimed that 
they were looking to expand the city’s economic base beyond real estate development, and to 
make sure that existing residents had opportunities to live and work in its changing districts.499 
The mayor’s plan showed that in practice, his focus on attracting new residents represented a 
continuation of the city’s campaign of urban removal, however. 
4.3 Power U’s case for environmental justice 
Power U campaigned for three years against Crosswinds, joined by Overtown residents who 
turned out to protest the project. Eventually, the county took control of the land from the city and 
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the project was halted.500 In a city where higher income residents were more likely to be able to 
band together and resist new high-rises and big-box stores in their neighborhoods, majority 
Black areas were deemed less politically powerful and therefore less able to fight the city’s push 
for big new developments.501 This pattern meant that the demise of Crosswinds was a rare and 
significant victory for Overtown residents. To counter Diaz’s vision of a green environment to 
attract wealthy incomers, Power U formulated an alternative environmental narrative, connecting 
environmentalism to Overtown residents’ most pressing concerns. 
 Perry and O’Farrell wanted to build an organizing foundation based on “urban concerns 
in low-income city neighborhoods.”502 They decided to create a second “community-owned and 
operated grassroots organization” based in Overtown. The environmental justice movement has 
concerned itself with providing alternatives to dominant narratives that present the 
disproportionate environmental burdens faced by low income communities – particularly 
communities of color –as the price of progress when they are acknowledged at all. In this vein, 
Power U defined its primary mission as “presenting, exposing, and reversing environmental 
racism” through its grassroots members’ participation and leadership, organizing residents to 
stop toxic dumping, contamination of schools, and transportation-related pollution from Miami’s 
expressways.  
By 2006, that mission had evolved thusly: “Power U Center organizes and empowers 
low-income communities of color fighting for environmental, economic and social justice in 
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Miami-Dade County. Power U is building a powerful metropolitan, membership-based 
organization led by people traditionally locked out of the circles of power through grassroots 
organizing, direct action, leadership development, and political education.”503 Dealings with 
Miami elites in previous decades showed how successfully business leaders and politicians had 
narrowed the basis for engagement. In response to the Miami uprisings and Hurricane Andrew, 
this narrowing had presented business-focused responses as sufficient redress, placing the burden 
on individuals to pursue equality alone. Diaz’s version of environmentalism promised to reverse 
the effects of urban sprawl and environmental segregation, while excluding those who had 
suffered from experiencing the benefits.  Like the apartheid protestors in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Power U connected local and global currents of exploitation, but took that process several steps 
further, presenting an integrated picture of racism and environmental destruction and demanding 
interconnected responses commensurate with their scale. 
Beginning in 1999, Power U aimed to build political analysis, skills, and consciousness 
for members and community residents. At its monthly Saturday Schools, attendees would discuss 
“local, national and global community struggles for justice and equality” as well as participate in 
leadership development programs to “increase the capacity of members to effectively lead 
political struggles and organize their community.”504 While campaigning for a noise wall to 
protect inner-city areas from the roar of I-95, Power U and its affiliate Neighborhoods in Action 
used workshops and newsletters to inform residents about the effects of noise and air pollution 
from expressways.  
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Unlike the wealthier, predominantly white, communities stretched along the route of I-95 
north of Miami to Palm Beach, those in the northwest of Miami had no barrier separating them 
from the thoroughfare. After the Florida Department of Transport added two extra lanes to the 
road, the noise from the road increased, throbbing through the community, disturbing residents, 
and shaking homes’ foundations, not to mention the effect the emissions had on the air. A 2001 
newsletter told readers when to see an audiologist for problems related to hearing loss, but also 
sought to frame the problems the community was experiencing as issues of environmental 
justice. It read, “Environmental injustice is when low income or people of color communities are 
overburdened with the pollution effects from activities from which white or wealthy 
communities receive the benefits.”505  
After the noise wall campaign succeeded, Power U remained focused on Overtown. In 
addition to the construction of I-95, O’Farrell said, Overtown suffered from toxic dumping and 
proximity to industry: “There was the concrete plant, and all kinds of factories there, and they 
had built the I-95 on top of people. […] When the city of Miami dredged the Miami Canal to get 
bigger ships in there, they put the sludge in Wagner Creek, right in the middle of Overtown.”506 
In increments, Power U’s work stitched together a picture of environmental segregation as it 
drew connections with other forms of discrimination in order to reframe daily life. 
Environmental justice advocacy has long been closely connected with the academic 
community through collaboration and the circulation of ideas.507 In a 2006 workshop, Power U 
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members read a modified version of R.A. Walker’s 2004 article “Power of Place and Space: 
Local Dimensions of Imperial Economic and Development Policy,” which compared processes 
like gentrification to “imperial” environmental exploitation.508 Walker’s analysis of an imperial 
city founded on the displacement of Native people and drawing resources both from the local 
hinterlands and as global markets had focused on San Francisco and California more broadly, but 
Power U adapted the text to address the situation in Miami. Where Walker spoke of “urban 
renewal” projects displacing low-income people at the behest of the city’s ruling class of 
industrialists and bankers, Power U talked about the exploitation of the state’s water supply and 
desecration of the Everglades:  
Real estate is a critical dimension of internal imperialism. […] When Miami wanted to 
expand banking business, technology industry, transportation or housing, they eagerly 
conquered new space by such devices as filling in the Everglades, and building I-95. […] 
That process of internal conquest continues to this day, leaving many more unemployed, 
hopeless and homeless. A similar process is leveling much more of Miami with a 
comparable targeting of black neighborhoods – and continues through Mayor Manny 
Diaz’s campaign to gentrify the city with his dream of a new vibrant Miami.509  
 
The adapted article connected its environmental and gentrification critiques with an argument 
rooted in class, identifying an empire led by the Cuban exiles who received federal government 
support and had the backing of white elites through the Republican Party and Miami’s older 
white business dynasties.  
We may think of Miami politics as more liberal than central and northern Florida (as the 
south goes, goes the nation) but when it comes to those at the top of the local business 
and political hierarchy, their command over space and place is just as fierce as and 
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unrelenting as any Bush incursion into Iraq. […]. Among the most famous of the 
dynasties over the years are Flagler, Colonel W.J. Worth, Boylegreen. This is not a 
matter of leading individuals or families, however, but of the leadership of class. [...] 
They guard their geography well, with gated communities and condominiums hidden 
along the ocean fronts of Coconut Grove and Bal Harbor. The fight against gentrification 
is to struggle for the poor to have such privileged access to space and power over their 
homes and workplaces. They live within the empire but without it at the same time.510 
 
This description sketches not just the practices of environmental injustice, but also the landscape 
of environmental segregation, showing how it made the Miami Way possible.  
Assessments during the first 20 years of the environmental justice movement have 
pointed out its limited public recognition despite an enthusiastic reception in parts of the political 
and academic landscape.511 Perry and O’Farrell focused on providing education about 
environmental racism and organizing strategies, but were also careful to connect these concepts 
to the existing concerns of residents. When the Florida Department of Transportation agreed to 
build the noise wall, for example, Power U members and Overtown residents also negotiated 30 
jobs for local residents. Furthermore, Power U drew on time-tested strategies of housing 
activism, as the issue proved especially important to residents, overshadowing other issues like 
jobs.512 Relocation “was a bigger detriment to the community than it may seem on the surface,” 
O’Farrell said, because people are dependent on the social networks in their neighborhoods. She 
added: 
You may have three children and the lady down the street that you’ve known all your life 
is the person who cares for those children while you’re working two jobs. And so once 
those networks are broken up, even if you can afford to move to another place, you don’t 
have that – and it is a part of preserving your environment in the way that it meets your 
needs and it’s your home.  
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Housing, then, represented environmental quality in a way that encompassed economic and 
social wellbeing. 
By 2006, Power U’s focus had shifted to anti-gentrification activism and generating a 
vision of environmental improvement in opposition to that of Diaz.  The group used direct 
action, advocacy, and community-building campaigns to promote “housing equity and resident 
empowerment in low-income communities.” For Power U, the most potentially harmful project 
was Crosswinds. In addition to its direct-action tactics, Power U’s campaign against the 
development included a lawsuit and legislative advocacy. It also worked to preserve tenant rights 
and low-income housing, organizing residents who were facing rent increases, evictions, 
and slum living conditions in private rental accommodation, as well as monitoring threats against 
the dwindling affordable housing stock.513  
In May that year, Power U representatives met with Los Angeles-based anti-
gentrification activist Gilda Haas, who had advised the group to focus on the project’s use of 
public land and research the value of public property. The following month, Power U wrote a 
response to the plans Crosswinds had produced alongside the Overtown CRA, expressing 
skepticism toward the trickle-down economic and environmental benefits the plan and the city 
promised. Power U cited CRA executive Frank Rollason’s admission that “gentrification is an 
inevitable byproduct of development in the area,” and expressed dismay that there was no 
specific commitment to affordability for current low-income residents. The organization was 
particularly critical of the CRA’s use of public land for a private, market-rate development. It 
invoked laws governing environmental assessments of new developments, arguing that no new 
assessment had been performed for the project when Crosswinds took it over from another 
 




developer in 2005. It also pushed back against the claim that Crosswinds could turn Overtown 
into a desirable neighborhood; in their eyes, Overtown already had many desirable features.  
To the proposal’s suggestion that new Crosswinds residents were “colonists” who would 
“demonstrate the viability of close-in convenient neighborhoods,” Power U bristled against this 
tendency to describe low-income neighborhoods as lacking,514 arguing that residents already 
knew Overtown was a viable community, while “[g]iven the history of colonialism and 
displacement and genocide  of precolonial communities, colonialism should not be accepted as 
part of the redevelopment of Overtown.” The plan held that the new buildings must “reflect the 
community’s cultural heritage. […] The redevelopment of these neighborhoods should occur 
within the context of these histories and new development should both acknowledge the past 
traditions and further their future.” Power U was not impressed, retorting that cultural heritage is 
sustained by residents, not just architecture.515 Point by point, the activists showed how 
Crosswinds’s rhetoric mirrored colonial narratives that positioned wealthy incomers as 
responsible stewards of the land while blaming existing residents for Overtown’s disinvestment 
and disconnecting them from their cultural heritage. In 2006, Power U submitted an 
Environmental Community Impact Report on the proposed use of public land for luxury condo 
development in Overtown and won its first lawsuit against the City of Miami for improper 
building procedures – a regular win for richer communities, but unheard-of in Overtown. 
The Crosswinds fight emboldened Power U. In several following campaigns, organizers 
strategized on how to build on the success of their anti-gentrification work and strengthen their 
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transportation organizing. The group decided to campaign against a planned additional ramp in 
Overtown, connecting the I-395 expressway to 14th Street. Documents show that the group 
reasoned the campaign was “not housing work but is the base of how development can 
happen.”516 By thinking about housing in a broader context, Power U could transfer the 
momentum from its success against Crosswinds into other campaigns. In its case against the 
ramps, Power U mirrored city language describing ideal green communities:  
Overtown is a pedestrian and bicycle community. We endorse directing transportation 
spending that increases the safety of pedestrians such as wider sidewalks, pedestrian 
friendly traffic lights, and bicycle right of ways and improved public transportation. By 
security a pedestrian friendly community this can add to the value of Overtown. 
Increased traffic increases crime, accidents, pollution, and unhealthy constituents. Studies 
indicate that people retreat from the sidewalks and community when roads become more 
congested or traffic increases.517 
 
Power U also drew on an alternative narrative about Overtown, highlighting its desirable features 
and connection to Miami ecosystems. As O’Farrell explained in an interview, Overtown 
residents had long gathered and fished at waterways within the neighborhood, even after the 
beach was integrated. Wagner Creek was once a popular fishing spot. Artesian wells bubbled up, 
and gopher tortoises lived on its banks.518  
The ramp, on the other hand, threatened to further isolate Overtown and damage 
important local amenities.  It would bring heavy traffic to several Overtown schools and destroy 
a community garden Marvin Dunn, a professor of psychology at Florida International University, 
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had planted on an empty lot. Power U argued that the ramp represented an environmental 
injustice because they benefited the wealthy – like the patrons of the new performing arts center 
– at the expense of Overtown residents. The Metropolitan Planning Organization eventually 
scrapped the ramp plan at the request of County Commissioner Audrey Edmonson.519  
Miami’s hot real estate market had made the problems faced by Power U even more 
complex. Through 2006, the organization was working with Florida Atlantic University 
professor Jaap Vos and his graduate students to generate a report to assess local development 
plans. In an email from that year, Vos apologized for his late responses to Perry’s questions. The 
problem was, the situation in Overtown was so complex that he was finding it hard to know how 
to approach it with the tools at his disposal. When he started the project, he said, he thought other 
experts who had tried to “help” Overtown before just weren’t genuine, that they were 
shortsighted, and that their solutions were “mostly a reflection of their lack of concern for the 
residents.” Months later, he was at a loss. He wrote:  
I am starting to see that the challenges facing Overtown are so complicated and the issues 
so pressing that regular planning processes and tools cannot help the community. All the 
tools I have available to me as a planner seem useless, some offer a glimmer of hope for a 
while but when we model some of the long term consequences, they always end up doing 
the same thing, displace the current residents.520 
 
This email points to the difficulties inherent in combating multinational real estate money, but 
also hints at some of the limitations of expert training in responding to those problems in a global 
city that had adopted the unregulated market as its growth model.  
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As long as developers were not interested in Overtown, the problem had been to attract 
investors in despite the poor prospects of earning a return. Since 2004, interest in Overtown had 
increased due to its proximity to downtown and its relatively cheap land, as well as a 
marginalized community with limited financial and political ability to stop unwanted 
development. Overtown land was cheap and rising demand meant investment was no longer a 
risk for developers. The problem for Overtown residents had become keeping unscrupulous 
developers out, especially in a community where 89 per cent of residents were renters and 
therefore vulnerable to the vagaries of the market. With homeowners, it would be possible to tell 
them not to sell. But, “[f]or renters, there is just no protection and for a landlord there is no 
incentive to maintain or improve properties,” Vos wrote. “Maintenance and improvement 
probably mean higher taxes which you have to pass onto tenants.” In areas where 
homeownership rates were high, residents had protection of government initiatives such as the 
Save Our Home Program, which limited tax increases. But for renters there was just “no 
protection at all.”521 The sudden influx of developers into Overtown would be just as disastrous 
for renters as the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, leaving those unprotected by homeownership 
with no recourse. And even if the area was successful in securing new affordable housing for a 
couple of hundred residents, it was a drop in the bucket compared to the 2,700 affordable units 
needed to house Overtown’s population. 
For most investors, Overtown was simply underutilized prime real estate ripe for the 
taking, Vos explained. Investors were needed who would be willing to invest in current 
residents, committed to working with them and local officials, and willing to make “suboptimal 
economic decisions based on a genuine concern for the current residents,” he continued in his 
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email. “I am willing to think that it is possible to find these kinds of investors and that it is 
possible to do this.” But once one careful development had been completed, there was nothing to 
stop residents of surrounding buildings from being displaced.  
4.4 Hegemonizing is hard work 
As Diaz and his administration worked to construct an ideal of a world city in Miami, he was 
careful to acknowledge the displacement the city and county had caused in the past. Officials 
have embraced the work of scholars like Raymond Mohl and housing activists like Elizabeth 
Virrick and Theodore Gibson, who forced city elites to recognize the effect urban renewal had on 
Overtown and Liberty City. Any actor hoping to steer Miami’s prevailing ideology knows that it 
is contested terrain, requiring them to placate “aggrieved populations” as well as attain control 
over them.522  It is a fallacy to suggest hegemony is unchanging: maintaining is a constant effort 
requiring dominant groups to make concessions to the populations they have wronged in order to 
legitimate their control over resources and institutions.523 As the cultural theorist Stuart Hall 
commented: “Hegemonizing is hard work.”524  
In Miami, the promotion of development remained a powerful legitimizing ideology, as 
did “green” policies, regardless of their effects on residents. Miami’s histories of activism had 
begun to demand other considerations, too, however, as the defeat of Crosswinds demonstrates.  
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These histories are ever-more embedded in Miami’s cityscape, and in how actors talk about it. 
Gibson and Virrick have been so embraced by the city that parks are named after them. Diaz 
acknowledged the effect I-95 and I-395 had on citizens, admitting that they had “essentially 
sliced Overtown into four sections, destroying a once thriving Miami neighborhood.”525 Aware 
of the road’s political significance, Diaz proposed to remove or bury I-395, in contrast to 
FDOT’s plan to widen the highway and eating into more of the area. Although the depressed 
highway idea was rejected, FDOT agreed instead to replace I-395 with a higher, safer bridge 
“much like the iconic bridge built as part of the Boston Big Dig project.”526  
The promise that Overtown could be restored to its former cultural and economic glory 
was less politically dicey. Diaz and his predecessor, Maurice Ferré, had both promised more 
expensive new apartments in Overtown would bring back the area’s lost middle class. This 
rhetoric glossed over the fact that as Miami’s economy was increasingly linked to global trade 
and banking, its middle class was diminishing. Although the city’s reliance on tourism had 
ensured there were plenty of low-wage jobs since the 1920s, “the expansion of interregional 
trade and financial services coupled with low pay for public sector employees produced an 
hourglass income structure typical of global cities, where low-wage workers provide personal 
services to higher-income financial workers and ancillary professionals, and the middle sector is 
comparatively small.”527  
Florida’s tax system also contributed to inequality in Miami. The decision to ban income 
tax left the state’s municipalities dependent on property taxes for revenue, tying the state’s 
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fortunes to the growth its founders wished to promote while attracting incomers opposed to 
taxation. When development slowed, tax revenue shortfalls would result, leading to cuts in health 
and education services as well as workforce reductions, furlough, and pay freezes. In addition, 
the state legislature voted in 2002 to prevent any municipality from changing its minimum wage, 
ensuring that it would remain the same whether workers lived in rural Florida where the cost of 
living was cheap or in Miami, one of the world’s most expensive cities.528  
Even with all these factors considered, Miami’s investment in traditional routes to the 
middle class has been minimal, with disparities made even starker by its neoliberal economy. 
This structure has been particularly harmful to communities for whom public sector jobs were a 
route to greater financial stability, like Miami’s Black communities.529 In 2010, Miami’s private 
practice attorneys made 133 per cent of state attorneys’ salaries. The trend holds true throughout 
the public sector, even compared to the rest of the state. Miami’s teachers, librarians, and teacher 
assistants made 75 per cent of the Florida average.530 The city’s development was not designed 
for these groups, either. 
Market forces and the lack of regulations protecting renters were not the only reasons 
why low-income Miami residents were susceptible to displacement. Beginning in June 2006, the 
Herald published a Pulitzer award-winning series showing that the city and county had 
engineered a crisis in the city’s public housing sector. Among other misdeeds, these articles –  
the result of a collaboration with the grassroots Miami Workers Center –  found that the federal 
government had awarded Miami-Dade County $35 million in 2000 to build hundreds of new 
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low-income homes, but that only three had actually been constructed. Miami-Dade’s Housing 
Agency and Department of Community Development had awarded millions of these dollars in 
advance to developers with political connections.531 They then failed to sanction the developers 
or take back public land after they built few houses, or in some cases, none at all. The Housing 
Agency had also pledged more than $87 million to construct 72 developments that would contain 
more than 8,300 units, but only 14 of the projects were completed.532  
In some cases, the Housing Agency sold homes intended for low-income residents to real 
estate investors.533 Further, the Agency diverted $5 million earmarked for homebuilding to pay 
for its new office building, along with a $287,000 sculpture of stacked teacups called “Space 
Station.” Even as the authorities were failing to build new homes, they continued to destroy old 
ones. The Miami Dade Housing Agency had demolished more than 1,400 aging housing units 
since 1992 and sold another 20. By 2006, the waiting list for housing vouchers in the county had 
grown to 41,000 before it was closed all together. Miami had one of the nation’s highest levels of 
vacant public housing, as the city was in the habit of boarding up units after families moved out. 
Scott-Carver Homes, a low-income development of 800 units, had been demolished with a 
promise to rehome its residents in 2003. Three years later, many were still homeless.534 Miami 
activist Max Rameau described the situation in these terms: “The harsh truth is that Miami-Dade 
County and the City of Miami did not try to increase the number of low-income housing units 
and fail; they tried to decrease the number of low-income housing units and succeeded. The real, 
 
531 Debbie Cenziper, “House of Lie$ (1),” Miami Herald, July 23, 2006. 
 
532 Cenziper, “House of Lie$ (1).” 
 
533  Cenziper, “House of Lie$ (1).” 
 




albeit unstated, public policy of local governments is to decrease the number of low-income 
housing units in order to manufacture a severe housing crisis and advance gentrification, 
resulting in a bonanza for developers who watch their holdings blossom and their investment in 
local graft return substantial dividends.”535 Diaz defended the administration of Miami public 
housing. In a Herald op-ed, he wrote: “There is no crisis in housing. […] Mistakes were made 
and will be made, but we learn from and fix them. Does this amount to a crisis? Absolutely 
not.”536 He and other Miami officials insisted there was no need to enact any new housing 
policies, as existing affordable housing systems were adequate.537 As Miami’s history of 
displacement, and Little HUD’s record showed, that statement could not have been further from 
the truth. 
4.5 The Right to the City 
The Herald investigation confirmed what had until that point been suspicions about the county 
and city’s intentions, and it spurred a new wave of activism connected to land rights in Miami. In 
response to the reports, called “House of Lie$,” local housing and social justice activists seized 
an empty public lot that had been designated for housing that was never built, and constructed 
the Umoja Shanty Town. The settlement consisted of 20 wood framed structures, a kitchen, a 
garden, and a “green” toilet. Umoja, which means “unity” in Swahili, was designed to give 
shelter and food to homeless people, and to make a political argument. The group made its stance 
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explicit when it erected a sign that read “Take Back the Land.”538 Umoja activist Max Rameau 
articulated the project’s ethos:  
This movement is fundamentally about land; we have the right to control the land in our 
community and use it for the public good; the government is an integral part of the 
problem and, therefore, cannot be depended upon to forge a solution; and development is 
not about buildings, paved streets or technology. Rather, true development is 
fundamentally about the lives and potential of actual people. We have only one demand: 
Leave us alone."539 
 
 In contrast to the colonial arguments made by developers since the 1920s, Rameau was asserting 
that Liberty City residents were the land’s rightful stewards. 
The 2007 Superbowl brought a global media spotlight to Miami for a week of events, 
culminating in the big game. That Sunday was doubly symbolic for the city. Hosting the Super 
Bowl was an important achievement for an ambitious mayor, and the city’s treatment of its 
homeless constituents as it tried to “clean up” its image in advance of the 1989 Super Bowl had 
been so draconian that a U.S. District Judge had ruled that the police could no longer arbitrarily 
arrest the homeless.540 Sixteen years later, a diverse array of community activists, grassroots 
organizations, and homeless people arranged their own counter-events to draw attention to the 
crisis. The Center for Pan-African Development, the Sierra Club, LIFFT, the Miami Workers 
Center, Power U, the Service Employees International Union and, South Florida Jobs with 
Justice were just some of the local groups heavily involved in the week of actions.  
In the days before the game, activists erected a new tent city, this time at Government 
Center to hold press briefings and coordinate different groups. Importantly, the tent city marred 
 
538 Mark Rameau, “Blast from the Past: Taking It Back in Miami,” Earth First! 38, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 37–38. 
 
539 Rameau, “Blast from the Past.” 
 





the image the city hoped to project to visitors and the media. 541 On January 31, activists took 
visiting media on a “Tour of Shame” to highlight housing inequality in Miami, stopping at 
Crosswinds condominium development, meeting with day laborers in Allapattah, visiting Fisher 
Island – the wealthiest resort in the US, –  and then following a worker home to Little Haiti 
where reporters were fed pumpkin soup.542  
One of the reporters on the tour was Los Angeles Times correspondent Carol J. Williams. 
She spoke to Laurie Dowdell, who had kept a vigil for days at “The Wall,” a billboard on the site 
of the razed Scott-Carver public housing complex, where she and 850 families had been evicted 
three years before. “They said they were going to tear down this place and rebuild - give us a 
better place,” she told Dowdell, but Scott-Carver residents were still waiting for their new 
housing. Her two daughters had gone to live with her cousin in Atlanta while she cleaned homes 
and worked odd jobs in Miami. The Times reporter observed that at Umoja, participants were 
holding guerilla art parties and a gentrification teach-in. Later, Dowdell visited the Blue Lakes 
Mobile Home Park where residents said their electricity had been shut off by the property owner 
to drive them off prime urban land. On February 1, members of Take Back the Land, Umoja, and 
Power U were arrested while opening two vacant apartment units in Overtown so two homeless 
families could move in, one of whom had resided at Umoja. That was not the end of the 
festivities, however: 
A few hours later, the Glitz and Glam Granny Cheer Squad, homeless women from the 
Scott-Carver complex, rolled up on a flatbed truck to an NFL media event to wave 
pompoms and cheer for new public housing. They shouted their encouragement to 
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neighborhood youths on hand for a football clinic at a sports and education complex that 
the NFL built for Miami after the 1995 Super Bowl.543 
 
Power U’s interest in environmental justice as one among several goals was echoed in the 
approach of its coalition members. Of Take Back the Land, Rameau wrote: “While race was not 
a major part of the axioms, there was plenty of room inside of those principles for individuals to 
advance their own hard race-based line. In the same way, there was space for a hard 
environmentalist line as well as lines in which economic analysis was primary.”544 The flexibility 
of the organizations’ approaches reflected a broader national push to connect activist 
organizations and see if claims to urban space could form the basis of an effective uniting 
“frame.”545 Power U and other Miami activists had joined with a network of urban community-
based organizations in January 2007 to form a national alliance called the Right to the City 
Alliance. Their movement is rooted in academic and social justice work. In 1968, Henri Lefebvre 
wrote that the “right to the city is like a cry and a demand […] a transformed and renewed right 
to urban life.”546 The right to the city can be seen as something in motion, “continually being 
remade as new groups initiate new claims in new contexts.”547 The Alliance built on the work of 
the 2004 World Charter for the Right to the City, which defined the right to the city as “the 
equitable usufruct of cities within the principles of sustainability, democracy, equity, and social 
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justice.”548 One activist from Rhode Island who took part in the 2007 meeting observed that a 
right to the city analysis put the focus on the “colonization of entire communities and 
highlight[ed] the national and international dimensions of gentrification.”549 Inspired by theorists 
like Lefebvre, as well as the World Social Forum, the Right to the City Movement was savvy 
about the ways in which a narrative “frame” could function. It could allow organizations from 
different parts of the country to share strategies and amplify each other’s campaigns; it could 
help as a tool to demonstrate to organizations’ constituencies the ways in which their concerns 
were connected to larger forces; and it could help local groups band together to campaign against 
problems, even if their priorities diverged.  
Gihan Perera, Executive Director of the Miami Worker’s Center, spoke about how the 
coalition worked to appeal to activists from different backgrounds and classes while influencing 
their political consciousness. The Right to the City could connect with both low-income residents 
and members of the white-dominated environmental movement who might otherwise be 
attracted by Diaz’s green vison. When, in 2007, developers and county commissioners pushed to 
extend the Urban Development Boundary – a zoning barrier created in 1983 to prevent 
development from spilling further into the Everglades –  and promised in exchange more 
affordable housing for low-income citizens, Right to the City organizers used it as an opportunity 
to unite urban housing activists and environmentalists – an interracial coalition of working-class 
and middle-class individuals. Perera said: 
To build this environmental/labor/community coalition, there is a low road and a high 
road. The low road is: labor wants jobs; the environmentalists want green buildings; the 
community wants houses. Traditional organizing theory is, “Just match up those self-
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interests and there you've got your coalition.” But I feel like we are at the end of being 
able to operate at that low level of self-interest because if we don't adopt each other on a 
higher plane, the coalition is going to be limited to that self-interest. So, for example, if 
the environmentalists are happy that they are building green houses but don't understand 
the importance of supporting the African American community's political power, it will 
not be a solid coalition. Once that project is over, if the threat to the African American 
community still continues, those concerned about environmental issues may not be there 
with support. So our job is to keep the conversation going. Yes, you're here for green 
buildings, but you also have to be doing this to actually build the power of a black 
community […]. That has to be central to their consciousness as environmentalists.550 
 
Persuading Florida’s large environmental groups to oppose green urban removal took a long 
time, O’Farrell told me. Traditional environmental groups like the Sierra Club and Audubon 
Society were interested in the “beautiful things,” not “a place like Overtown.” It took the 
presence of endangered gopher tortoises on the banks of Wagner Creek to interest of the Sierra 
Club in toxic dumping in Overtown.551 Groups like Sierra and the Audubon Society had initially 
supported Diaz’s plans for a greener, denser Miami before Power U and other grassroots 
organizers explained their potential impact on low-income residents. “It’s not like anybody 
doesn’t want greenways and all of that, but it was a plan that people that live there had not been 
involved in at all,” O’Farrell said.552 Building a wider network helped to keep that conversation 
going. 
A national network also enabled activists to speak to struggles in other cities, connecting 
environmental injustice with housing concerns. In 2006, Power U invited Detroit residents to 
speak at a hearing on Crosswinds and describe how they had been displaced by one of the 
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company’s previous projects. Perry and Power U used the Right to the City concept to show that 
Crosswinds was more than a local fight. Perry noted: 
We could have carried on the Crosswinds campaign as only being mad at our local 
commissioner […] but then we’re missing the entire picture. Neoliberalism, corporations 
[…] all of those pieces would be missing. […]. When our members talk about 
Crosswinds, they also look around the city of Miami at the increase in poverty, the 
increase in homelessness. As we help people understand it more, they can name it even 
more clearly, but they already understand it. It's just about sharing theory and language 
amongst organizations, which will help build a broader-scale movement.553  
 
Shared theory and language were important tools in mounting campaigns against processes that 
had become naturalized, such as displacement in the service of real-estate-based growth and the 
neglect of low-income communities.  
The Right to the City movement also provided the opportunity for groups like Power U to 
speak to neighborhoods that face gentrification but lack Overtown or Liberty City’s historical 
grievances with the city. In a city where racial stratification was severe, the organizations hoped 
to foster increased cooperation along class lines. Cubans had become the predominant racial 
group in Miami politics, but the level of Cubans’ social ascent depended upon when they arrived. 
While the first wave of Cuban arrivals – mostly middle and upper-middle class professionals – 
received significant economic and social support from the U.S. Government, but later arrivals 
tended to have benefited far less from U.S. foreign policy priorities.554 While Cubans who 
arrived from the 1980s onward still received more opportunities and support than Haitians 
fleeing the dictatorship of Papa Doc and the devastation of natural disasters,555 they still found 
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themselves struggling with prejudice and a lack of opportunity in ways similar to other Latin 
American and Caribbean migrants.556  
4.6 Conclusion 
These strategies were visible on August 31, 2007, when Power U and the Miami Workers Center 
joined other groups to storm the Housing Agency of New Orleans to demand the right of return 
for residents whose homes had been destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and who had received no 
aid to allow them to go back to their neighborhoods. And on June 19, 2008, Right to the City 
Miami, made up of Power U, the Miami Workers Center, Vecinos Unidos, and Florida Legal 
Services targeted the 40th convening of the United States Conference of Mayors, held in the city. 
The group held a parallel meeting, the People’s State of the City Summit, to “discuss a people’s 
platform for the U.S. urban agenda in 2008.”557 Nearly all of Right to the City’s members went 
on to play significant roles in the Occupy movement around the world in 2011 and 2012. More 
recently, following the wishes of Overtown residents, Power U has turned its attention to 
problems such as school safety and the criminalization of young people.  
Although climate change did not feature explicitly in the campaigns of Power U or the 
other Right to the City members, the connection between environmental and housing justice has 
become key to activist platforms as Miami works to respond to sea level rise. Influencing a 
developer-led political class continued to be a struggle, however. In 2008, Perry was among the 
Right to the City activists who acknowledged that their reach would be limited unless they got 
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candidates elected to office.558 So far, two commissioners sympathetic to Miami activists’ cause 
have been elected: Eileen Higgins and Daniella Levine Cava.   
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5. Miami through the lens of climate gentrification 
Maggie Fernandez, a former government employee, had been invited to speak at a 2018 meeting 
of Miami’s Sea Level Rise Committee about her nonprofit, Pay Up Climate Polluters, and a 
proposal to ask the city to tally up how much it was spending to deal with the effects of climate 
change each year. The committee’s chair, land use lawyer Wayne Pathman, told Fernandez that 
any topics beyond sea level rise were outside of the committee’s purview. “We are the sea level 
rise committee, not the climate committee,” he said. “I, as the chair […] want to explore this idea 
and how we can do certain things, but if we decide we want to take up all climate initiatives in 
the city, I don’t think that’s what the [city] administration wants.” During public comment, 
Fernandez expressed frustration with what she felt was a lack of urgency to deal with climate 
change among board members. Further, she said, the committee did not reflect the diversity of 
the community it was supposed to serve (eight of its nine members were men), had limited its 
scope, and had achieved little to change policy since its formation in 2015.  
At several administrative meetings I attended in Miami– particularly meetings of the 
fractious City Commission – someone on the dais would take offense at criticism and launch into 
a tirade. Proceedings that often started late could stretch hours into the evening, or conversely, 
would be abruptly halted altogether. On the night in question, Reinaldo Borges, an architect and 
member of the Sea Level Rise Committee since 2015, took umbrage at criticisms of the 
committee’s record and makeup, but also at Fernandez’s views on what its jurisdiction should be. 
He told her: “This is not a climate change meeting. […] [M]y action plan as an architect in this 
community is to think through adaptation. I don’t want to spend an ounce of my energy on this 
planet right now fighting the polluters. Because I think we all are that.” Many climate impacts 
such as sea level rise were already locked in by past emissions, he added. He told Fernandez to 
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focus on finding solutions, not telling the committee they were incompetent or criticizing its 
equity balance. Other committee members apologized to Fernandez, but the matter did not end 
there.  
Fernandez, who knew the mayor of the City of Miami, Francis Suarez, texted him to tell 
him what happened.559 Borges’s wish to keep focusing on adapting to climate change rather than 
examining the responsibility of the biggest polluters reflected a way of doing things that activists 
were increasingly pressuring the city to change. The same was true of whether bodies like the 
Sea Level Rise Committee represented Miami’s communities. That night, however, the optics 
were particularly bad: Borges left Fernandez in tears, and another committee member, José 
Regalado, had told Fernandez she was out of line for accusing Borges of “mansplaining” to her. 
The incident prompted a deeper reassessment from the mayor’s office. What was the Sea Level 
Rise Committee’s role? Should it focus solely on the threat flooding posed to Miami’s property 
values and its tourism- and development-focused economy, or should it encompass other aspects 
of debates about climate change and what to do about it? And who should be represented within 
it?  
In this chapter, I change focus from the materials that officials, planners, architects, and 
activists have produced to interviews conducted in-person and on the phone with individuals 
connected to Miami’s climate conversation. I use these conversations and the meetings I attended 
to interrogate how the narratives and coalitions I observed are historically grounded and 
contextualized. Unlike the impressions I formed from historical sources, which provided a 
limited ability to see how people reacted to narratives of green urban removal, this l approach 
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made it is possible to see how people employ narratives like the “Miami Way” or historical 
critiques of segregation as they make sense of climate change. I show how segregation has 
created very different understandings and physical experiences of climate change and, 
correspondingly, different solutions. 
I focus on the evolution of understandings of climate change in Miami, especially the 
rising prominence of environmental and housing justice arguments in mainstream political 
debates about Miami’s future as the city becomes an increasingly visible global symbol of 
climate vulnerability and climate action. The movement to put equity at the center of climate 
change planning presents a challenge to political narratives that frame climate change as 
predominantly a threat to development and real estate investments connected to sea level rise, as 
well as the policies that have emerged from that characterization. It also complicates Miami’s 
effort to emerge as a global climate leader through its participation in national and international 
alliances.  
As a result of this shifting discourse, committee makeups have changed and policymakers 
have begun to include affordable housing under the new umbrella term “resilience.” At the same 
time, Overtown, Liberty City, and Little Haiti – all previously considered undesirable areas on 
high ground away from the coast – are under increasing pressure from developers looking to buy 
large parcels of land to create new megadevelopments. I examine how climate change has 
become understood as both an impetus for gentrification and a galvanizing force for activists, 
despite the difficulties of pushing back against development in a city where development 
interests are powerful, connected, and a key source of revenue. With these power dynamics in 
mind, I appraise the uneven consequences of climate gentrification in historically 
disenfranchised areas.  
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Further, I show how two new terms – resilience and climate change gentrification – 
collide with the older narratives about the city, its nature, and its people that I have discussed in 
previous chapters, including colonial narratives of conquest and discovery, the Miami Way, 
boosterism in the press, the tension between urban renewal and urban removal, and arguments 
for environmental justice. These narratives, fragmented in their adoption across demographics 
and frequently across space, each have different implications for understandings about climate 
change, what should be done about it, and who should benefit. 
The rise of “resilience” has been a crucial force in shaping local, national, and 
international responses to climate change. Although the term remains ill-defined, its flexibility 
has allowed municipalities in Miami to participate in international discussions about resilience, 
and to accommodate shifting ideas about what climate change means for Miami and shifting 
priorities in talking about and addressing it. Resilience functions as a “lens” that allows the 
connections between different problems to come into focus. It can be interpreted in ways that 
support the Miami Way and its continuing legacy of development and displacement, or to 
highlight the needs of the city’s most vulnerable. Miami has also become the focus of a new 
climate lens that has shifted the public and policy conversation about responses to climate 
threats: climate gentrification. Although contested, this lens has brought into focus the 
connections between Miami’s history of displacement and environmental racism, as well as its 
current vulnerability to climate stresses.  
Finally, I examine the climate movement’s success in changing both policy and 
narratives, as well as a new turn in the area’s climate discourse as cities in the Greater Miami 
area declare a “climate emergency” and Miami itself adopts a “net zero” target for carbon 
emissions, a goal that had been mostly absent from climate conversations for several years. At 
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the same time, a growing number of voices are beginning to advocate for a just retreat from a 
delicate ecosystem that soon will no longer be able to support the needs of its 6.1 million people. 
5.1 Evolving understandings 
The 2009 election of Mayor Tomás Regalado, a Cuban-American Republican, seemed to reverse 
the city of Miami’s climate conversation. Regalado, who ran against Diaz’s “big picture” 
administration with promises of fiscal responsibility and tax cuts, rarely spoke about climate 
change in his first years in office.560 While Regalado remained silent, climate change impacts 
had begun to encroach on daily life with increasing regularity. Miami was already experiencing 
sunny day flooding, king tides, and more frequent and severe tropical storms and hurricanes. 
Over the past decade, flood events in Miami – one of the most vulnerable cities in the country to 
sea level rise – have increased in frequency by 400 per cent.561 There are several reasons that the 
flooding poses such an eminent threat to the city. Sea level rise in Southeast Florida is 
approximately 15 per cent higher than the global average, according to research by local 
scientists.562 In addition, Miami’s average elevation is only six feet above sea level. The coastal 
ridge that served as the main base for population and infrastructure until Miami’s postwar 
suburban boom is only 12 feet above the water. By comparison, New York, also considered 
vulnerable to sea level rise, sits an average of 33 feet above sea level. Finally, Miami’s bedrock 
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is made of limestone, meaning that water from the ocean soaks into the soft rock and gurgles up 
through the land, drenching lawns and concrete, and rendering dikes or walls ineffective.563 
In Florida, about 300,000 homes are located less than three feet above the high-water 
mark, as well as 2,555 miles of roads, 35 public schools, one power plant, and 978 EPA-listed 
sites such as hazardous waste dumps and sewage plants. At six feet, these numbers grow to more 
than 16,000 miles of road, 300 schools, 14 power plants, and 5,509 contaminated sites listed by 
the Environmental Protection Agency.564    
By 2013, Miami’s flooding had begun to catch the attention of the national press. That 
year, the Rolling Stone published an article ominously titled “Goodbye, Miami,” quoting 
scientists and engineers on the extent of the problem, as well as officials’ general failure to 
recognize its seriousness.565 That year, Philip Levine, the CEO of a cruise company, was elected 
mayor of Miami Beach after promising to “fix” the flooding that was crippling the island’s 
economy and running a campaign video in which he pretended to paddle home from work in a 
boat.566 Even Regalado began to change his mind. In a 2017 interview, he did not attribute his 
newfound interest in climate policy to national press attention, evidence from scientists, or the 
city’s worsening flooding, but to conversations with his son. Jose Regalado had come back to 
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live with his father after his mother died, and, according to the Miami Herald, he began to talk to 
his father about climate change over coffee each morning.567  
This shift was visible in 2016 when Regalado asked Republican presidential candidates to 
tell him what they planned to do about rising seas, and when he called on President Trump to 
talk about climate change as Hurricane Irma threatened the city in 2017. That year, he also began 
to drum up support for a bond dedicated to funding climate change responses, which was to be 
raised through a portion of Miami’s property tax. He started to shift his political messaging, 
standing in floodwater from that year’s king tide in Shorecrest, one of the few seafront blue-
collar areas in Miami, and posting pictures of flooding overwhelming seawalls on Twitter.  
Urgent items on Regalado’s agenda included updating a 2012 stormwater study that 
failed to take sea level rise into account, thereby missing the urgent need for infrastructure 
improvements in places like Shorecrest, which was already experiencing “weeks of extreme tidal 
flooding every year.”568 Diaz, who had made the installation of pumps to deal with flooding an 
important part of his platform, did not link that flooding with climate change. For him, 
responding to climate change involved encouraging the construction of more efficient buildings 
and reducing car travel. But during Regalado’s two terms, climate change became explicitly and 
indelibly linked to sea level rise and the attendant flooding that was now happening rain or shine. 
Both mayors, however, shared a desire to reconcile climate action with development, a marriage 
that was hoped for around the world, but especially in Florida. 
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A mosaic of climate efforts began to form in both Miami and Miami Beach, drawing 
inspiration from Miami-Dade’s long-running climate plans dating back to 1993, as well as its 
participation in the Southeast Florida Climate Change Compact, a collaboration with Broward, 
Monroe, and Palm Beach Counties.569 The county’s focus, discussed in previous chapters, had 
remained on encouraging density at the urban core. Its County Climate Change Advisory Task 
Force, made up of 200 officials, academics and other experts, had issued recommendations that 
were included into the County Sustainability Plan and the 2014 County Comprehensive Planning 
Guide.  
Gestures toward climate change action have not guaranteed that such action actually 
takes place, however. Until activists began to put serious public pressure on his administration, 
Regalado could benefit from positive headlines for talking about climate change without any 
accountability for following through, just as his predecessor, Diaz, could receive international 
attention for his climate policies that did not pay attention to sea level rise. In 2015, the county’s 
$6.8 million budget made no mention of climate change. Activists organizing the Miami 
People’s Climate March to coincide with the marches happening around the world in September 
of that year noticed the absence, and brought out 200 residents – some wearing inner tubes and 
water wings – to the budget hearings, prompting Miami-Dade to create the County Office of 
Resilience and allocate $75,000 toward the position of Chief Resilience Officer.570 
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5.2 The rise of resilience 
Resilience was becoming an increasingly popular term in urban policy circles, promoted by 
wealthy think tanks and NGOs.  It focuses on cities’ ability to “bounce back” from “shocks” like 
extreme weather and deal with “stresses” like climate change. Over the past 30 years, 
“resilience” has become an increasingly popular concept in disciplines such as engineering, 
political ecology, psychology, sports, urban studies, and risk management. Its conceptual 
attractiveness extended even to the beauty industry: Estée Lauder named a range of face creams 
it released in the early 2000s “Resilience Lift.” In the field of disaster management, Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 emerged as an example of the need for resilience when New Orleans’s levees, 
pumps, and canals failed despite the predictability of such an event in the region.571 Katrina 
showed, as one book about resilience said, that “first-world countries” could be vulnerable, 
too.572 
Resilience appeared to resist precise definition yet offered an answer for almost anything. 
An op-ed in the South Florida Sun Sentinel reflecting on the human-caused disaster during and 
after Katrina hinted at how this flexibility could border on fuzziness, calling resilience a “squishy 
set of qualities that allows a person or community to bounce back.”573 Resilience’s applicability 
to environmental concerns has grown increasingly prominent. Andrew Zolli, the author of a book 
Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back, declared in a 2012 New York Times op-ed that the concept 
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of sustainability, which he characterized as efforts to “put the world back into balance,” had 
failed in the face of increasing imbalance, as seen in the disruption wrought by Hurricane Sandy 
and searing drought in the Midwest. Resilience, meanwhile, focused on “how to help vulnerable 
people, organizations and systems persist, perhaps even thrive, amid unforeseeable 
disruptions.”574 Zolli, like other resilience adherents, associated the attribute with the “new” 
realities of the first decade of the 21st century. 
Also around the turn of the millennium, “resilience thinking” was gaining popularity with 
city planners as they updated aging infrastructure, for example, to fortify systems against a range 
of threats that were top of mind in a post-9/11 world: terrorism, extreme weather, and energy 
disruption. Unlike sustainability, resilience encompassed a range of policy areas, from the 
environment to technology and cybersecurity. Resilient infrastructure could mean “smart” 
microgrids that collect data on their users, or the term could be extended to include natural 
features such as wetlands serving as a “buffer against hurricanes.”575 Policy recommendations 
encouraging urban adaptation to multiplying environmental and security risks have proliferated 
from governmental and non-governmental sources like the 2012 campaign by the United Nations 
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction How to Make Cities More Resilient, and the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities initiative that makes funds and training to cities it identifies as 
vulnerable.576 
Through 100 Resilient Cities, Rockefeller made $200 million available to cities on its list 
for consultant services and access to its network. In 2015, Greater Miami and the Beaches – 
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consisting of Miami-Dade County, the City of Miami, and Miami Beach – were selected to join 
the group. One of Rockefeller’s most important acts was to fund Chief Resilience Officers, 
official posts in member cities. Miami-Dade County founded its Office of Resilience in 2015, led 
by Jim Murley, also head of the South Florida Regional Planning Council. Miami Beach’s Chief 
Resilience Officer is Susanne Torriente.  In 2016, Jane Gilbert was appointed as the City of 
Miami’s first Chief Resilience Officer, setting up an Office of Resilience and Sustainability.  
Together, under the purview of 100 Resilient Cities, the three municipalities have produced the 
Resilient 305 strategy, a plan to increase the Miami region’s resilience to shocks, including 
climate change.577 Since the 2018 election of a new Florida governor, Ron DeSantis, the state 
also briefly gained a resilience officer, Julia Nesheiwat, a former hostage negotiator with the 
State Department.578 
From municipality to municipality, the focus on resilience differs, however. Gilbert’s 
work focused on developing Miami’s climate resilience response – responding to climate change 
and sea level rise, with a focus on hazard mitigation.579 The role is structured in such a way that 
Gilbert had her own staff, but was not part of any existing department. This gave her more 
leeway to “challenge the status quo,” she said, working across departments that had not always 
cooperated in the past and encouraging them to factor climate change into their decisions. 
Jeremy Calleros Gauger, a planner for the City of Miami, described how, for example, the 
existence of the office had made considering problems like sea level rise in projects all over city 
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government the new “status quo” rather than a topic that frequently evaded staff’s attention.580 
The restoration of the Miami Marine Stadium, built in the 1960s as a venue for powerboat 
racing, would now fall under the rubric of resilience,  requiring it to accommodate a certain 
amount of sea level rise. 
Miami Beach applied the term to its most recent strategic plan, using a framing it calls 
the “lens of resilience,” which, it argued, “helps us clearly see our shocks and stresses,” allowing 
the city to survive shocks like “storms and special events” as it copes with ongoing issues like 
“aging infrastructure and congestion.” The plan groups these problems and the associated 
solutions into “vision areas,” and invites readers to “put on your lenses and get ready for some 
strategy.”581 Miami Beach’s definition of resilience also includes security-focused concerns such 
as cyberterrorism.  Despite its interpretational fuzziness, the idea of resilience as a “lens” that 
allows the linkages between policy concerns that may otherwise be dealt with separately has 
been productive in Miami’s municipal governments.  
Resilience’s broad applicability has made it a site for contestation. As Moses Shumow, a 
professor of journalism at Florida International University, remarked in an interview, used to 
apply to buildings and infrastructure, resilience, as conceived at the municipal level, can ignore 
the history of resilient people who live in Miami.582 Like “sustainability,” resilience has been 
used as a rhetorical means to accommodate the drive for consumption and development 
alongside environmental protection, to the detriment of populations who bear the costs (but not 
the rewards) of attempts to create a “win-win.” Large new developments that risk displacing 
 
580 Jeremy Calleros Gauger in discussion with the author, February 19, 2019. 
 
581 Raul J Aguila et al., “Our Future in Focus: 2019 Strategic Plan Through the Lens of Resilience” (City of Miami 
Beach, 2019). 
 




lower-income residents – many of whom work in essential service jobs – have claimed the 
moniker, for example, asserting that elevation and on-site renewable energy generation assure 
the development’s longevity and green credentials.  
A counternarrative has emerged among community organizations and others, meanwhile, 
that focuses on the need to ensure low-income residents have resilient housing and paints as 
resilient the people who have lived for generations in Miami or came as refugees. Speaking of 
Little Haiti, a low-income area on higher ground, community organizer Marleine Bastien 
described the story of Haitian migrants who came to Miami in the 1960s and 70s and turned the 
area into a “thriving, culturally diverse neighborhood” out of “sheer resilience, determination, 
and courage.”583 By shifting the focus from infrastructure onto people – as Power U did in 
response to the plans for Crosswinds – Bastien and other activists add another facet to their 
narrative against displacement. Others in community meetings have pointed out the way that 
“bouncing back” presumes that returning to how things were before is desirable, when policies 
could instead aim to improve on that baseline in economically and environmentally vulnerable 
places. 
The conflict between different narratives of resiliency has emerged with increasing 
persistence, challenging the narrative of Miami as a “perky engine of commerce” in official 
settings. In chapter one, I discussed the importance of the “Miami Way” to the city’s 
development, an ethos that espoused a need to build in order to secure revenue; a faith in 
technology’s ability to tame nature; a reliance on service industries and tourism staffed by low-
paid workers; a rigid , racially-stratified class system that ensures a continued supply of 
precarious workers to local businesses; and a lack of union organization. I have also shown how 
 




environmental concerns can be incorporated into the Miami Way, framing green space and clean 
air as necessary for maintaining the city’s competitiveness as an engine for tourism and an 
attractive place for desirable new residents. Studying the Miami Way and its evolution provides 
a strikingly unadulterated case of a city conceived of and governed as a growth machine. As 
federal funding for cities has decreased, industrial cities have lost their economic base, service 
industries grow, and work becomes more precarious, localized variations of the Miami Way 
seem to be spreading. And as other scholars have demonstrated, Miami has represented an 
important early example of challenges other US cities may come to face as migration accelerates 
around the country.584 I argue that the same can be said of the city’s exposure to the threats of 
extreme weather and the effects of climate change under ever more extreme deregulation, even 
as municipalities and the state begin to reckon with those threats.  
Miami’s real estate boom stalled only briefly after the global financial crisis. Soon, more 
cranes than ever were visible breaching the skyline along the waterfront, assembling buildings 
with helipads, private automobile elevators, and glass-walled penthouses offering 360-degree 
views of the city, the ocean and Biscayne Bay. This constituted a “lopsided” comeback for the 
wealthy, including opportunities to buy and tear down old properties, and build in their place 
“new Gatsby-esque” mansions, even as most people found themselves unable to get a 
mortgage.585 The boom coincided with a sharp increase in flooding, especially on Miami Beach, 
where instances rose by 400 per cent between 2006 and 2016.586 
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Officials like Miami Beach’s Philip Levine encourage the continuing construction of 
luxury developments for several reasons, one of the most important being that it raises tax and 
property revenues,587 increasing the funds available to municipalities to pay for the infrastructure 
to serve a growing population and at the same time preparing for ever greater pressures from 
flooding, hurricanes, and heat. This leaves municipalities in the strange position of encouraging 
development – which leaves them more vulnerable as they proliferate flood-prone concrete 
surfaces and put more assets in the way of future hurricanes – because it will help them pay for 
the infrastructure needed to cope with increasing vulnerability. Reining in development, 
especially in the urban core, has been anathema to most Miami politicians. When asked whether 
the developers might stop building on the waterfront given the predicted rise in sea level, Mayor 
Regalado answered: “The developers? Of course not.”588 Miami’s position may not be much 
different from that of other world cities. Plans to reduce development or even retreat from the 
shoreline are few and far between. After Hurricane Sandy, for example, New York Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg painted redevelopment on Staten Island’s ruined shoreline as a moral duty. 
Leaving the area free from future development was unthinkable. Instead, it should be 
redeveloped with “resilient” buildings that would bring new commerce to Staten Island.589  
In Miami, too, adaptation measures have seemingly helped to maintain the development 
cycle. In 2013, Miami Beach embarked on an aggressive set of adaptation policies to raise roads, 
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build sea walls, and install seawater pumps in response to residents’ complaints about 
increasingly problematic flooding. During king tide, even on sunny days, residents were wading 
through dirty water to get to work or buy groceries. As I explore further in the conclusion to this 
dissertation, the measures have created complicated new perceptions of risk. Like Bloomberg’s 
positioning of resilient new infrastructure as the solution to qualms about development, the new 
pumps help to maintain the illusion of a dry Miami Beach, further fueling the boom.590 One 
reporter found that realtors at Miami Beach condo viewings frequently commented that the city 
had “fixed” sea level rise with the pumps.591 At the same time, politicians have admitted freely 
that all the pumps represent a “band-aid,” not a long-term solution. In such cases, the tendency 
has been to point to future technologies. Confronted with the suggestion that his fixes were not 
permanent, the former mayor of Miami Beach, Philip Levine, argued,  “human innovation” 
would produce “innovative solutions to fight back against sea level rise that we cannot even 
imagine today.”592 In this case, then, resiliency involves not only maintaining the pace of 
building, but also gesturing toward expected future innovations. 
Such optimism looks to the future but draws on Miami’s history as a place where settlers 
used technologies such as drainage to cope with increasingly hostile surrounds. In an interview 
in 2018, Wayne Pathman, a land use lawyer and the chairman of the City of Miami’s Sea Level 
Rise Committee, demonstrated how the Miami Way has remained constant in attitudes toward 
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challenges like sea level rise. New technologies, big plans, and clear regulation could allow 
Miami Beach to continue to grow, he explained:  
A few years ago, when Rolling Stone magazine did their article by Jeff Goodell, they 
made it sound like complete doom and gloom and pack your bags, it’s time to leave. 
Well, hundreds of articles have been written since then. Still we have flourished down 
here in terms of development, but we need to develop and build differently. [… ]The 
sooner you start, the better chance of you actually having the opportunity to do it and do 
it right and, at the same time, encouraging development in the area because they will see 
that, OK, the city has a plan on how they’re going to address this issue. […] 
 
 I think man has figured out a lot of things. We got to the moon. When people came here 
in 1905 or the 1900s what they saw was not what you see out my window. It was swamp, 
mosquitoes, hot, trees and look what they built. […] I think that we can be resourceful. I 
think you have to accept Mother Nature… she’s coming… but I think we can adapt to 
things. The critical issue to me is when do we start.593 
 
According to Pathman, planning was not the enemy of continued development in Miami but its 
savior. Several interviewees suggested that the municipalities are rushing to squeeze in as much 
development as possible before the next crash, but others contend that the demand is unlikely to 
go away soon, especially in the context of immense interest from overseas buyers. One 
interviewee - a land use lawyer - commented that six years ago, she had expected building to die 
away in the face of the growing obstacles posed by sea level rise, as well as a slowdown in the 
condo market, but international investment has fueled interest in Miami as a place to park wealth 
and enjoy a warm climate in exclusive developments in Brickell, Downtown, and the Design 
District, without the perceived dangers of crime and economic turmoil in countries such as Brazil 
and Venezuela.594 The New York-based developer Witkoff  announced in January 2020 that it 
would move to the area to build a series of new projects in Miami-Dade. “We believe in the 
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growth of Miami,” the company’s executive Vice President Alex Witkoff told the Herald.595 
This technological optimism – also the engine of Everglades drainage – promises the 
materialization of machinery that has not yet been invented. This colonial narrative also assumes 
that low-wage labor will still somehow be available to propel the Miami Beach economy, even 
as the cost of living continues to soar.  
In addition, the attention to flooding has pushed pumps to the forefront of the list of 
available responses. Getting water off the streets is portrayed as the most important climate-
related goal. Pump stations may remove inconvenient water, but they are extremely energy-
hungry, and South Florida’s electricity provider, Florida Power and Light, has lobbied against 
renewable electricity production from sources such as solar power. Despite the Miami-Dade’s 
early focus on reducing energy emissions, the rising prominence of sea level rise made the 
overall mitigation of climate change and its non-flooding effects less of a priority. Resilience 
advocates have been working to change that: Alissa Farina, the City of Miami’s Resilience 
Programs Manager, acknowledged that while the city was “not doing a ton right now” to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, she was working to find ways to ensure the city was “tackling climate 
change at both ends,” both working on adaptation and lowering emissions. 
The Miami Way has helped to produce a conceptualization of climate change response 
that emphasizes the need to maintain development to fund adaptation that will encourage further 
development. By decontextualizing climate change and, until recently, making the primary 
concern the maintenance of property values and the pace of development, the meaning of 
resilience can be reduced to maintaining optimism among city investors and promising future 
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technologies that may never be invented. Meanwhile, other aspects of climate change have 
remained less discussed, such as the city’s role in reducing carbon emissions and the concerns of 
low-income neighborhoods.  Determined to change this situation, community activists mounted a 
campaign to get their concerns addressed and change the dominant discourse about climate 
change and in policy approaches.   
5.3 Climate change in the “Third Miami” 
In 2017, Hurricane Irma became the worst hurricane to batter Miami since 1992. Its winds 
reached 145 miles per hour, and unlike Andrew, Irma brought significant storm surge, flooding 
downtown Miami and cutting off the Keys. At a Sea Level Rise Committee after the storm, one 
speaker recalled looking back at his home on Miami Beach as he evacuated. If the storm 
destroyed it, he remembered thinking, he’d simply rebuild because that was what Miamians had 
always done. This reality might hold true for some Miami residents, although it is becoming 
increasingly out of reach as insurance rates rise, even for those who receive funds from FEMA to 
rebuild their homes.596 While television cameras initially focused on the spectacle of water 
inundating Brickell, Miami’s financial district, a different kind of disaster was unfolding in low-
income areas, even ones that escaped flooding due to their position on high ground. Poorly 
maintained rental apartments fared badly under the stress of the winds, leaving many without 
housing after the storm. Service workers who evacuated before the storm or who could not come 
to work in its aftermath risked being fired. Some of the problems residents faced were new: 
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Without electricity, electronic cards for food allowances would not work, leaving people without 
food.597  
For people on low incomes, preparing for and responding to hurricanes is a challenge at 
every step. Assembling the food and other supplies needed to ride a storm out is costly. 
Evacuation without a car in Miami is challenging, and employers are not always understanding if 
people do not make it in to work. Even if people are allowed time off work to escape a hurricane, 
missing a few days’ pay could put them at risk of losing their homes. For renters, the hurricane 
was an especially stressful time. Landlords could choose not to repair damaged buildings, 
leaving tenants homeless.598 Val Jonas, a civil rights lawyer who represents sex offenders in 
South Florida, recalled the difficulties she encountered in finding places for her clients in 
hurricane shelters. Sex offenders in Florida are often homeless because they are banned from 
living near children, and they have also been barred from public hurricane shelters in the state.599  
Maggie Fernandez, a member of the Miami Climate Alliance and now a senior advisor to 
County Commissioner Eileen Higgins, told me that Irma brought the climate vulnerability of 
Miami’s low-income communities to the forefront of the public and political imagination.600 She 
recalled speaking with Valencia Gunder, a climate and housing activist based in Liberty City, 
who knew that her community was not ready for the hurricane. As Irma threatened, Gunder set 
up the Community Emergency Operations Center, which delivered help to 18 low-income 
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communities before other aid reached them.601 People in Miami’s low-income areas are living in 
a state of constant precarity even before a hurricane strikes, a situation made worse by 
environmental segregation’s effect on community health.  
This segregation has rendered environmental experiences highly localized, and made it 
harder for lower-income areas to have their concerns addressed. A year after the storm, Liberty 
City residents were still asking the county to remove a huge pile of hurricane debris from the 
only residential landfill site in Miami-Dade. The county had claimed the debris was all organic 
and did not represent a danger to drinking water, but the landfill was attracting vermin and 
mosquitoes. Residents and reporters had photographed non-organic waste such as mattresses in 
the mound, which was located near homes and a kindergarten.602 At a coordinating meeting for 
Miami Climate Alliance members, one Liberty City organizer compared the concern in the news 
about the impact of plastic waste on ocean animals like turtles with the relative absence of 
coverage of the humans in Liberty City who were enduring dangerous circumstances as a result 
of climate change, environmental racism, and inequality. Both turtles in the ocean and children 
in Liberty City were suffering from the notion that the debris of capitalism can be thrown 
“away.” Her critique highlighted how the colonial placement of nature in an idealized – if 
threatened – wilderness blocked Liberty City residents from becoming subjects who deserve eco-
health in the same way charismatic animal species do. 
Gunder is one of several prominent women of color building new narratives about 
climate change that center the disproportionate burden low-income communities are facing. 
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Across activist circles, I was struck by the number of women – many of whom claim African-
American, Latinx, and/or Caribbean heritage – demanding that climate change be addressed 
through tackling poverty in addition to its most visible effects, and through finding new ways to 
communicate the urgency of climate change to different constituencies. The contrast is all the 
more striking when compared to Miami’s heavily male-skewed formal power structures such as 
the city and county commissions.  
Through these new modes of talking about climate change, community activism on old 
problems, such as the continued dominance of slum landlords in Overtown and Liberty City, has 
gained new salience in public debates due to some activists’ success in linking housing to  
Miami’s climate discourse. While Miami’s slumlords were once identifiable individuals, they are 
now much more likely to be companies based elsewhere in the country or, increasingly, the 
world. 603 The difficulties encountered in locating the companies investing in Miami housing 
after Hurricane Andrew have multiplied in the interim, showing that the city’s international 
property market is by no means limited to luxury condominiums. Ninety-five per cent of the 
owners of apartment blocks in Overtown are not based in the area. Many in Liberty City and 
Overtown are run by absentee LLCs with names like “World Domination.” Landlords will amass 
liens on their properties for keeping them in such poor condition that residents live with blocked-
up plumbing, leaks, and vermin, but then have them canceled when they sell the property to the 
next owner.604 Struggle for Miami’s Affordable and Sustainable Housing (SMASH), a member 
of the Miami Climate Alliance, aims to connect work to increase affordable housing with climate 
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change adaptation by creating a community land trust for affordable housing in Liberty City.605 
Meanwhile, others have been working on crafting legislative responses to allow municipalities to 
raise Florida’s minimum wage so that low-wage workers can afford rising rents, as well as new 
renter protections. 
Another way activists have drawn attention to the unequal burden of climate change 
borne by the poor is through transportation reform. Unions and transportation activists have 
shown that Miami’s worsening traffic is compounded for low-wage workers who are dependent 
on public transportation to get to work at places like the hotels on Miami Beach. Buses are 
infrequent, routes chaotic, and several transfers are often necessary, sometimes to go just a short 
distance. In addition to suffering from poor air quality as a result of Miami’s famous traffic, 
patrons of public transportation must wait at stops that rarely have shade.606 Public transportation 
is all the more necessary when employers like the Fontainebleau Hotel require workers to pay for 
parking. Unions including the AFL-CIO and Unite Here Local 355, which represents hotel 
workers, have been attempting to link the problem with climate change concerns, and to field a 
new crop of climate activists. For example, one union organizer I spoke to described efforts to 
raise the problem with local and state authorities, as well as to encourage bus drivers to measure 
temperatures on board buses.607  
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5.4 Climate gentrification 
One of the most effective – and widely disputed – means of connecting climate vulnerability to 
the legacy problems associated with redlining has been through discussions of climate change 
gentrification. Neglected areas on Miami’s coastal ridge such as Liberty City and Little Haiti 
have seen increases in speculation from investors looking to develop Special Area Plans and 
other developments. I argue that like resilience, climate change gentrification functions as a 
“lens” that allows the concept to fulfill different functions in the city’s climate change discourse. 
Gunder and fellow Liberty City activist Paulette Richards have said that their community has 
known for years that the area’s high elevation would attract wealthy speculators eventually, just 
as Overtown’s proximity to the downtown area had made it a target for urban renewal.608 
Miami has also attracted researchers investigating whether climate change was driving 
new gentrification. Since 2012, Tulane University professor Jesse Keenan had been studying 
what he believed to be an increased demand for land in places that are relatively protected from 
the impacts of climate change. After hearing anecdotal accounts of rising land prices inland, 
Keenan and his colleagues carried out a study of property values over time in Miami in 2015.609 
They found that residences on the shoreline, in areas such as Miami Beach where some of the 
area’s most expensive homes were built, had decreased in value in relation to those inland on 
higher ground, which remained much cheaper but had gained relative value.610  
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Both assertions – that climate gentrification is a continuation of historic patterns and that 
it is a new national and international-scale phenomenon - appear credible in Miami’s runaway 
housing market. Interviewees regularly cited evidence that they felt backed up the notion that 
living close to the water is losing some of its allure. For example, Jorge Damian de la Paz, who 
researches land use patterns at the University of Miami’s Office of Civic and Community 
Engagement pointed out that homes valued in the millions are increasingly up for sale in 
expensive neighborhoods such as the Venetian Islands, a string of manmade islands that in the 
1930s were awarded an ‘A’ rating from redliners despite their exposure to hurricanes.611 
Meanwhile, higher neighborhoods such as Little Haiti and Liberty City are experiencing an 
onslaught from speculators. Renters face even greater precarity, while homeowners have 
reported receiving phone calls in the early hours of the morning from speculators.  
At the same time, few developers will admit that elevation has been a factor in their 
decisions to target Little Haiti or Liberty City. Most have claimed their interest comes from the 
areas’ proximity to growing hotspots such as Wynwood and the Design District. There is 
certainly evidence that this is true. Wynwood and the Design District have spurred an increase in 
investments by LLCs in neighboring areas for at least four years, according to Hernan Guerrero 
Applewhite, a planner who worked as the City of Miami’s Housing Development Coordinator 
and now has his own consulting firm. Still, he said, he could believe that developers who have 
witnessed sunny day flooding and the inundation after Irma “tacitly, anecdotally, are beginning 
to realize what’s happening.”612 A luxury Miami Beach home broker quoted in the Miami Herald 
said the idea that prices are changing because of sea level rise is “fake news,” citing data that 
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showed the median price of a single family home in Miami had gone up every month for six 
years straight. “I have not talked to one buyer – not one – who said, ‘I’m not buying in Miami 
because of sea level rise,’” she said. “It’s a simple ebb and flow of the real estate market, not the 
ocean.”613 
In at least one case, however, a developer overtly linked their choice of site to rising sea 
levels. The Magic City Innovation District, an 18-acre area in Little Haiti named for the mobile 
home park it displaced, is tailor-made to answer the needs of the “creative class” the city has 
been hoping to attract with initiatives such as a plan to turn Miami into a tech hub.614 Little Haiti 
Commissioner Keon Hardemon last year did away with requirements to force developers to build 
affordable housing on-site, instead negotiating a $35 million package of community benefits.615 
In its application for SAP status, Magic City’s developer highlights the area’s elevation under the 
heading “resilience.” The plan describes other “green” ambitions, such as the preservation of 
mature trees. Architects’ visualizations, circulated in the press, show diverse crowds gathered in 
community spaces influenced by Haitian architecture.616 Further, the application emphasizes 
Magic City’s position on South Florida’s coastal ridge, where city and county planners have 
been encouraging urban infill connected to public transportation. “The Magic City SAP has been 
located and designed with an eye towards sustainability and resilience,” reads a section of the 
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project’s application letter. It adds: “Its location on a high coastal ridge will help to protect the 
Magic City SAP campus area from flooding and potential sea level rise issues.”617 The most 
recent iteration of this call came from the Urban Land Institute in a report commissioned by the 
city, which points out the need for greater development in “naturally resilient” areas such as the 
coastal ridge.618 According to Magic City and the Urban Land Institute, then, resilience does not 
relate to infrastructure or people, but is a feature land can possess alone, removed from the 
context of what or who already exists there. 
 
Figure 8: A page from the Magic City ‘concept book’ showing the planned 
development’s location on the coastal ridge (“Magic City Innovation District Special Area 
Plan Concept Book” (Miami, June 20, 2018), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/384128980/Magic-City-SAP.) 
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Magic City has become emblematic of critiques of climate change gentrification in the 
press and at community meetings where residents spar over whether such development is a 
benefit or a detriment to the area.619 Keenan argued, however, that his definition of climate 
gentrification diverges from that of many local activists. The evidence indicates that the 
gentrification in Little Haiti and Liberty City is “mostly (but maybe not entirely) driven by a 
classic gentrification model that hasn’t historically been driven by climate change”, he said. 620  
Instead, according to his research, climate gentrification may occur across multiple scales: 
neighborhoods, municipalities, regions, and countries, and take into account economic 
opportunities and investment in climate-resilient infrastructure as well as the relative safety from 
climate shocks that Little Haiti offers. Therefore, sea level rise in Miami Dade County may lead 
to climate gentrification in Central Florida, which is more insulated from climate shocks. 
Likewise, sea level rise on the east coast may lead to climate gentrification in Atlanta, which has 
abundant housing and employment opportunities.621  This distinction separates Keenan’s 
formulation of climate gentrification from the green urban removal I have described in previous 
chapters, but maintaining that separation can be difficult in Miami’s narrative landscape. 
Keenan acknowledged that although in theory, “climate gentrification will affect people 
of a lot of different racial or country of origin demographic characteristics throughout the 
country,”622 what advocates have done was important in highlighting that municipalities should 
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not  repeat past mistakes, especially because lower-income communities tend to have less 
political power to oppose projects or negotiate community benefits packages commensurate to 
the size of the development.623 Certainly, the package negotiated by Commissioner Keon 
Hardemon, who represents Wynwood, Overtown, and Little Haiti, is far smaller than the $100 
million well-to-do Bal Harbor negotiated for a $500 million SAP.624 Community activists 
Marleine Bastien – the founder of Family Action Network Movement (FANM) – told local 
journalists that the developers, who had been meeting with FANM and local residents, had 
stopped doing so in the weeks before the City Commission agreed to the development. Bastien 
cited Keenan’s article, arguing that climate change is “inverting what count as desirable and 
undesirable places to live.” Further, Bastien highlighted the way that Miami’s extreme spatial 
stratification had affected the visibility of the most vulnerable to climate change. She argued: 
“There are no pictures on the 6-o’clock news showing the families displaced by climate 
gentrification, even though being priced out of one’s home or business by speculators looking for 
higher ground has more of a permanent impact than, for example, being temporarily displaced by 
a storm.” Bastien’s quote highlights that gentrification is occurring all the time, not just after 
extreme weather. It is also a permanent displacement, not the kind of short-lived climate change 
impact that is more often highlighted in the news. 
Several interviewees said they believe gentrification in Little Haiti may have started out 
as the next step for developers expanding out from Wynwood and the Design District, but that 
they expect interest in high ground to increase. Whichever permutation activists have adopted, 
by linking climate change gentrification to the historical patterns of creating and enforcing 
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environmental segregation that I discuss in earlier chapters, activists like the Miami Climate 
Alliance and FANM have forced Miami officials to attempt to answer the question of what will 
happen to the city’s low-income communities as they face the effects of climate change. This 
focus on Miami’s past forms a counternarrative to the tendency to act as though Miami had no 
real history. Marvin Dunn, a former professor of psychology at Florida International University 
and author of a book on the history of Black Miami, said the city’s penchant for ahistoricity 
“allows people who don’t know that history to come in, build, and destroy what was here.”625 As 
Shumow recounted, Developer narratives about Wynwood for example, have painted the 
neighborhood as industrial dead space, obscuring its history as an immigrant neighborhood. The 
Magic City development, meanwhile, took its name from a mobile home park that was bought 
and its residents evicted, but its developers painted the lot as a wasteground.626 Kilan Bishop, the 
Sea Level Rise Committee’s one female member at the time of Maggie Hernandez’s critique of 
the body, successfully pushed for a resolution to investigate climate gentrification by the city.627 
This makes Miami the first city in the United States to systematically study the effects of climate 
gentrification and formulate potential solutions.  
Climate gentrification allows people who have been focused on one or the other problem 
to consider the two in tandem. As mentioned above, the term – like “resilience” – works like a 
lens to bring into focus connections between factors that might otherwise seem unrelated. For 
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example, gentrification has increased public consciousness of climate change. Kate Stein – a 
former climate reporter for WLRN public radio in Miami who is now the Sustainability & 
Resiliency Officer for the town of Surfside – said that she observed community members, both in 
low-income and better-off communities, looking into climate gentrification “regardless of 
whether they believe climate change is the main driver.  […] So climate change is becoming 
more in the public consciousness because of the gentrification happening.”628 In Little Haiti, 
community leader Leonie Hermantin had noticed that although there is no easy way in Creole to 
talk about climate change, the term had come to stand in for gentrification itself: “You do hear 
about climate change, but people only use it when they want to say, ‘Oh, it’s about climate 
change gentrification,’ and people repeat 'climate change gentrification' even if they don’t know 
about sea level rise.”629 
The concept of climate gentrification also provides activists a means to articulate the 
possibility that without care, adaptation measures could contribute to the gentrification of 
historically neglected neighborhoods. Two activists who formed a social enterprise after Irma to 
fix up damaged homes so their owners would not be forced to leave, have argued that 
gentrification through adaptation is already happening in Little Haiti through the creation of bike 
lanes and traffic mitigation, for example – things that the neighborhood had always needed but 
had not received until developers began to express an interest.630 In this way, the climate 
gentrification argument offers a vehicle for counternarratives that critique the vision of 
“neoliberal nature” that, according to local media studies scholars Moses Shumow and Robert 
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Gutsche, is often found in Miami climate policies.631 This notion, first described by Michael 
Mascarenhas, describes how neoliberal reform created a “colorblind racism” that favored 
“economic liberalism over government intervention.” This predisposition has extended to 
changing environmental paradigms – a “neoliberal nature” that emphasizes the “register of the 
economy” over other components of sustainable development like “environmental sustainability 
and social justice.”632 In the face of reforms that have made pinpointing the culprits of 
environmental injustice harder and harder, the developers targeting Little Haiti, just like 
Crosswinds before them, present an easily identifiable target for criticisms of gentrification with 
“green” promises. By applying the lens of climate gentrification, activists can show that unless 
they specifically address questions of equity, large developments with attractive green 
credentials still stand to deepen Miami’s environmental segregation and add to its ranks of 
displaced people. 
5.5 Communicating in a fractured space 
Miami’s spatial stratification – a state Shumow and Gutsche described as “fragmented urban 
space”633 - and uneven climate impacts have led to important differences in the ways that 
activists and officials attempt to talk to various constituencies about the threats of climate change 
and potential responses to them. Linguistic and cultural differences – and continued segregation 
– have created a fragmented picture of both what climate change means and the favored 
remedies for it, which in turn creates continuing clashes with policy models that focus primarily 
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on sea level rise along the shore. New attempts to communicate about climate change have 
revealed other peculiarities about Miami audiences. Alex Harris, a reporter for the Miami 
Herald, was one of the first local climate reporters in the country. Among her most popular 
articles ever was on the threat sea level rise posed to septic tanks in areas – often in Miami’s 
south and west – that were never connected to the sewer system. 
The climate education-focused CLEO Institute, meanwhile, learned that in order to 
connect with lower-income neighborhoods such as Little Haiti and Liberty City, they would have 
to do things differently than in wealthier areas. Workshops would have to take place in the 
evening, serve culturally appropriate food, and provide childcare so that parents could attend. 
After consulting local residents, CLEO’s director Caroline Lewis found that concerns linked to 
climate change were often specific to the area. Residents in Liberty City, for example, were less 
concerned about sea level rise but, given the vulnerability of the housing stock and the scale of 
displacement from the area, wanted to talk about “emergency management,” “heat and health,” 
“education and why more people who live in their communities did not know about [climate 
impacts],” and “climate gentrification because they were telling us anecdotally that they were 
feeling preyed upon by developers.” These differences make it hard to identify with the 
portrayals of climate change that often appear in the national news, which focus on shorefront 
flooding and its risk to property values. In contrast, lower-lying communities like Shorecrest 
wanted to talk about flooding, not gentrification, and why their streets were not being pumped 
out when Miami Beach’s were.634 Other groups have also focused on hurricanes rather than sea 
level rise in their outreach to communities on higher ground. Catalyst Miami, a social services 
organization, created a program to coordinate community-led hurricane responses to make up for 
 




official delays in reaching certain areas. There, too, gentrification causes concern. At a meeting I 
attended in 2018, one participant expressed worry about how gentrification could make the 
aftermath of hurricanes less safe, as incomers do not know their neighbors and may be more 
likely to call the police on people of color, or could create language differences that may lead 
misunderstandings. 
More concerted attempts at getting communities to talk about the effects of climate 
change have also revealed the limitations of climate education programs that presume that global 
scientific models will be universally appealing. For Gabriela Noa Betancourt - a local union 
organizer working on the intersection of climate and labor - a presenter who spoke largely in 
scientific jargon showed that the voices that dominate the climate debate can be “alienating for 
people who don’t fit the traditional profile of environmentalist.” For the union, transit problems 
and the concept of climate gentrification, illustrated with maps that show the coastal ridge and 
the locations of low-income communities, feel far more “real and imminent.”635 Emily Gorman, 
an organizer for the Sierra Club, described deep divisions within the climate movement itself that 
complicate the building of coalitions. In Magic City, for example, she finds members in 
opposition over their divergent visions for environmentalism. Some picture responses to climate 
change as “green infrastructure” like waterways that help the city deal with flooding, “and that’s 
it”. Others are looking at affordable housing, local food, and social services. Each offer a “very 
different vision for what the future looks like,” leaving activists with the challenge of developing 
a shared vision for “what community should look like.”636 Without common narratives that 
center housing needs – the climate gentrification lens – environmentalists who prioritize 
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questions such as green infrastructure and reducing emissions may see gentrification as a 
separate problem rather than one that environmental policies can exacerbate. 
Officials running workshops to identify potential responses to sea level rise noticed stark 
differences in community concerns and awareness based on their location and income level. 
County resilience officials like Katie Hagemann and Sandra St. Hilaire found, for example, that 
awareness of inland flooding was much less pronounced than flooding along the coast: “People 
don’t know that the flooding is everywhere: western communities are also at risk.” Meanwhile in 
Liberty City and Little Haiti, gentrification “overwhelmed other considerations.”637 The focus on 
coastal flooding might lead some to believe that climate change is “all a coastal wealthy high end 
real estate problem,” a view that might pit “the homeowner against the city or the developers, or 
people concerned about gentrification,” according to Miami’s former chief resilience officer Jane 
Gilbert, who left the role in 2020. Her response was that “this is a challenge that’s facing us all 
and our future depends on how well we work together to make a solution.”638 This focus creates 
a burden of responsibility onto a potential coalition that may never form, however. It also 
suggests that it is more productive to coalesce around a single climate change narrative. But as 
the experience of Hurricane Andrew has shown, a single narrative risks subsuming the voices 
and needs of the least powerful, especially given climate change’s disproportionate impacts on 
those groups. Forging a uniting narrative centered on equity will demand important shifts away 
from the status quo. Efforts to highlight climate change’s unequal impacts on rich and poor had 
been gaining momentum in Miami since the People’s Climate March in 2015. Happening 
worldwide, the marches represented an important change in tone when compared to mainstream 
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climate demonstrations in the past, attempting to create a coalition of activists that put the 
environmental justice, indigenous, and labor movements – “frontline communities” – at the 
center of their message, a marked contrast to dominant climate discourse that had centered 
whiter, wealthier environmentalists’ and scientists’ appeals to ideals of pristine nature and 
charismatic animals like the polar bear.639 The Miami Climate Alliance, formed to organize the 
march, now contains over 100 organizations and many more affiliates, from Power U to the 
League of Women's Voters, from  Catalyst Miami to the Friends of the Everglades and Sierra 
Club. Its focus is “equity and resilience […] increasing understanding of climate change as a 
threat to all forms of justice.”640 This narrative frame creates common ground for groups with 
very different priorities. 
After the march, the group began to put pressure on all levels of Miami’s government to 
factor equity concerns into their resilience planning. Although at least one county official had 
noted that the effects of the urban building boom had included gentrification and the need for a 
complete redesign of the downtown Miami water infrastructure, “social justice and vulnerability” 
remained a “sparsely addressed topic within climate-change adaptation planning contexts” other 
than task force recommendations for affordable housing.641 When in 2016, the county’s yearly 
budget did not include line items to help low-income communities, Caroline Lewis, director of 
the CLEO Institute, wrote to county commissioners to air her frustration. According to one 
article, Murley responded that the budget would address “some of her concerns” through new 
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personnel to deal with flooding events and $800,000 for consultants to research “sea-level rise in 
poor and rich communities alike.”642  
More recently, resilience policymaking appears to have shifted, at least in terms of 
language. Robin Bachin, a history professor at University of Miami and head of the public 
outreach-focused Office of Civic and Community Engagement, argued that activism centered on 
the climate concerns of the area’s poorest may be changing politicians’ policymaking focus, 
which has historically been on catering toward future residents, to also consider its low-income 
residents, many of whom work in the service industries that form the backbone of Miami’s 
economy.643 After Alliance members conducted letter-writing and other campaigns, the 2018 
county budget contained more line items focused on the most vulnerable, including research into 
access to social services.644 In 2017, the Miami Forever Bond, Regalado’s legacy policy, 
contains “equity” as one of its key “guiding themes,” alongside “economic return” and 
modernization.”645 And in 2018, its first declared list of spending priorities included $100 
million toward affordable housing. Miami Beach’s “resilient” strategic plan also lists poverty 
and the lack of affordable housing as “stresses” to address.646 When one housing activist I spoke 
to was recruited to the Alliance’s steering committee, he decided to focus on housing as a 
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climate change problem, bringing the resilience and climate gentrification lenses together. He 
said:  
Now the Miami Climate Alliance understands the concept of climate gentrification and is 
100% against it. […] That’s really been what the focus of our organization has been in 
our organizing has been, just getting people to understand what climate gentrification is. 
[We need to get] solutions in place that give these frontline communities the resilience 
that they need […] through affordable housing in areas that are particularly susceptible to 
this kind of speculation. And so now when we’re having a resilience conversation at the 
city and county level, that includes the production of affordable housing that previously 
wasn’t happening before. Before, it was mostly all about adaptation, stormwater 
management […] which are all very important, but they were missing a huge component, 
which was where are people going to live if all of this infrastructure is in place? Because 
right now it’s looking like they’re not gonna be able to live anywhere.647 
 
By adopting the intersection of the resilience and climate gentrification lenses as a platform, 
SMASH can intercede in the broadest possible conversation, challenging the tendency to avoid 
the history of race and class discrimination in both housing and environmental policies. At least 
in planning sessions so far, resilience representatives are attempting to account for that history. 
Murley, for example, chose affordable transit-oriented development as his team’s focus at a 
workshop run by Columbia University’s architecture department and local planners and 
architects.648 
While Miami’s climate activists have successfully fought to force local governments to 
consider the needs of low-income communities in resilience rhetoric, old practices and narratives 
– such as the tendency to rubberstamp developments and avoid community input – are harder to 
change. Zelalem Adefris, Catalyst Miami’s climate lead, explained that while the Miami Forever 
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Bond included “equity” as a guiding principle for policymaking, encouraging community 
participation is a much harder task. The city announced its bond spending priorities in 2018 
without community consultation, for example. Catalyst successfully lobbied to have “community 
leadership” included as an acceptable qualification for membership on a citizen’s oversight board 
for the bond, which had previously required a degree and therefore severely limited who could 
join. But most of the other city committees are dominated by white men.649 Without sufficient 
oversight, some interviewees have worried, the needs of poor communities will go unaddressed. 
These could include increasing shade through tree cover, access to air conditioning, or the 
problem of rising seawater seeping through septic tanks. 
Beyond a focus on unity, resilience officials have also spoken about how they plan to 
prioritize adaptation projects in equitable ways. Doing so is a challenge, given the historic lack 
of investment in the infrastructure of lower-income communities of color. Alan Dodd, head of 
the city’s Department of Resilience and Public Works, said that as the city decides its budget, it 
is working to “make sure that we’re allocating all the money towards the entire city by districts 
and not just by the people who pay the most taxes.” In working on the city’s stormwater 
management, for example, they aim to focus on the areas where flooding is most severe. 
“Typically,” he said, “that will be in some of the more impoverished neighborhoods, and that’s 
the way it should be. You take care of the worst first.”650 The first tranche of the Miami Forever 
Bond also allocated money toward the worst-maintained roads in the city in order to improve 
neighborhood infrastructure, although work is not yet underway.  
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Further complicating matters for policymakers, resilience programs and infrastructure 
improvements cannot protect residents from displacement. Tacit practices skew the political 
process in favor of pushing through large developments like Magic City, several interviewees 
noted. City Commission members tend not to “mess” with each other’s projects, for example, so 
that they will not encounter retributive opposition when they want to do something in their own 
district. Others suggested that Miami governments still hope to limit community involvement 
due to the potential extra expenditures it may entail for unforeseen considerations. State level 
interventions can also limit the possibilities for action that would help to alleviate problems like 
income inequality or the kind of environmentalism prioritizes the needs of those on the lowest 
incomes.  
For example, the State Supreme Court recently struck down an attempt by Miami Beach 
to set a higher minimum wage.651  Union representatives campaigning for less precarious 
conditions for minimum-wage workers and renters have found their task in Tallahassee vastly 
more difficult than in Miami-Dade. Ron DeSantis, the Republican who replaced Rick Scott as 
governor in 2018, has voiced a greater commitment to environmental concerns, appointing the 
state’s first resiliency officer, but has also packed the state Supreme Court with judges who have 
since rejected attempts to loosen preemption on matters ranging from municipality control of 
minimum wage laws to a state ban on municipal attempts to cut plastic waste.652 This 
conservative framework creates an important tension with mayoral rhetoric focused on 
independent action. 
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This government intervention to shape market conditions, meant that gentrification 
pressures followed a “hot” housing market with a vengeance. Interviewees often emphasized the 
strength of market forces and expressed little faith that government intervention could slow 
gentrification trends. When I asked Murley whether he felt building affordable housing in transit-
oriented developments might help alleviate the pressures of gentrification, for example, he 
responded that he had “never in 40 years of working seen any regulation or government program 
being in a dominant position in steering the market. The key is private property, and if you’re not 
in the system, the market is very, very tough,” with demand coming from foreign, domestic, and 
local buyers.653 Some activists see relocation as inevitable. Their focus has become on ensuring 
that it happens in a way that does not lead to dislocation, displacement, and homelessness. Some 
have focused on campaigning for community benefits from developers, while others are focusing 
on demands such as green jobs, affordable housing in safe buildings, and green infrastructure 
that connects diverse communities rather than separating them.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Climate gentrification has helped to create new, historically-informed understandings of climate 
change that at least tacitly acknowledge the area’s history of segregation and force more officials 
to contend with the environmental fragmentation it has created in communication and 
engagement strategies as well as policymaking. It is too soon to tell  how successful activists and 
policymakers have been at bringing this understanding to the mainstream of climate 
policymaking, but changing outcomes as well as rhetoric will prove an uphill battle in the face of 
the practices that have deep roots in the Miami Way.  
 




6. Conclusion: Life at the Limits 
When I arrived in Miami, I was fascinated by the way that climate change had come to mean 
very different things to people depending upon where they lived, their experience of government, 
and the environmental conditions they experienced. Climate gentrification had become a term 
that referred to current patterns of gentrification and displacement, but also to a much longer 
history of segregation. I wanted to know the extent to which these patterns related to 
environmental policies. It was and is a local story that is part of a global trend.  
Critical climate change scholars have compellingly documented the way that 
environmental segregation is developing in more and more cities around the world,654 leading to 
displacements in the name of environmental best practice.655 Historians have shown both how 
environmental policies have displaced people from land that became national parks, including 
the Everglades,656 and how urban renewal was in fact a policy of urban removal.657 Less work, 
however, has been done to explore the connections between these movements. In this 
dissertation, I investigate the narratives of policymakers and activists to show how policies 
designed to displace and exploit Miami’s Black population intertwine with ideologies 
encompassing race, the environment, and capitalism. The narratives that stemmed from these 
starting points connect colonial projects such as the creation of Miami’s botanical gardens with 
its New Deal-era plan to relocate Black residents to tropical subsistence farms. They are visible 
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in the creation and maintenance of environmental segregation, which has endured since the city 
was founded. They can be found in Miami-Dade’s responses to Hurricane Andrew and to the 
effects of climate change, or the colonialist rhetoric of developers over the decades. They form 
the discursive infrastructure that helps to shape how Miami policymakers conceive of what 
climate change represents and what to do about it.  
This investigation of the narratives, infrastructures and spatial policies that underlie 
Miami’s environmental conversations shows that while the city is often portrayed as an anomaly 
– unusually environmentally vulnerable, corrupt, and generally odd – it is in fact an ideal place to 
explore the intersection of local, national, and international political currents. Miami was 
involved in the circulation of colonial environmental knowledge and segregationist policies. It 
has been shaped not just by local boosters, but by Tallahassee’s pro-growth policies, from the 
income tax ban of the 1920s to the Bush-era minimum wage restrictions and today’s ban on 
plastic bag legislation. Miami has also been part of global climate discussions since the 1990s, 
aiming to be at the forefront despite a climate a budget in the millions, not the billions.  
Through this study of the strategies different actors have brought to the discussions about 
race, space, the environment, and climate change, I show that the term “climate change” cannot 
be assumed to have universal meaning, and climate action cannot be viewed as an unalloyed 
good. As Miami’s history shows, within current regulatory, political, and ideological 
frameworks, environmental policies are more likely to deepen unjust practices like 
environmental segregation than to challenge them. At the same time, the case of Miami shows 
that counternarratives that force at least partial acknowledgement of the city’s history of 
displacement have been successful in ensuring that problems like affordable housing, which are 
not always associated with environmental policies, have made it onto the agenda. As the effects 
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of climate change accelerate, the question becomes whether these advances can translate to a 
more just understanding of retreat.  
I set out to investigate the discursive infrastructure that scaffolds understandings of 
climate change in Miami and show how, in turn, the narratives that compose it have created or 
denied space, both rhetorical and physical, for action on environmental concerns and social 
justice. I wanted to learn: What does climate change mean in Miami? What does action on 
climate change entail, and who benefits from that understanding? I found that planners and 
politicians have used beliefs about Miami’s environment – and the environment itself – to justify 
and naturalize segregation. The environmental segregation that emerged from these policies 
continues today, enabled in part by narrow conceptualizations of climate action. But by 
understanding climate change as one result of the exploitation of humans and nature, the city’s 
history is reconfigured. Miami’s tradition of exploitation has become an important campaign 
touchstone for a growing coalition of activists advocating simultaneously for environmental and 
social justice, especially in the area of housing. Policymakers are faced with a choice: They can 
begin the process of addressing environmental apartheid, or they can deepen the unequal division 
of environmental quality and accelerate decades-long patterns of displacement in the name of 
preserving economic growth. 
6.1 Summary 
Using archival research and 88 hourlong interviews, I traced how Miami’s attitudes toward 
climate change have historically be suffused with colonial ideologies about race and the 
environment, coupled with adherence to a growth machine model dependent on low-wage labor. 
I examined how different actors strategically positioned themselves within, and eventually 
outside, this discursive infrastructure. I concentrated on collecting data centered on political 
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responses to several moments of social and environmental crisis in Miami, and connected each to 
larger patterns. Each juncture led to the displacement of low-income, mostly Black, communities 
due to a combination of “market forces,” legislation, and direct intervention from politicians and 
planners: the hurricane of 1926 followed by the Great Depression and the New Deal; the 
destruction of Overtown to make way for the I-95 and I-395 expressways and the Miami riots of 
the 1960s and 80s; and Hurricane Andrew and its uneven recovery. In the final two chapters, I 
move to examine the slow disasters of climate change and climate gentrification in the context of 
the 2008 recession and Hurricane Irma in 2017. 
The materials I used for each event show how narratives connecting racist beliefs, 
colonialist attitudes, environmentalist ideologies, and arguments about growth, displacement, 
and land use became less overt while still retaining many of the assumptions of the early texts, 
debates, and land use plans. As political responses to climate change became ever narrower, they 
retained the older narrative infrastructure, helping to ensure their effects have been the same: the 
pursuit of idealized new residents at the expense of the displacement and segregation of low-
income people. Environmental policies have been integral to these strategies. In each instance I 
examined, I showed how these layers of governance interacted as the actors changed, connecting 
the paternalistic strategies of New Deal administrators and the Anglo business elite with the 
color- and class-blind growth strategies that followed neoliberal reform and the installation of a 
new, Cuban-dominated business and political elite. 
In the first case, I established the use of environmentalist policies in the service of 
economic growth based on segregation in Miami and illustrate how it connected with global 
colonial discourse about race and the environment. I show how New Deal economic policies, 
redlining, and colonial racial and environmental ideologies came together in the ambitions of 
271 
 
Miami’s business and planning communities, especially in the work of George Merrick, the 
founder of Coral Gables. Merrick realized planners and business leaders’ hopes of removing the 
entire population of “Colored Town” – later called Overtown – to the city’s periphery in order to 
grow the downtown area. From that early point in the city’s history, Miami’s growth rested on a 
combination of exploitation and environmental destruction. These two strands came together in 
the confined places designated “Black.” The unsanitary and dangerous conditions they endured 
functioned to produce enormous profits to both Black and white landlords, while also serving as 
a logic for future removals of Black people. 
  Merrick shared the enthusiasm of his counterparts in business, development, and 
planning for the “Miami Way” – a combination of boosting Miami’s unique attractions as a 
destination for tourism and development with the New South’s rigid segregation and reliance on 
the low-wage work provided by Black laborers. Merrick blended this ethos with the racial and 
environmental ideologies of John Bright, whose plan for Coconut Grove envisioned the 
wholesale removal of the Grove’s “Colored Town,” and naturalist John C. Gifford’s enthusiasm 
for tropical ecosystems and subsistence farming as a way to maintain racial harmony and prevent 
the “rise of color.” When Merrick planned to remove the residents of Overtown to subsistence 
communities on the outskirts of Dade, he promised Black workers, presumed content in their 
“natural” tropical setting, the ability to overcome the inconvenience of distance with “exclusive” 
public transportation. While most Merrick’s ideas were never enacted, Merrick was not alone in 
deploying Miami’s ecology to create, maintain, and naturalize racial segregation. “Natural” 
boundaries such as parks and waterways formed the boundaries of racialized communities in the 
same way that roads, railway lines, and walls did.  
272 
 
In chapter two, I establish another layer essential to understanding the development of 
Miami and the environmental attitudes that have grown with it: the maintenance of racial 
boundaries through environmental segregation. I explore more deeply how landlords profited 
from the denial of infrastructure, eco-health, and environmental amenities to Black 
neighborhoods. Planners advocating for the construction of the expressway system through 
Overtown then used the health and environmental disasters that resulted from such profitable 
neglect as justification for the displacement of thousands of people from the economic and 
cultural heart of Miami’s Black community. Dade County’s new Housing Authority echoed 
these misleading characterizations as they encouraged Overtown residents to move to new public 
housing developments in the northeast of the city, where the first of these – Liberty Square – was 
built. Echoing Merrick’s vision of better, albeit more distant housing for Black residents, the 
Housing Authority argued that public housing on Miami’s peripheries offered low-income 
people an improved environment that, in turn, would foster racial harmony and ensure its 
residents were productive, grateful members of society. This rhetoric belay the reality for most of 
those relocated to Liberty City, the area that grew up quickly around Liberty Square as 
developers moved to cash in on a new opportunity to extract high rents with no obligation from 
the city or county to provide infrastructure or open space. Miami’s Black housing model simply 
reproduced slum conditions in Liberty City and the growing area around it where Black families 
settled into areas whites were vacating for the suburbs. Cleanup initiatives worked to place the 
blame on residents – not the government – for poor environmental conditions, while erasing 
Black areas from their publicity efforts and framing them in terms of slum clearance. 
Environmental segregation, therefore, functioned in several ways: to isolate Black 
communities, to increase slumlords’ profits, and to stigmatize Black communities while 
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providing justification for slum clearance and displacement. The concept of segregation was 
evoked to resist further discrimination and displacement in the name of environmental policies, 
too. Metrorail, a new heavy-gauge rail system, was conceived as a response to rapid 
suburbanization and traffic congestion, and was intended to reduce oil consumption and the 
march into the Everglades. Funded in the wake of the uprising of 1980, the system was designed 
around the needs of suburban city workers while cannibalizing funding for the county bus 
system, which served a mostly Black and Latino population. The construction of new train lines 
and stations would also once again displace Overtown residents. Transportation union workers 
and bus customers staged protests calling Miami an apartheid city with a two-tier transportation 
system, eventually reversing some of the county’s attempts to erode bus service and the status of 
its drivers. Activists reprised the theme of apartheid when local Cuban politicians refused to 
welcome Nelson Mandela to Miami in 1992, staging a three-year boycott of Miami conference 
facilities thereby threatening a major source of income. When Anglo business leaders came to 
the table to negotiate with Black protesters, however, the Miami Way limited the imagination of 
potential recourse to business training, promised support for Black businesses, and hotel industry 
scholarships. 
In chapter three, I use Hurricane Andrew, which struck Miami in 1992, to examine how a 
potential opportunity to address hyperdevelopment, segregation, unequal access to political 
decisionmaking, and increasing environmental vulnerabilities became a response focusing on 
improved building codes and business-focused recovery. I demonstrate how a wide variety of 
expert voices collectively shifted attention from the environmental destruction caused by sprawl 
to corrupt developers and poorly enforced building codes, all while obscuring the experiences of 
Miami’s poorest communities. Instead of seizing the chance to rebuild a more equitable city, the 
274 
 
response to Andrew accelerated white flight, concentrated poverty in Black and Latino parts of 
South Miami, and inaugurate a building boom that far outstripped even the runaway 
development that had occurred before the storm. While paternalistic responses were still 
apparent in the activities of the “Non-Group” as manifested through We Will Rebuild’s 
initiatives, the aim had shifted almost entirely to promoting business recovery, leaving housing 
“to the market” except in cases where rebuilding was being used in an attempt to attract 
wealthier new residents. 
The local and national growth consensus, clearly illustrated in President Clinton’s claim 
that growth could continue while emissions reduced, interacted with norms about experts’ roles 
in public discourse and shaped the narratives about the root causes of the destruction wrought by 
Andrew. While the National Weather Service had criticized growing development along 
America’s coastlines, for example, the National Hurricane Center chose to limit its advice to the 
construction of individual homes and subdivisions rather than comment broader patterns. 
Investigations by the Miami Herald and the Miami-Dade County Grand Jury shed light on 
corruption in the development industry, but the Herald balanced this criticism with its traditional 
role as a local booster, while the Grand Jury’s criticisms were tempered by its insistence on 
placing partial culpability on individuals for not demanding better housing. This focus on the 
building industry led to a satisfying narrative conclusion without raising questions about 
systemic problems such as segregation’s continuing effect on environmental conditions or the 
costs of overdevelopment.  
In chapter four, I contrast an even narrower vision of climate change action – Mayor 
Manny Diaz’s plans to turn Miami into a green, international engine of commerce – with the rise 
of an environmental justice movement focused on bringing attention to Miami’s continuing 
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patterns of displacement and environmental segregation. From 2001, when construction was 
booming, to 2008, when the global recession was hitting Miami hard, Diaz aimed to elevate 
Miami to the status of “global city” alongside places like Michael Bloomberg’s New York. Diaz 
connected his climate plan, which ignored sea level rise but focused on promoting density in 
Miami’s urban core, with initiatives to bring new wealth into the city through an explosion of 
condominium construction and overtures to artists and other members of the “creative class” to 
work and live in Wynwood, formerly a working-class Puerto Rican neighborhood. In this way, 
Diaz hitched his ambitions to turn Miami into a leading city actor on climate change to the old 
Miami project of gearing public policy toward newcomers.  
As news emerged that the city and county had created a crisis in public housing through 
tactics like shuttering units, local grassroots activists were galvanized to greater and more public 
actions that linked local gentrification and the neglect of low-income residents to the wider 
forces of globalization and imperialism. This framing fed into a broader national movement, the 
Right to the City coalition. In Miami, these work also encouraged “traditional,” predominantly 
white environmentalists to connect their primary focus – the destruction of South Florida’s 
environment outside the city – with gentrification, challenging their longtime acceptance of 
“environmental” policies that sped up the displacement of low-income residents. Both Diaz and 
Power U’s positions placed nature within the city as well as outside it, but while Diaz saw the 
greening of Miami as a strategy to attract new, “desirable” residents, Power U sought to serve 
those who already lived there.  
In more recent years, Miami’s racial, spatial, and environmental fragmentation have been 
expressed through different groups’ understandings of climate change. Communities living by 
the shoreline are most concerned about sea level rise, whereas for some residents in higher-lying 
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areas, climate change has become synonymous with gentrification and low-income 
neighborhoods’ greater vulnerability to hurricanes. Through interviews with individuals involved 
in discussions about climate change, I use chapter five to examine how narrative devices such as 
the “Miami Way” and the perspective of those left behind by development intersect with ideas 
about what climate change is and what to do about it. I explore the importance of the twin lenses 
of “resilience” and “climate gentrification” in the debates that have emerged from activists’ 
demands to consider historic discrimination when policies are being considered. Both resilience 
and climate gentrification are flexible terms that have come to accommodate multiple meanings 
while remaining influential on policymaking.  
The collision of these lenses with long-running narratives have created multiple 
conversations about climate change. The developers of Magic City – a billion-dollar residential 
shopping, technology, and culture “campus” – have touted the development’s “resilient” 
credentials in its pitches to the city, citing its relatively high elevation and plans for energy 
efficient buildings and on-site open space. Local critics, meanwhile, have promoted the theory 
that developers are pursuing a strategy of climate gentrification as they eye previously neglected 
land on high ground. The place of history has become important in many of these narratives, as 
when white business leaders cite the drainage of the Everglades and creation of a habitable island 
on Miami Beach as evidence that the area will find ingenious means to continue to thrive and 
grow even as the waters rise. According to this formulation, underpinned in law and policy, 
continuing to build in this fragile place is not counterintuitive, as it provides tax funds for 
adaptation while ensuring a continued flow of affluent new residents.  
This contemporary reprise of the Miami Way tends to ignore the low-wage labor needed 
to produce continued growth and the increasing difficulties those workers face in living and 
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getting around Miami-Dade County. Climate policies focused on preserving Miami’s economic 
engine have only rarely addressed the need for its workers to stay afloat, too. A growing group of 
environmental and social justice activists has intervened in the climate conversation with a 
counternarrative that connects past and current climate and housing policies with the 
displacement that continues due to high rents, weak tenant protections, and a minuscule 
minimum wage. Organized under the Miami Climate Alliance, environmentalists' demands for 
action on sea level rise are explicitly connected to the work of housing and labor advocates, and 
as a result, local policymakers have begun to include provisions such as affordable housing into 
climate plans such as the city’s Miami Forever Bond and Miami Beach’s Action Plan. Climate 
gentrification has become an important focus for these demands, despite disagreements over 
whether it is really happening or happening in the way that some activists have claimed. 
Policymakers have attempted to accommodate both narratives in their responses, encouraging 
development while noting the importance of affordable housing. 
As urban centers increasingly recognize the current “climate crisis,” the City of Miami’s 
has promised to address carbon emissions in its climate plan and shown new interest in the 
possibilities for “green” infrastructure to complement and in some cases replace the “gray” 
responses like sea walls and pumps favored by politicians just a few years earlier. These 
broadener reckonings with Miami’s interlocking problems have produced some original attempts 
to understand the relationships between humans and nature. Miami Beach’s dune plan and 
attempts to balance the rights of different species as it hopes to increase mangrove cover along 
the shore serve as compelling examples and are discussed in detail below. More frequently, 
however, the wrangling of nature into the framework of “ecosystem services” folds these policies 
into an overarching concept of “neoliberal nature,” an understanding of sustainability that sheds 
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the need to consider questions such as social justice and the importance of alternative forms of 
knowledge in favor of an idealized form of consumption decoupled from environmental impacts. 
Without steps to fully address how the disasters of segregation, sea level rise, and environmental 
vulnerability interconnect and amplify one another, belated changes in attitudes toward nature 
still have the potential to accelerate gentrification, increasing the population of displacees 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The question remains: Miami for whom?  
6.2 Life at the Limits 
Whizzing through Miami Beach on an electric trolley, I had joined a group of policymakers and 
academics from all over the country to inspect the city’s new “green” sea level rise 
infrastructure. “When we plant mangroves, we have to consider that this leaves less space for 
seagrass, which is important for turtles and manatees,” a city resilience worker told me.658 In the 
years since Philip Levine had implemented his accelerated concrete-only plan to deal with sea 
level rise, Miami Beach officials had changed tack in significant ways. In some cases, they were 
reassessing how best to engage with a predominantly wealthy and highly vocal population on 
adaptation plans such as raising roads. Just as interesting, city officials were examining ways to 
use natural features such as mangroves to protect their area from flooding and storm surge. The 
model, crudely put, of installing pumps to protect development and property values, which in 
turn generate the revenue to pay for more pumps, is becoming increasingly hard to defend. 
Before I turn to my final conclusions, I will examine several examples in which different groups 
are experimenting with new understandings of climate change and climate action in Miami, as 
well as the power relations they entail. 
 
658 Resilience worker in discussion with the author, February 13, 2019. 
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After coming to work for the city, the resilience worker drafted a pathbreaking plan for 
the management of Miami Beach’s sand dune, and now works to protect the city’s natural 
resources. The Army Corps of Engineers created the dune in the late 1970s to create a buffer 
between the city and the Atlantic Ocean, and to lower the burden of beach renourishment.659 
Eventually, the dune became a self-sustaining system, anchored by sea grapes and other plants, 
and home to its own feral cat colony and population of cat feeders. Her job was to create 
legislation that balanced city needs and tastes with the health of the dune system. For example, 
while sea grapes tend to grow tall, thus creating an extra barrier against the sea, the city police 
were concerned about homeless people taking shelter in the thicket and crimes being committed 
in the relative seclusion they afforded. Thus, the plants are trimmed short. Similarly, cat feeding 
is limited to designated plastic feeding stations disguised as logs. She is also tasked with 
considering how to balance the needs of different species as the city attempts to increase its 
green infrastructure.  
Enthusiasm for creating or preserving green infrastructure has come from the 
understanding that landscapes contain their own protections against extreme weather. 
Mangroves, considered useless for much of Miami’s history, clean water and reduce storm surge, 
protecting the land that lies behind them. Coral and oysters protect coastlines, too, and unlike 
human-made structures like sea walls, they grow taller as sea levels increase. “Blue” 
infrastructure has also become a common topic at conferences and workshops. Increasing the 
number of waterways offers the possibility of “living with” water, rather than creating expensive 
technologies that remove it from the land’s surface. A “green and blue” combination ideally 
 
659 “Strategic Beach Management Plan: Southeast Atlantic Coast Region” (Division of Water Resource 




creates a more permeable land surface in which flooding occurs but is less disruptive of daily life 
than in a cityscape dominated by dry streets. 
Miami Beach officials have found that “green and blue” infrastructure is in many cases 
more popular with residents than gray measures alone, while the idea of plants and animals 
growing to accommodate rising seas could save money over the long term. Additionally, 
resilience professionals know that pumps are only effective for as long as they are still above 
water, and several of those installed under Levine have already been overwhelmed in recent 
years due to power outages during storms. The short-termism of many of Miami’s climate plans 
may become increasingly obvious as sea level rise continues to speed up.660 This accelerating 
rise has forced officials to, at least partially, think about what Miami Beach might look like over 
a longer period, and nearby communities have been watching their rich neighbor’s experiments 
closely. County officials, for example, have been experimenting with workshops that barely 
mention pumps, to encourage residents to entertain alternative measures in the places where the 
tax base is not as high. After all, many of those who work for the Beach’s tourism industry can 
only afford to live there if they share apartments. 
 
660 John Boon et al., “Anthropocene Sea Level Change: A History of Recent Trends Observed in the U.S. East, Gulf, 
and West Coast Regions,” Special Report in Applied Marine Science and Ocean Engineering (Virginia Institute of 





Figure 9: Slide from an Urban Land Institute presentation encouraging Miami Beach 
to adopt a blue-green infrastructure approach (Nicole Martinez, “Living with Rising Sea 
Levels: Miami Beach’s Plans for Resilience” (Urban Land Institute, May 23, 2018).) 
 
Some local advocates have been campaigning for green and blue infrastructure that might 
help to alleviate some of the social and political isolation environmental segregation has created. 
Take El Portal, a leafy village on the coastal ridge surrounded by low-income communities north 
of Little Haiti. There, community members have pushed for green infrastructure that would help 
connect neighborhoods separated by Little River and the Florida East Coast Railway, and for 
better public transportation to serve residents. Unfortunately, this example appears to be more 
exception than the rule. Beyond vague assertions that a greener city will be more pleasant for 
everyone, discussions of affordable housing appear to have remained relatively separate from 
those on blue-green infrastructure. 
One important example illustrates how green and blue infrastructure alone cannot remedy 
imbalances of power. Everglades restoration projects have become an important part of South 
Florida’s sea level rise strategy. Restoring freshwater flows out to sea may help to keep out 
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saltwater, which threatens the Biscayne aquifer and fragile soil with salinization. The Army 
Corps of Engineers’ strategy has been to keep Everglades water levels as high as possible year-
round, an effort that runs against the wishes of the Miccosukee who live in the Everglades. 
Houston Cypress, the artist and activist, explained that the tribe had argued against the policy 
because the natural raising and lowering of water levels with the seasons is essential for plant 
and animal species to reproduce. Miccosukee representatives had only just begun to adopt the 
term “climate change” because it helped them to advocate for their positions in debates over 
Everglades policy, which occur between a wide array of interests including the Army Corps, 
farmers, environmentalists, and scientists. Cypress described the devaluation of traditional 
knowledge in this arena meant Miccosukee expertise was often ignored or plagiarized by other 
groups. That year, however, the Miccosukee were proven prescient when water levels had gotten 
lower than they had in decades and bird numbers blossomed.661 
Looking to the future, many of Miami’s municipalities – such as the City of Miami, 
Miami Beach, and Coral Gables – have bowed to pressure from activists and declared a “climate 
emergency.”662 The city, too, has announced that it plans to reduce its carbon emissions to “net 
zero” by 2050, joining C40 Cities, an international climate organization that helps cities to 
reduce their carbon emissions. Quoted in the Herald, Mayor Francis Suarez said, “[I]f we really 
want to be here forever we can’t just react to what mother nature is doing. We have to do 
everything in our power not to make matters worse, but to make matters better.”663 Herald 
 
661 Cypress in discussion with the author. 
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climate reporter Alex Harris noted that in a large, car-centric city, the path to achieving that goal 
is far from clear. Some of the people I spoke to were concerned that not just policymakers, but 
activists and scientists, were not talking about Miami’s inevitable inundation. Even if global 
emissions reduce dramatically, Miami’s freshwater supply is at severe risk of being 
contaminated by seawater well before the worst flooding happens. Further, even areas on high 
ground will not be particularly habitable if they can’t be reached, or if their utilities are cut off by 
the water.  
Greg Bloom, a community organizer, described his dismay that few groups are willing to 
discuss the idea of retreat from the shoreline at all. “The paradigm of resilience is very 
conservative,” the activist said. “Let’s just talk about keeping water off the streets; let’s be sure 
to give everyone the information they need to retrofit their own house or whatever.” Imagining a 
situation in which such measures are useless, one where no amount of personal responsibility 
will resolve nature’s incursion into century-old infrastructures, can be unbearable. He continued: 
“So, when I start saying things like, ‘What about mental healthcare for everyone? What about 
grief counseling for people who go through the process of dealing with the future death of their 
community?,’ their eyes glaze over, because it’s traumatic.”664 Laurencia Strauss, a local artist, 
argued that Miamians are already moving through the stages of grief, but that most are in a stage 
of denial. “We are living with a terminal diagnosis,” she said. “But instead of dealing with that 
loss head on and organizing around that for adaptive actions such as managed retreat, we are 
mostly doing everything we can to prolong the way of life here as we have known it to be, 
buying time and bargaining for the idea that life here can stay the same as it has been.”665 
 
664 Greg Bloom, in conversation with the author, 2019 
 
665 Laurencia Strauss in discussion with the author, 2019. 
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Beyond Shorecrest, one tiny enclave that is experiencing worse than usual shoreline 
flooding, mainstream talk of retreat is postponed indefinitely to the future. Those who can afford 
to move from areas like Liberty City and Little Haiti to Homestead, Florida City, and other parts 
of South Dade face less-publicized risks, including septic tanks threatened by flooding, or salt 
contamination of freshwater wells. Under these circumstances, it is too early to tell who might 
stand to benefit from recent acknowledgements by Miami’s governments that climate change 
cannot be tackled by narrowing its problems and solutions to those most compatible with 
politicians’ and developers’ priorities. The displacement has already started for the most 
vulnerable, even if the direct reasons for it are older and less dramatic than the one sees in artists’ 
renderings of Miami Beach underwater. As we consider who will get to stay to see Miami’s 
hoped-for transformation into a green and blue city, the answers may be rooted in Miami’s 
lifetime as a segregated city. A study begun by academics investigating the neighborhoods in 
which house prices recovered after the 2008 recession suggested that the biggest factor in 
recovery was the number of white people, even though, as one of the authors said, “there are 
hardly any of us left in Miami.” Whiteness acts as an anchor in turbulent times. The assets it 
confers give choices about whether to stay or leave. 
It feels like another injustice to consider that just as Miami residents have begun to gain 
traction in forcing a reckoning with histories of green urban removal, they are facing even 
greater turbulence due to the effects of climate change. Already, engineers and businesses have 
begun to treat the city as a canvas for exclusive floating settlements and other expensive 
arrangements for a new wave of colonists.666 The activist tools that Miamians have developed, 
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however, are becoming even more essential to imagining a future in which there is space for 
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